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SUMMARY 
 
 
This PhD dissertation is a collection of four essays focusing on the demand and supply of 
small business finance in Kenya. The studies are the result of primary research conducted over 
three years with both demand-side players, more specifically micro and small-scale 
entrepreneurs operating in a low-income area in Nairobi. And the main suppliers of small 
businesses finance in Kenya - commercial banks - which provided data on the size, characteristics 
and evolution of their SME finance portfolio between 2009 and 2013. Since commercial banks 
are not the only players in the provision of finance to small firms, the dissertation studies the 
entire financial landscape of both formal and informal financial providers, including institutions 
such as microfinance institutions, savings groups and moneylenders among others.   
The dissertation is divided in two parts: the first half of the dissertation analyses the 
determinants, effects and challenges of access to formal and informal finance by small 
enterprises in Nairobi (Essays 1 and 2). These two essays use primary data collected through a 
survey questionnaire with 344 micro and small enterprises in a low income neighbourhood in 
Nairobi. The analysis describes the financial landscapes in which businesses operate and the 
effects of access to credit on firm performance (e.g. investments, profitability and employment 
growth.). The second half of the dissertation analyses the supply-side, more specifically the 
relation between formal financial sector development and economic growth (Essay 3) and the 
characteristics and development of bank financing to SMEs (small and medium enterprises) in 
Kenya (Essay 4). Essay 3 relies on secondary time-series data taken from the World Bank 
databases, whereas Essay 4 uses original survey data administered to commercial banks in Kenya 
in two survey rounds in 2012 and 2014. 
Each essay in this dissertation is a standalone study with its own literature survey, 
research questions, data and methodological approach. The main findings of the demand-side 
chapters is that informality has significant effects on access (or exclusion) to bank finance, but is 
less relevant when we investigate informal financial instruments such as self-help groups and 
family/friend loans. Essay 2 of the dissertation shows that different types of loans have different 
effects on the performance of businesses, and that loans from commercial banks seem to 
incentivize investments and employment creation more than other types of loans. The supply-
side chapters on the other hand show that there is a long-term association between financial 
sector development in Kenya and economic growth, and that there is a reciprocal relation of 
causality over the long-run. Finally, Essay 4 shows that bank financing to SMEs has grown steadily 
over the last few years and that banks are increasingly exposed to small businesses in their 
lending portfolio. However, the financial products to SMEs tend to be unsophisticated and 
concentrated in few sectors.
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Introduction 
 
 
This PhD dissertation is a collection of four essays focusing on the demand and supply of small 
business finance in Kenya. The studies are the product of primary research conducted over three years 
with both demand-side players, more specifically small-scale entrepreneurs operating in a low-income 
area in Nairobi; and the main suppliers of small businesses finance in Kenya, namely commercial banks. 
Since banks are not the only players in the provision of finance to small firms, the dissertation studies the 
entire financial landscape of both formal and informal financial providers, discussing the role that they 
play in the development of small firms. In line with this approach, the dissertation is divided in two main 
parts: the first half analyses the determinants, effects and challenges of access to formal and informal 
finance by small enterprises in Nairobi (essays 1 and 2). The second half analyses the supply-side, more 
specifically the relation between formal financial sector development and economic growth (essay 3) and 
the characteristics and development of bank financing to SMEs (small and medium enterprises) in Kenya 
(essay 4). 
In this introductory chapter, the objective is threefold. First, to outline the broader questions that 
this study tries to address, analysing the main strands of literature which represent the pillars of this 
dissertation. Second, the chapter provides an overview of the Kenyan economy in order to understand 
some key facts and figures about the local economy and providing the context in which each of the four 
essays are based. Finally, it provides an overview of what to expect in the rest of the dissertation and a 
summary of core research issues addressed in the four essays. 
1 BACKGROUND: PLACING THIS DISSERTATION IN THE BROADER CONTEXT 
OF ECONOMICS, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 
Each essay in this dissertation is a standalone piece containing separate literature surveys on the 
specific issues addressed in the papers. This introduction however wants to place the dissertation in a 
broader theoretical and conceptual context to see where it fits in the fields of economics, finance and 
development. Like any dissertation, this study starts by addressing the “big” questions and unsolved issues 
in the literature, but then drills down to very specific issues which partially answer these questions, 
inevitably leaving some gaps and recommendations for further research. 
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This dissertation stands on three large but related strands of academic literature: first, the 
microeconomics of finance and development, more specifically microfinance and financial inclusion in the 
context of small enterprises. Second, the macroeconomics literature on finance and economic growth, 
especially with a focus on low-income countries. Finally, this thesis has strong links with the private sector 
development literature, in particular the issues of enterprise informality and enterprise development. 
Next sections will review the key issues that have emerged in the literature in recent years, and it will set 
the theoretical background for the rest of the dissertation. 
1.1 THE RISE AND CRISIS OF MICROFINANCE, AND ITS TRANSFORMATION INTO “FINANCIAL 
INCLUSION” 
The story of Grameen Bank and its founder, the Bangladeshi economics professor Muhammad 
Yunus, is well-known in development circles. In his book “Banker to the Poor”, Yunus (1998) tells the story 
of his visit to the poor village of Jobra (Bangladesh) in 1976, when he met low-income women making 
bamboo furniture for their livelihoods. These women had no opportunity to obtain credit from formal 
financial institutions, and therefore had to rely on local moneylenders to buy raw material at exorbitant 
interest rates. During one of his visits to Jobra, Yunus lent the equivalent of 27 US dollars to 42 women, 
de facto starting the first informal microfinance activity in the country1. Since these women lacked physical 
collateral, Yunus relied on group-based lending techniques, where the loan was disbursed to a group of 
women and each member was considered a co-guarantor of the loan. Despite some initial scepticism, 
Yunus was able to secure a first loan from a Government bank in late 1976 and eventually other banks 
accepted to finance Yunus’ micro-lending project, which by 1982 expanded to almost 30,000 members. 
In 1983, Grameen Bank was formally registered and started a period of fast expansion reaching world-
wide notoriety and replication of its business model in other countries. In the last published figures in 
December 2013, Grameen Bank accounted 8.74 million members and 6.54 million active borrowers, 94 
percent of them women2. 
The “microfinance revolution” expanded well beyond the Bangladeshi borders. According to the 
Microcredit Summit Campaign (2012), as of December 2010, 3,652 microfinance institutions reported 
reaching over 205 million clients worldwide, 137.5 of whom were among the poorest households, and 
                                                          
1 While some early forms of microcredit started already in the 19th century in Europe with the Raiffeisen credit 
cooperatives (Viganò 2004; Roodman 2012), the field of microfinance become a core part of the international 
development agenda after the success of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. 
2 Data taken from http://www.grameen-info.org/ (last accessed in October 2014). 
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82.3 percent of these poorest borrowers are women. Microcredit has generated considerable enthusiasm 
in policy-making and donor circles, leading to the Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Yunus and the Grameen 
Bank in 2006 for contributing to poverty alleviation worldwide. In parallel with its expansion, the last 
decade registered also an important “schism” in the field of microfinance, with many academics and 
policymakers supporting the transformation of microfinance institutions into fully independent profit-
making institutions (Morduch 2000). In its early stages, providers of microcredit were not financially 
sustainable and relied on subsidies and grants from donor agencies or NGOs. This has changed over the 
last decade: as the field of microfinance became more mature, for-profit companies have entered the 
space and some non-profit institutions have transformed into for-profit traded companies, the most 
notorious examples being Compartamos Banco in Mexico and SKS Microfinance in India. 
Starting from 2010, and especially after the rise of microcredit-linked suicides in the Indian state of 
Andhra Pradesh3, the field of microfinance started attracting growing criticism and entered a period of 
crisis. The state of Andhra Pradesh saw a fast expansion of microfinance institutions in the 1990s and early 
2000s, to the point that the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), a microfinance-focused 
organization housed at the World Bank, named Andhra Pradesh the Indian “Capital of Microfinance” 
(CGAP 2010:2). The microfinance industry in Andhra Pradesh faced a profound crisis when almost all 
microfinance borrowers decided to stop repaying their loans incited by politicians who accused the 
industry of making exorbitant profits at the expense of the poor. In an influential article published on the 
New York Times in November 2010, Polgreen and Bajaj (2010) drew some similarities with the subprime 
mortgage crisis in the US, when the seemingly noble idea to finance home ownership to low-income 
individuals threatened to collapse the banking system. After the crisis in India, microfinance institutions 
faced periods of crisis in other parts of the world including Latin America, with the emergence of the “No 
Pago” movement, and Bangladesh, with a prolonged stalemate between Grameen founder Muhammad 
Yunus and the Bangladeshi government over the leadership of the Grameen Bank (Banerjee et al. 2013). 
Criticisms of microfinance emerged also in academic circles. A strongly critical literature led by 
Milford Bateman argued that the microfinance model is strongly faulted. Bateman and Chang (2012) 
outline a number of arguments on why microfinance harms the efforts of economic development and 
poverty alleviation in low-income countries: here we will list three that are most relevant to this 
dissertation. First, they argue that the microfinance model ignores the crucial role of scale economies. The 
                                                          
3 For a background on the so-called “suicide epidemics” in Andhra Pradesh see http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
south-asia-11997571 (last accessed in November 2014). 
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main criticism is that microfinance by definition promotes the establishment of microenterprises, which 
are inefficient and operate only for subsistence. According to Bateman and Chang (2012) the most 
pressing need in many developing countries is to target the so-called ‘missing middle’ of firms between 
large-scale internationally-renowned corporations and the hundreds of millions ‘survivalist’ informal 
microenterprises. But microfinance institutions are ill-equipped to address those needs. Bateman and 
Chang (2012) also state the very strong argument that microfinance helps to de-industrialise and infantilise 
the local economy. The argument is that while institutional economics have shown that creative, young 
enterprises can trigger the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction, microfinance actually harms 
these efforts because the high interest rates and short maturities typical of micro-loans are tailored for 
the most simple and unsophisticated microenterprises, typically micro trading, retail or service activities, 
with little to no growth potential. Finally, Bateman and Chang (2012) argue that the microfinance model 
ignores the crucial importance of solidarity and local community ownership and control. The argument 
here is that existing practices of mutual help and support are destabilised by the strongly competitive 
nature of microfinance institutions and the peer-pressure that borrowers place to each other when they 
obtain a loan as a group. 
While the arguments in Bateman and Chang (2012) have raised some relevant concerns about the 
potential risks of microfinance, their criticism stands mostly on ideological grounds rather than empirical 
research (van Rooyen, Stewart, and de Wet 2012). For example the argument that microfinance 
deindustrialises and infantilises the economy tends to oversimplify the complex and multifaceted reality 
of businesses in the informal economy and the diverse nature of market development in low-income 
countries. A large body of literature since the 1990s has shown that contrarily from popular belief, the 
informal economy is not a “reserve army of labour” operating for survival and with no growth potential. 
While low-productivity subsistence enterprises certainly exist, numerous firms in the informal economy 
have growth potential and can be considered the equivalent of the small business sector operating in 
industrialized countries (Maloney, 2004). Compared to the early literature on the informal economy (see 
Chen 2005), the key difference in recent literature is that the informal economy is no longer seen as a 
homogeneous part of the market but a  diverse and evolving environment, composed of different 
potentials and constraints to growth. The impact of microfinance is therefore different depending on the 
segment of the informal economy one is focusing on.  
In recent years in fact a number of studies have shown contradicting results on the impact of 
microfinance on low income households and microenterprises. Some of the most positive results were 
reached in Latin America by Becchetti and Conzo (2011, 2013), who studied the non-monetary effects of 
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microfinance on capabilities and life satisfaction. Becchetti and Conzo (2011) argue that microfinance 
enhances the horizontal positive externality among borrowers: since loan concession occurs after severe 
screening procedures, it becomes a proof of trustworthiness which increases private and social outcomes 
of the borrower. By creating a positive externality on the trustworthiness of the borrower, microfinance 
improves the capacity of interpersonal relationships and expands individual capabilities (Becchetti and 
Conzo, 2011: 265). In the more recent publication, Becchetti and Conzo (2013) show that access to 
microfinance loans has significant direct effects on life satisfaction of the borrowers independent of the 
changes in incomes. Using a set of qualitative and quantitative indicators to measure life satisfaction, they 
argue that this effect is due to increased self-esteem, trust, social recognition and expectations on future 
incomes. 
  A special edition of the American Economic Journal (Applied Economics) published in January 
2015 focused entirely on the impact of microfinance, showing the results of six randomized control trials 
conducted in different parts of the world (Crépon et al. 2015; Attanasio et al. 2015; Angelucci, Karlan, and 
Zinman 2015; Augsburg et al. 2015; Banerjee, Karlan, and Zinman 2015; Banerjee et al. 2015; Tarozzi, 
Desai, and Johnson 2015). The six randomized evaluations use a variety of sampling design strategies, data 
collection techniques and econometric models to measure the causal effects of microcredit on borrowers 
and their communities. This introductory chapter will not describe in depth each of the studies, but it is 
important to summarize the key findings of the papers (see table below). According to Banerjee et al 
(2015:6) the overall pattern identified in the RCTs is that microcredit has partially positive but not 
transformative effects on the poor.  
Table 1: Impact of microcredit from the 6 RCTs (Source: adapted from CGD, 20154) 
Location Bosnia Ethiopia India Mexico Mongolia Morocco 
Sample 
composition 
Men and 
women 
Men and 
women 
Women only Women only Women only Men and 
women 
Type of lending Individual 
loans 
Group 
Liability 
Group 
Liability 
Group 
Liability 
Individual loans 
and group liability 
Group 
Liability 
Credit access + + + + + + 
Business activity + + + + x + 
Income x x X x x x 
Consumption - - x x + x 
Social effects x x X + x x 
Note: “+” indicates a significantly positive result (p<0.05), “x” indicates insignificant results and “-“ indicates significantly 
negative results 
 
                                                          
4 Available at http://www.cgdev.org/blog/final-word-microcredit (last accessed in March 2015) 
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Roodman (2012) conducted another in-depth analysis of the impact of microfinance arguing that 
microfinance has little or null long term impact on poverty eradication in low-income countries. In line 
with 6 RCTs mentioned above, he argues that although microfinance stimulates the creation of 
microbusinesses, over the long term households that borrow micro-loans are not lifted out of poverty. 
Microfinance, in other words, help households survive poverty rather than escape it.  
The crisis of microfinance described above has contributed to the transformation of the field of 
microfinance into the broader field of “financial inclusion”. The objective of financial inclusion academics 
and practitioners is to go beyond microfinance institutions themselves and include different types of 
informal and formal providers (e.g. ROSCAs, credit cooperatives, telecommunication providers, etc.). The 
objective is also to go beyond credit and include other financial services such as payments, insurance and 
savings that can lower transaction costs for the low income population. Johnson (2004) for example 
studied access to finance among low income households in Kenya and developed the concept of “financial 
landscapes”. The idea is that while microfinance is one type of financial provider, poor household rely on 
numerous other institutions, both formal and informal, to manage their finances. In her study, she shows 
that key players are the informal rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCA) and the accumulating 
savings and credit associations (ASCA)5, in addition to mobile money providers, credit cooperatives, 
commercial banks and moneylenders among others. The richness of the financial landscapes, and the 
different roles that each institution plays in the functioning of small businesses represents a key goal of 
this dissertation, in particular in essay 1 and 2 which look at the determinants and effects of formal and 
informal credit on enterprise performance. 
Another characteristic of financial inclusion is that it looks at financial services beyond credit itself. 
In a recent article, Harvard Economist Dean Karlan (2014) argues that finance should be seen as a glue 
that can support the lives of the poor in different dimensions: “[Finance] enables money to be in the right 
place at the right time for the right situation. To borrow and save is to move money from the future to 
the present, or from the present to the future. To insure is to move money from a “good” situation to a 
“bad” one. Ideally, we would never have to think about finance. It would be seamless, operating in the 
background. It would allow us to invest and consume exactly as we deem.” While the role of financial 
services such as payments and insurance has become very important in both academic and policy-making 
circles, it is only partially addressed in this dissertation, which has maintained stronger focus on the 
                                                          
5 ROSCAs and ASCAs are two types of informal savings group with slightly different functioning mechanisms. They 
will be analysed more in-depth in essays 1 and 2 of this dissertation. 
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provision and usage of credit instruments by small firms. Addressing Bateman and Chang's criticism 
(2012), however, this dissertation does not focus only on survivalist microenterprises but also looks at 
firms that are small but more growth oriented. This will be explained in more detail in essay 1 and 2 of 
the dissertation. 
1.2 FROM MICRO TO MACRO: FINANCIAL DEEPENING, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 
Almost simultaneously with the emergence of microfinance literature in the 1990s –but in very 
different academic circles– the question of financial sector development become central also in 
macroeconomics: a core topic of research in the 1990s was whether the expansion of the financial sector 
is conducive to growth and economic development or whether, on the contrary, there is no impact or it 
is economic growth that fuels financial sector development over the long-term (King and Levine 1993; 
Rajan and Zingales 1998; Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000). An extensive 
review of literature in this field is conducted in essay 3 of this dissertation, but this introduction provides 
a background and explains why this is relevant for the analysis of small business finance conducted in the 
dissertation. 
An interesting review of how finance became part of the growth economics literature was 
conducted by Honohan (2004). He argues that until the early nineties most academics and policymakers 
studied the banking sector and monetary policy in terms of how to preserve stability, not as potential 
drivers of economic growth. Although the 1970s saw the rise of the “money and growth” literature, this 
mostly focused on how interest rates could affect investments and savings rates in the short-term: 
“money and finance were seen as something that could go wrong, plunging the economy into a 
disequilibrium of involuntary unemployment as had occurred in the 1930s, and seemed to be re-emerging 
in the 1970s with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the oil crises.  Avoiding crises seemed to 
be the main task of financial policy” (Honohan 2004:3). The issue of stability of course returned central to 
finance and economics after the 2008 financial crisis and, as mentioned earlier in this section, the crisis in 
Andhra Pradesh raised many questions about the effect of over-indebtedness on low-income borrowers 
and the sustainability of the microfinance model. Reading Honohan’s quote with the 2008 financial crisis 
in hindsight is a strong reminder that financial sector development has to go hand by hand with stability: 
without the proper checks and balances, the unregulated expansion of the financial sector can expose the 
countries to huge risks and plunge the economy into recession. Although financial sector stability does 
not represent a core topic of this dissertation, this should be considered a limitation of the thesis rather 
than an implicit argument that financial sector development carries no risks.  
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In addition to studying the contribution of finance to economic growth, several studies in the late 
2000s have analysed the distributional effects of financial sector development and its aggregate impact 
on lower income households and small businesses (Jalilian and Kirkpatrick 2005; Honohan 2008; Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2007; Beck et al. 2008). Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2007) for example 
conducted a cross-country empirical investigation showing that financial development boost incomes of 
the poorest quintile of the population and reduces income inequality. They find that 60 percent of the 
impact of financial development on the poorest quintile works through GDP growth and approximately 
40 percent operates through the reduction in income inequality. They also attempted to measure the 
impact of financial development on the fraction of the population living in extreme poverty under one 
dollar a day and find a significant effects. Though, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2007) warn the latter 
finding requires further research because of limitations with the data. Moreover, since the econometric 
analysis does not analyse the country-specific characteristics and policies, their research provides limited 
contribution on which particular financial policies are more effective at fostering poverty-reduction. 
In a related study, Beck et al. (2008) analyse the distributional effects of financial development on 
the private sector, in particular they investigate whether financial development tends to benefit small 
enterprises or larger-scale firms with easier access to financial services. Beck et al (2008) follow a similar 
methodology to the one used by Rajan and Zingales (1998)6. Using a cross-industry, cross-country 
econometric approach, they examine whether industries that have a larger share of small ﬁrms grow 
faster in economies with well-developed ﬁnancial systems. Using a difference-in-difference approach, 
they find that industries with larger shares of small firms grow disproportionally faster in economies with 
developed financial systems, proving therefore that the development of the financial sector at the 
aggregate level is very relevant for small business finance. The characteristics of bank financing to small 
businesses is analysed in-depth in essay 4 of the dissertation. 
 
1.3 ENTERPRISE INFORMALITY AND PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT  
Another strand of literature that plays a relevant role in this dissertation focuses on enterprise 
informality, the informal economy and private sector development. The issues of informality plays an 
important role in the first two essays of the dissertation, which focus on the demand-side of small business 
finance. The literature on economic clusters is very important as well, in particular in the choice of the 
                                                          
6 This study will be reviewed more in-depth in essay 3. 
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research locations analysed in the empirical research. Theories on economic clusters help understanding 
the development of local economies and the relevance of firm networks in increasing the productivity of 
local economic systems (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002; Mead and Liedholm 1998; Mehrotra and Biggeri 
2007). This will be addressed more in-depth in the first chapter of the dissertation. 
Since in the early 1970s when the concept of informal sector was developed (Hart 1973), 
numerous studies have approached the issue of economic informality from different angles and provided 
diverse views on its causes and consequences. Three prevailing theories have emerged in the past forty 
years: Dualist, Structuralist and Legalist schools. A fourth strands of literature, which is not yet a “school 
of thought” but is important for this dissertation, concerns the role of social networks in informal 
economies. 
 The Dualist theory emerged after the ILO mission in Kenya in 1972 and Keith Hart in Ghana (1973), 
and builds a clear-cut formal-informal dichotomy between traditional and modern sectors, as envisaged 
the Lewis model (1954). In general terms, dualists shed a positive light on the informal economies for their 
role in poverty alleviation. However, informal operators are considered a ‘reserve army’ of labour 
completely detached from the formal sector and institutions (Gerxhani 2004). Most studies focus on 
survivalist activities, especially the self-employed and own-account operators, with the assumption that 
the size of the informal sector is anti-cyclical compared to the broader macroeconomic environment and 
that the modernization of the economic system will eventually eradicate the traditional (i.e. informal) jobs 
still present in developing economies (Chen 2005). 
The radical split between formal and informal economy was strongly criticized in most of the 
following studies, in particular in the Structuralist literature emerged in Latin American in the late 1970s 
and 1980s (Portes, Castells, and Benton 1989; Moser 1978). Structuralist scholars argued that informal 
micro-enterprises serve to reduce input costs and increase the competitiveness of large capitalist firms. 
According to this school, it is the nature of capitalism, rather than slow economic growth and 
unemployment, that causes the expansion of informal economies in developing countries (Chen 2005). 
Portes, Castells and Benton (1989), for example, showed that many informal firms are exploited through 
sub-contracting methods. They show case studies of garment and construction sectors in Latin America, 
where most large enterprises increased profit margins by outsourcing labour with unregulated contracts 
in the informal sector. Moreover, they describe the situation of street traders in Colombia, where 
wholesalers used their stronger bargaining power to maintain informal street vendors dependent on them 
for the survival of their businesses. Moser (1978), on the other hand, confirms the central role of 
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‘subordination’ in informal economic relationships, but she divides in ‘benign’ and ‘exploitative’ 
relationships. Subcontracting is not exploitative by definition; however, large firms tend to relate with 
marginal enterprises because they can escape labour laws and have the power to underpay sub-
contractors. 
During the nineties, after the studies made in Peru by De Soto (1989, 2003) the so-called ‘legalist 
school’ argued that informality is provoked by obsolete legal systems and dysfunctional states’ 
institutions. According to this school, the majority of entrepreneurs in developing countries rationally 
decide to operate informally because the costs for complying with legal requirements are unaffordable 
for most micro-scale enterprises7: “Having to waste 289 days on red tape before being able to operate an 
industry, or having to wait almost seven years before being able to build a house, are the obstacles which 
the mercantilist system erects against entry to the market” (De Soto 1989:210). The legalist school is 
important for this dissertation because it outlines how enterprise informality (i.e. lack of compliance with 
regulatory requirements) can affect access to formal finance. The effects of enterprise informality on 
credit access and usage represents a core research objective in essay 1 of the dissertation. 
Over the last two decades numerous influential studies have emerged, trying to go beyond the 
three schools of thought described above and to look at the complex nature of informal economies in 
developing countries (Loayza, Oviedo, and Servén 2005; Djankov et al. 2002; Meagher 2005; Maloney, 
2004, Chen, 2005). World Bank economist William Maloney for example added a new perspective to the 
debate which concerns the ‘voluntary’ nature of informality (Maloney 2004; Levenson and Maloney 
2003). Most literature argue that informal entrepreneurs would prefer to have a formal job and interpret 
informality as a marginalized part of the market. On the contrary, Maloney argues that only a fraction of 
the informal sector is composed of ‘necessity’ entrepreneurs while the rest decide voluntarily to operate 
informally. The informal sector is therefore considered as the “unregulated, developing country analogue 
of the voluntary entrepreneurial small firm sector found in advanced countries, rather than a residual 
comprised of disadvantaged, workers rationed out of good jobs” (Maloney, 2004:1159). After Maloney’s 
work, many scholars interpret the formal-informal duality as the result of a cost-benefit analysis of 
entrepreneurs, making a rational decision between the benefits of informality such as flexibility, and the 
lower fixed costs; and the benefits of the formal sector, in particular those related to the participation and 
access to societal institutions (safety nets, credit system, courts, etc). Many studies have used this 
                                                          
7 The “voluntary nature” of informal economies was explored also by World Bank economist William Maloney. For 
more details see Maloney (2004) and Levenson and Maloney (1998) 
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approach, especially Djankov (2001) and Djankov et al (2002) who developed a useful conceptual 
framework on the different types of businesses along the formal-informal spectrum (see Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Different types of businesses in the informal-formal economy (Source: adapted from Djankov, 2002) 
 Informal sector Formal Sector 
 Subsistence 
enterprises 
Unofficial 
enterprises 
Unofficial 
enterprises 
Official enterprises 
Degree of 
informality 
100% High. Proportion of 
sales undeclared and 
workers not 
registered 
Some proportion of sales undeclared and 
workers unregistered 
Type of activity Single street traders, 
microenterprises, 
subsistence farmers 
Small manufacturers, 
service providers, 
distributors 
contractors 
Small and medium manufacturers, service 
providers, IT services 
Labour/Capital Labour intensive Mostly labour 
intensive 
Knowledge and capital intensive 
Skills Poor, low education, 
low skills 
Poor and non-poor, 
well educated, high 
skills 
Non-poor, highly educated, sophisticated 
skills 
Markets Low barriers to entry, 
highly competitive, 
high product 
homogeneity 
Low barriers to entry, 
highly competitive, 
some product 
differentiation 
Significant barriers to entry, established 
market/product niche 
Finance needs Working capital Working capital, 
some investment 
capital, supplier 
credit 
Working capital, investment capital, letters of 
credit, supplier credit 
Other needs Personal insurance, 
social protection 
Personal and basic 
business insurance 
Personal and business insurance, business 
development services 
  
Least dynamic 
Completely informal 
 
Highly dynamic  
Partially formal 
 
Finally, another strand of literature which is relevant to this dissertation concerns the role of social 
networks in informal economies. According to Meagher (2005:217) “Many leading commentators on the 
informal economy have abandoned the informality paradigm in favour of a focus on the organizational 
role of social networks … Rather than representing economic informality in terms of an absence of 
regulation, social networks portray the informal economy as alternative forms of regulation operating 
outside the framework of the state.” The basic assumption is that while formal enterprises can engage 
with the formal institutional context for sustaining their activity (for example, engaging with banks for 
credit, local government for entering the market, with legal courts for contract enforcement, and with 
public or private insurance in case of injury or sickness), most informal operators have to cope with partial 
or complete exclusion from these formal institutions. However, instead of being passive subjects of this 
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exclusion, informal operators rely on a wide variety of institutions and organizational forms based on 
social ties such as kinship, friendship, ethnicity, or even location and sector, which replace or supplement 
formal regulatory and institutional structures.  
2 CONTEXTUALIZING THE RESEARCH: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE 
KENYAN ECONOMY  
Making a comprehensive description of the Kenyan economy since independence is not the goal of 
this dissertation. However, it is important to introduce the key characteristics of the economy and 
understand the economic background on which the entire dissertation is based. 
As a starting point, it is worth looking at the structure of the economy. As shown in Table 3 Kenya’s 
economy is predominantly based on agriculture, which represented over a quarter of GDP in 2013. The 
main agricultural exports are tea and coffee, but there is important production also of corn, wheat, 
sugarcane, and fruits such as mangoes and pineapples. Among the weaker performers in the economy 
there is manufacturing, which contributed only to 8.9 percent of GDP in 2013, down from 9.8 percent in 
2010. A very important sector is also wholesale and trade, which represents over 10 percent of GDP and 
transport and communication, which is just below 10 percent. 
 
Table 3: Contribution to GDP by sector (2010-2013). Source: adapted from the Kenya Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) 
Industry 2010 2011 2012      2013 
Agriculture 21.2 23.8 24.6 25.3 
Fishing 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Mining and quarrying 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 
Manufacturing 9.8 9.6 9.5 8.9 
Electricity and water supply 2 1 1.4 1.4 
Construction 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.4 
Wholesale and retail trade 10.1 10.5 10.5 10.2 
Hotels and restaurants 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.5 
Transport and communication 10 10 9.6 9.1 
Financial intermediation 5.6 6.3 5.2 4.8 
Real estate 4.8 4.4 4.3 4.1 
Public administration 5.5 5 5.5 6.7 
Education 6.2 5.8 6.1 6.7 
Health and social work 2.5 2.4 2.4 1.9 
Other  3.7 3.6 3.6 3.9 
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The most important recent news on the Kenyan economy is that since October 2014 Kenya is no-
longer classified as a low-income country. The Kenyan Ministry of Planning rebased the GDP calculations 
and revised it upward by 25 percent, using improved data for key sectors such as manufacturing, 
telecommunications and agriculture, and changing the base year for the calculations from 2001 to 2009. 
Overnight Kenya jumped in all economic rankings and became the 9th largest economy in Africa with a 
gross national income (GNI) per capita of 1,160 US dollars: having surpassed the World Bank threshold of 
1,036 US dollars, now Kenya is officially classified as a middle-income economy. According to media 
commentators, this change in GDP is likely to facilitate accessing commercial loans by the Government 
since a larger GDP means lowering the overall Kenya debt ratios. 
The sudden GDP expansion however is unlikely to solve the problems that the economy has been 
facing over the last few years, in particular the issues of (relatively) slow growth and current account 
deficit. The economy has grown below potential since 2007, in particular compared to neighbouring 
countries such as Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania which have been able to sustain faster growth rates. 
Figure 1 shows that growth of the economy dropped dramatically in 2008 and 2009 as a consequence of 
the violence that hit the country in the aftermath of the disputed presidential elections in December 
20078. Growth restarted relatively fast in 2010 (5.8 percent) but then dropped again between 2011 and 
2013 as a consequence of macroeconomic instability that hit the country during this period, including high 
depreciation of the currency and spiralling inflation9 . 
 
Figure 1: GDP growth in Kenya (2000-2013). Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
 
 
                                                          
8 Between December 2007 and February 2008 Kenya entered a period of political and humanitarian crisis after the 
incumbent President Mwai Kibaki was declared the winner of the presidential election against opponent Raila 
Odinga despite international observers confirmed manipulations of the results. The country returned to peace 
after former UN Secretary Kofi Annan mediated a power-sharing agreement between the two opponents. For 
more details see Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero (2012).  
9 The causes and characteristics of this macroeconomic instability that affected Kenya in 2011 and 2012 will be 
described more in depth in essay 3 and 4 of this dissertation. 
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According to the former chief economist of the World Bank in Kenya, Wofgang Fengler, the period 
of macroeconomic instability suffered in 2011 and 2012 was caused by a fundamental structural problem 
of the Kenyan economy: Kenya imports too much and exports too little. The strong current account deficit 
experienced in recent years makes Kenya vulnerable to instability over the medium and long term10. As 
shown in Figure 2, the current account deficit is beyond 10 percent of GDP, among the highest in the 
world, and it is unlikely to decrease in the next years unless Kenya is able to boost its key exports such as 
tea and coffee. Another important source of foreign currency has traditionally been tourism, but this has 
been heavily affected in the last year as a consequence of growing insecurity and terrorism, especially in 
the coastal region.   
 
Figure 2: Current account deficit in Kenya as a percentage of GDP (2005-2012). 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators 
 
 
Finally, it is important to look at how Kenya has been performing in the World Bank Doing Business 
Reports. As shown in Table 2 Kenya continues to perform poorly in terms of ease of doing business. 
Although the country has gained one position in the 2015 Doing Business Report compared to the previous 
year, Kenya is still at the 136th place out of 189 economies. The biggest falls concerns the issue of 
construction permits, which became more expensive in 2014 and therefore Kenya lost 60 positions in the 
rankings11. Kenya however improved its ranking in the ease of getting credit. According to the report, this 
is due to the establishment of an efficient system of credit information sharing via credit reference 
bureaus (World Bank 2014). Banks already started sharing negative information in 2012, but in 2013 the 
                                                          
10 For more details see http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/how-to-kick-start-kenya-s-second-growth-engine (last 
accessed in November 2014). 
11 In reading the rankings, it is important to notice that an improvement in the ranking does not necessarily mean 
that regulation has improved during the period. It could also be that other countries have performed poorly during 
the period and therefore Kenya has improved not in absolute terms but only in relation to other economies. 
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government passed a new legislation that allows for the sharing of positive information as well. This is 
believed to improve the problem of information asymmetries and make banks more efficient at evaluating 
credit risks. 
 
Table 4: Kenya rankings in the World Bank Doing Business Reports 2015 and 2014. Source: World Bank (2014) 
TOPICS 2015 Rank 2014 Rank Change in Rank 
Starting a Business    143 134 -9 
Dealing with Construction Permits    95 35 -60 
Getting Electricity    151 151  - 
Registering Property    136 131 -5 
Getting Credit    116 111 -5 
Protecting Minority Investors    122 118 -4 
Paying taxes 102 146 44 
Trading Across Borders    153 152 -1 
Enforcing Contracts    137 137 - 
Resolving Insolvency    134 138 4 
 
3 OBJECTIVES, STRUCTURE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE DISSERTATION 
As mentioned earlier in this introduction, each essay in the dissertation answers separate research 
questions and uses separate methodologies, datasets and literature surveys. The overarching objective is 
to shed light on the evolving nature of financial landscapes in Kenya, and to understand the role that 
formal and informal financial providers are playing in the development of small businesses and of the 
country more in general. The four essays are based on three separate datasets. The two demand-side 
essays (essay 1 and 2) are based on a survey conducted with small enterprises in Nairobi between 
September 2011 and June 2012. Essay 3 relies on secondary time-series data available from different 
World Bank databases (World Bank Development Indicators and the Global Financial Development 
Database). Essay 4 instead uses data from two survey rounds conducted in 2012 and 2014 by the author 
in collaboration with Financial Sector Deepening Kenya (FSD-K), the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) and the 
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World Bank. This survey aimed at understanding the trends, characteristics and development of bank 
financing to small and medium enterprises in the country.   
Essay 1 explores the determinants of access to finance among micro and small enterprises in a low-
income neighbourhood in Nairobi. Differently from previous studies, the study does not limit itself to the 
analysis of microfinance institutions or banks, but rather it takes a “financial landscape” approach, 
analysing the role that different types of formal and informal financial providers play in support of small 
businesses. The study analyses in particular the role of enterprise informality, social networks and the 
firm’s life cycle as determinants of access to finance. It shows that the financial landscape is extremely 
rich and diversified, and that entrepreneurs tend to borrow simultaneously from different sources, both 
formal and informal. Far from suffering from a complete lack of financing options, small businesses 
analysed in the research often use a variety of financial instruments. As argued by Meagher (2005), the 
focus on exclusion from formal finance per se is not useful for our understanding of small enterprises 
because it overlooks the role of informal practices and institutions12.  
Essay 2 uses the same dataset but focuses on the impact of formal and informal loans on the 
performance of small businesses. The key hypothesis is that different types of loans have different effects 
on firm performance because the social ties embedded in the lending transaction are very different. Loans 
from relatives or friends can be tangled in a web of social ties, whereas loans from commercial banks or 
other formal institutions are much more impersonal. The study in fact finds that loans from commercial 
banks tend to affect positively investments as well as employment creation, whereas loans from 
microfinance institutions seem to have negative effects on investments based on the findings of a 
propensity score matching model. However, it is important to note that the research is based on a 
relatively small sample size and it focuses on one specific area in Nairobi. Therefore the external validity 
of the findings is a key limitation of the study.  
Starting with essay 3 the focus shifts from the demand side to the supply-side. In particular, this 
essay looks at the macro level on the relationship between financial sector development and economic 
growth. Using time series data from the early 1970s to 2010s, the core hypothesis is that the relation 
                                                          
12 To understand the core role of informal institutions in Kenya, it is sufficient to note that the Kenyan flag contains 
the motto “Harambee” which literally means “let’s all pull together” in Swahili. Harambee refers the notion of self-
help that is strongly embedded in most Kenyan communities. Every ethnic group in Kenya have a different term for 
harambee. The Luo ethnic group call it Konyir Kende, the Luhya call it Obwasio, the Kikuyu call it Ngwatio, the 
Kamba call it Mwethia, and the Masai call it Ematonyok. For more details on the evolution of the harambee culture 
in Kenya see Ngau (1987). 
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between the deepening of the financial sector and GDP growth is not direct, but occurs through specific 
intermediary variables, in particular gross investments and gross savings. This study innovates the existing 
research on many fronts, in particular by creating a composite index variable for financial development, 
which combines several proxy variables that are traditionally used in the literature. The study finds 
causality linkages going in all three directions (three-directional causality) between the key variables in 
the model, namely financial development, economic growth and savings. These findings partially 
contradict previous studies conducted in Kenya on the same topic. 
Finally, essay 4 uses data collected in two survey rounds with commercial banks, and represents 
the first attempt to measure the size and characteristics the market for SME finance in Kenya. The study 
shows that bank lending to SMEs has increased dramatically between 2009 and 2013 and that banks are 
increasingly exposed to the segment. Among the main concerns raised by the paper, there is the low 
sophistication of financial instruments provided to SMEs (which are mostly overdrafts) and a growth in 
non-performing loans among large banks in 2013. 
As a concluding note, it is important to mention once again the limitations of the dissertation. We 
mentioned already the issues of sample size for the demand-side essays, and the lack of focus on financial 
sector stability in the supply-side essays. In general, however, the reality is that this dissertation can only 
depict a partial picture of the overall development of the financial sector in Kenya. One of the key 
developments which is not analysed in this dissertation concerns mobile banking, and the role played by 
frontier money transfer technologies, such as MPesa, and credit technologies such as MShwari; these are 
unique innovations in the field of finance that were invented in Kenya and now are spreading in Africa 
and beyond. These disruptive innovations have changed the financial landscape in Kenya, but they have 
affected mostly the retail customers (individuals) rather than businesses. They represent nevertheless 
extremely important topics for future research on financial inclusion.  
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Essay 1 
 
 
The determinants of access to finance 
among micro and small enterprises in 
Nairobi 
 
An analysis of the role of informality, social networks and the firm’s  life-
cycle 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The nature of financial landscapes in contexts of informality and marginalization is often assumed 
to be simple and of little interest for economists and social scientists. The tendency is to stress the issue 
as “exclusion” from formal banks and welfare institutions rather than as alternative mechanisms used by 
entrepreneurs and their determinants. Recent literature however has shown that financial instruments 
used in contexts of marginalization are extremely rich and diversified. In particular, Collins et al. (2009) 
show that, contrary to popular belief, households living in extreme poverty in Bangladesh, India and South 
Africa do not live “hand to mouth”; rather, they tend to use a complex combination of financial 
instruments, relying on social networks and non-formal institutions to manage their resources. Similarly, 
Johnson (2004) has shown that households in Kenya tend to combine formal and informal financial 
instruments to meet their daily financing needs.  
This study examines the financial landscapes and determinants of access to finance among small 
businesses operating in Nairobi. We first discuss the formal and informal financial instruments available 
to small businesses, in particular informal groups such as rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) 
and accumulating savings and credit associations (ASCAs), which are very common in informal and semi-
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formal economy. Second, we analyse the determinants of access to finance. In particular, we look at three 
factors that are rarely combined in a single model: (i) the role of informality, (ii) the role of social networks 
and (iii) the role of the firm life-cycle. Informality and social networks are notoriously difficult to quantify. 
Therefore this study disaggregates the definition into multiple dimensions. Informality is defined both in 
terms of enterprise informality (degree of compliance to government regulation) and the informality of 
the entrepreneur’s background (length of work experience in formal/informal sector firms). Social 
networks are divided in three types as well: (i) investment networks, (ii) savings and credit networks and 
(iii) solidarity networks. The research shows that informality has a significant effect on access (or 
exclusion) to bank finance, but is less relevant when we investigate informal financial instruments such as 
self-help groups and family/friend loans. Participation in social networks seems to affects usage of MFI 
loans and bank loans. The life-cycle of the firm instead does not seem to affect the firms’ financing 
strategies. 
Next sections are organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on financial landscapes in 
developing countries, Africa in particular, and then it looks at the role of informality, social networks and 
the firm life-cycle as determinants of access to finance. Section 3 describes the data collection in Nairobi 
and shows the results of the empirical analysis. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1 FINANCIAL LANDSCAPES: A SURVEY 
The notion of “financial landscape” has played a central role in the transformation of the field of 
microfinance into the broader field of financial inclusion13. The term emerged in the development 
economics literature as early as the mid-1990s (Bouman and Hospes 1994; Bouman 1994), and then 
gained traction over the last ten years (Johnson 2004; Malkamäki, Johnson, and Nino-Zarazua 2009; 
Collins et al. 2009; Johnson and Nino-Zarazua 2011). The objective was to provide a more comprehensive 
analysis of how low-income households manage their finances, what formal and informal financial 
instruments are used for investments, emergencies and daily expenses, and the role played by social 
networks as complements or substitutes for formal financial services. A relevant notion that has emerged 
                                                          
13 A brief overview of this transformation is described in the introduction chapter of this dissertation. 
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in parallel with “financial landscapes” is the one of “financial portfolios” (Collins et al. 2009): the idea is 
that instead of focusing on the issue of financial “exclusion”, many lower-income households use a 
complex combination of formal and informal financial instruments in order to cope with volatile incomes 
and difficult periods.   
This study uses financial landscapes as the core methodological approach to understand the 
determinants of access to finance. The main difference is that most existing literature focuses on the 
household level, not the enterprise level14. Although research such as Collins et al. (2009) and Johnson 
(2004) shows interesting examples of the role of self-employment and small businesses in the economics 
of the household, the focus is not on the firm itself, and therefore lack comprehensive analysis of non-
formal institutions in enterprise financing, investment and start-up capital, among other issues. Moreover, 
Collins et al’s study (2009) is confined to the “extremely poor”, living on less than two dollars a day. 
Although poverty is widespread in low-income areas and markets, numerous owners of micro and small 
enterprises (MSEs) are not necessarily trapped in extreme poverty, and therefore they are likely to use 
financial instruments offered by a combination of formal and informal providers.  
The financial landscape is certainly diversified in a market like Kenya, where strong traditional 
institutions and social structures coexist with one of the most developed financial sectors in sub-Saharan 
Africa as well as booming mobile banking technologies.15 The reality revealed in recent literature is that, 
instead of lacking access to financial services, small businesses and households rely on numerous (mostly 
unconventional) instruments, both formal and informal, market and non-market, according to their needs 
and opportunities. The term “unbanked” is often used in semi-formal and informal contexts, but it is no 
longer appropriate for a dynamic economic environment like urban Kenya where the banking sector is 
developing fast and co-exists with informal institutions.  
                                                          
14 Some exceptions include Fafchamps et al. (1994); Fafchamps (2004); Vandenberg (2003); Akoten, Sawada, and 
Otsuka (2006)  
15 Over the past few years, a new mobile banking technology called M-PESA has begun to flourish throughout 
Kenya. For more information on the use of mobile banking in the Kenyan low-income markets, see Jack and Suri 
(2011). 
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Figure 3: Financial landscape for MSEs in Kenya (adapted from Johnson, 2004; Malkamaki, Johnson and Nino-Zarazua 2009) 
 
 
 
The structure of financial landscapes used in this study follows previous research done in Kenya by 
Johnson (2004), Malkamäki, Johnson, and Nino-Zarazua (2009) and Atieno (2001) and divides financial 
instruments in six main types. Figure 3 shows that formal financial providers include (i) commercial banks, 
(ii) microfinance institutions (MFIs) and (iii) savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs). In Kenya, 
microfinance institutions and SACCOs are divided in “deposit-taking” and “non-deposit taking”. The 
difference is that the deposit-taking microfinance institutions are prudentially regulated by the Central 
Bank of Kenya (CBK) and the deposit-taking SACCOs are regulated by the SACCO Society Regulatory 
Authority (SASRA), whereas non-deposit taking institutions are not regulated by any specific government 
authority. 
 The informal side of the financial landscape includes (i) family and friends, (ii) moneylenders and 
(iii) savings and credit associations. The latter category is sometimes divided further into (a) rotating 
savings and credit association (ROSCA), (b) accumulating savings and credit associations (ASCAs). ROSCAs 
and ASCAs are similar types of organizations where members meet regularly (usually weekly or monthly) 
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and put their savings in a common “pot”. The main difference is that ROSCAs give out the contents of the 
pot immediately to one of the members on a rotating basis, whereas ASCAs do not give the funds 
immediately, but lend them to members and charge interest. The interest paid on loans accumulates in 
the group fund and the dividends are distributed periodically to the members, usually at the end of the 
year (Malkamäki, Johnson, and Nino-Zarazua 2009). There are also other groups such as i) welfare 
associations, which usually operate only when one of the members faces an emergency like sickness or 
funeral expenses; ii) Savings clubs, where members simply encourage each other to save regularly in a 
shared bank account; investment clubs, which meet for the specific purpose of investing in profit-making 
activities. The different types of informal networks are summarized in Table 5. 
 
 
Table 5: Classification of financial self-help groups (adapted from Johnson, 2004 and Malkamäki, Johnson, and Nino-Zarazua 2009) 
 Purpose Membership Operations 
ROSCA 
Encourage savings and the 
rotation of “useful lumpsums” 
among members 
Usually people who share 
common characteristics or goals 
(same market, neighbourhood, 
friends, etc.) 
Meet regularly (daily, weekly or 
monthly). Members contribute 
an equal amount and the total 
sum (“pot”) is given to one of 
the members on a rotating basis 
without interest. 
 
ASCA 
Savings and credit. Distribution 
of dividends 
Similar to ROSCAs. Members 
often participated in MFIs in the 
past  and replicated the 
functioning 
Meet regularly. Members 
provide an equal contribution 
which is disbursed as a loan 
(with an interest) to members 
who request it. Interests is kept 
in the group fund and shared at 
the end of the year 
  
Mixed financial networks 
Usually combine two between 
ROSCA, ASCA, and welfare 
groups 
Usually people who share 
common characteristics or goals 
(same market, neighbourhood, 
friends, etc.) 
Combine one or more activities 
of ROSCA, ASCA and welfare 
groups. The regular contribution 
is divided in the different goals 
(emergency funds/rotating 
funds, etc) depending on the 
group structure. 
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Savings clubs Promoting savings 
Sharing common needs to save 
money generated from the 
informal businesses 
Regular contribution is directly 
saved in a common bank 
account or kept by a trusted 
representative. Money is given 
back at the end of a cycle 
 
Welfare groups 
Mutual support in case of 
emergencies 
Usually based on family or 
ethnicity. Operates only in cases 
of emergencies 
Intervenes irregularly when 
emergencies arise 
  
Investment clubs 
Investments, new businesses. 
Networking 
Members are usually 
entrepreneurs (not necessarily 
in the same line of business). 
Participation usually happens 
through personal connections, 
not applications. 
Meetings are not regular, they 
are usually called by the 
members. Meetings are also an 
opportunity to socialize 
2.2 THE DETERMINANTS OF ACCESS TO FINANCE  
After the brief description of the financial landscape for small enterprises provided in section 2.1, 
this section explores more in-depth the determinants of access to finance. How do firms choose their 
financing strategies? Why do some entrepreneurs favor loans from MFIs instead of loans from banks, or 
vice versa? Why other rely solely on informal financial instruments? This section answers these questions 
by reviewing the literature on three specific factors: the role of informality, the role of social networks 
and the role of the firm life-cycle. 
2.2.1 The role of formality/informality 
The causes and effects of enterprise informality have been studied widely over the last three 
decades (De Soto 1989; De Soto 2003; Meagher 2006; Meagher 2010). The most prominent theoretical 
argument linking formality, access to finance and firm’s performance comes from Peruvian economist 
Hernando De Soto (1989, 2003). He argues that without formalization and protection of property rights, 
informal entrepreneurs are denied the key services that have made capitalism work in western 
economies. Formality, in fact, could guarantee access to services such as formal credit, business 
development associations and judicial courts where the enterprise can request the enforcement of 
contracts. Being ‘legal’, can also allow enterprises to operate more visibly in the market and promote the 
activity without augmenting the risk of police harassment (Winterberg 2005). However, the costs of 
compliance with Government regulation are unaffordable in many developing countries and therefore De 
Soto accuses many Governments to operate as “Mercantilist states” and to deliberately raise the costs of 
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entry to the formal sector: “Having to waste 289 days on red tape before being able to operate an industry, 
or having to wait almost seven years before being able to build a house, are the obstacles which the 
mercantilist system erects against entry to the market” (De Soto 1989:210). The role of informality was 
analysed at the household level as well by King (2014). Using the data from the Finscope survey in Nigeria, 
he finds that lack of formal documentation is a strong obstacle to access to finance and that formalization 
can therefore decrease financial exclusion.  
In this research we expand the concept of informality and distinguish between two levels: firm-level 
informality, defined as the firm’s degree of compliance with government regulation; and entrepreneur’s 
level informality, defined as the length of previous job experiences with formal sector firms or institutions.  
The latter is a rather unconventional variable and it has rarely been analysed in the literature. However, 
we hypothesize that having worked for formal sector firms increases the entrepreneurs’ exposure to 
formal finance and her/his entrepreneurial skills. This argument is in line with the definition of 
“managerial capital” proposed by Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar (2010), who argue that managerial capital 
could affect firm performance in two ways: it could improve the marginal productivity of the firm’s inputs 
(labour, physical capital, etc.) with better management and motivation of the labour force and 
maintenance of the firm’s machinery. Managerial capital may also manifest itself with a better 
understanding of the “quantity” of physical and labour that optimize the firms’ processes at different 
stages of enterprise development: “The decision to access inputs like capital or labor in itself requires 
managerial inputs to forecast the capital needs of the firm, plan the process by which to approach lenders, 
invest the obtained resources, etc.” (Bruhn, Karlan, and Schoar 2010:630) The authors therefore argue 
that managerial capital can be acquired through specialized training or through job experiences in well-
run firms. Nichter and Goldmark (2009) also stress the importance of previous job experience in 
determining firm performance. They argue that it may contribute in two ways: “directly, by expanding the 
capabilities of MSE owners and employees through the acquisition of skills and knowledge; and indirectly, 
by expanding entrepreneurs’ social networks” (2009:1455). These factors will be a core topic of research 
in the empirical analysis.  
 
2.2.2  The role of Networks  
The role of social networks in access to finance attracted increasing interest over the last few years, 
but found limited application due to the difficulty to quantify the concept and make it suitable for 
econometric analyses (Fafchamps, 2000). The lack of clarity of the term however has not discouraged 
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many academics from asking the deeper underlying question: whether there are social network effects 
on the financing preferences of MSEs, and whether these occur through the flow of information, the 
transference of financial capabilities, attitudes towards investment, re-investments and risk propensity. 
The literature in this field is limited. However some studies can provide guidelines into the 
conceptualization of the problem.  
Fafchamps (2000) for example studies the role of ethnicity and social networks on access to finance 
among medium sized firms. Using data from two surveys of manufacturing businesses conducted in Kenya 
and Zimbabwe between 1993 and 1994, he studies whether the membership in groups and social 
networks affects access to bank credit and supplier credit (i.e. credit from suppliers in the firms’ value 
chain). Fafchamps (2000) finds that both countries have considerable level of ethnic and gender 
concentration: the owners of manufacturing firms tend to be male and from ethnic minorities, particularly 
Asians in Kenya and whites in Zimbabwe. He finds that female-headed firms and those with an owner 
from the African ethnic majority are constrained in accessing supplier credit, but not when they apply for 
bank loans and overdrafts. Fafchamps (2000) finds that socialization and information sharing — what he 
calls network effects — play an important role in explaining the ethnic bias16: “People talk with their 
friends and professional acquaintances about jobs, bad payers, and arbitrage opportunities, and they refer 
job and credit applicants to each other. In such environment, individuals with better networks collect 
more accurate information, which enables them to seek out market opportunities more aggressively and 
to better screen prospective employees and credit recipients” (Fafchamps, 2000: 208) 
The role of social networks has been studied also beyond the role of ethnicity. Outside the African 
context, Le and Nguyen (2009) study the Vietnamese market and divide networks in three main types: (1) 
official networks, which capture the ties between entrepreneurs and government officials. (2) Managerial 
networks, which capture ties with suppliers and clients; and (3) social networks, which focus on ties with 
relatives, friends, and members of social organizations and clubs. In order to estimate the model, Le and 
Nguyen (2009) run two regressions with two separate dependent variables: one is a binary variable 
indicating whether the firm has a bank loan or not, which is regressed against the role of the different 
types of networks indicated above and control variables. A second model uses a continuous dependent 
variable estimating the effect of networks on the ratio of bank loans to total capital. The findings of the 
empirical analysis show that networks have different effects on access to finance. Official networks 
                                                          
16 In order to measure the network effects, respondents were asked to describe their relationship with suppliers. 
The author then constructed two dummy variables to identify whether firms deal with suppliers in an “anonymous 
fashion” or whether they socialize outside the business (e.g., sporting events, community gatherings, and religious 
celebrations). For more detail see Fafchamps (2000:222). 
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increase the probability of having a bank loan but not the size of the loan. Managerial networks on the 
contrary do not increase the probability of accessing credit, but they have an effect on the size of the 
loans obtained by the banks. Le and Nguyen reach the surprising finding that social networks decrease the 
probability of having access to credit. The argument is that while managerial and official networks can 
facilitate access to loans because they help firms have access to business information and knowledge; 
social networks often represent a potential substitute to formal finance that can reduce the need or 
willingness to apply for bank loans. 
Uzzi (1999) on the other hand investigates whether firms in the US market are more likely to obtain 
bank loans and receive better interest rates when they are socially connected to their lenders through 
what he calls “embedded ties”. The concept of embeddedness is operationalized through two variables: 
the duration of the relationship with the lender and the “multiplexity” of the relationship, defined as the 
number of business and personal services an entrepreneur uses from the financial institution. The 
empirical analysis confirms the hypothesis that the duration and multiplexity of the relationship 
significantly reduce the cost of capital, but Uzzi finds no evidence that these variables affect the 
probability of accessing credit: “These null effects indicate that while the quality of a relationship can 
influence the competitiveness of a rate, it is unrelated to whether or not a firm ‘passes the bar’ for credit 
eligibility” (1999:498). 
A different type of analysis was conducted by Barr (2002), who uses data on manufacturing firms in 
Ghana to understand how networks affect firm performance. In her analysis, Barr (2002) makes an 
important distinction between two types of networks: innovation and solidarity networks. While 
innovation networks tend to affect positively the performance of firms, solidarity networks might reduce 
uncertainties but have little effects on performance. The two types of networks differ in terms of structure 
and composition (see Table 6). While innovation networks tend to be larger and less cohesive (relying 
therefore on weak ties17) and to involve larger firms, solidarity networks tend to be small and more 
cohesive (strong ties) and to be common among small-scale entrepreneurs. This categorization of 
networks is important because it was adapted with modifications to the empirical research conducted in 
this study.  
 
 
 
                                                          
17 The notion of “weak ties” and “strong ties” and their effects on the role of networks was studied by Granovetter 
in sociology. For more details see Granovetter (1973 1983; 1985) 
31 
 
Table 6: Network function, structure, and effect on enterprise performance. (Source: adapted from Barr, 2002) 
 Innovation network Solidarity network 
Network function To enhance enterprise 
performance 
To reduce uncertainty 
Type of information flowing 
through the network 
 
About the world, technologies and 
markets 
About member’s conduct, 
circumstances and intentions 
Characteristics of the sets of 
contacts maintained by network 
members 
 
Large, diverse, relatively infrequent 
interactions 
Small, homogenous, high levels of 
interaction with each contact 
Overall effect of current enterprise 
performance 
 
Relatively large Relatively small 
Spillover effects of networking 
 
 
A low proportion of the overall 
effect 
A high proportion of the overall 
effect 
Typical member enterprises Enterprises with access to formal 
institutions, who employ more 
advanced technologies and serve 
more diverse markets 
Enterprises with no access to 
formal institutions, who employ 
traditional technologies and serve 
less diverse markets 
 
2.2.3 The life-cycle theory of capital structure 
The link between the firm life-cycle and access to finance has mostly been studied in a separate 
field of economics, namely in capital structure theory. Capital structure theory is a field of finance and 
economics focusing on how firms finance their investments through a combination of debt finance, equity 
finance and other hybrid instruments (Chittenden, Hall, and Hutchinson 1996). It has rarely been used in 
the context of financial inclusion mostly because of its focus on large scale corporations and the 
assumption of well-functioning debt and equity markets. However, some insights that have emerged in 
recent years can be extremely valuable for the analysis done in this paper. 
Understanding the determinants of financing decisions has been a core goal in finance and 
economics since the ‘60s (Modigliani and Miller 1958; Modigliani and Miller 1963; Kraus and Litzenberger 
1973; Myers 1984). Capital structure theory has largely focused on the corporate level, usually large-scale 
publicly listed firms, whose financing options are very different compared to small businesses (Ang 1991). 
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According to Zingales (2000:1628), this has hampered our knowledge of capital structure both 
theoretically and empirically: “Theoretically, the emphasis on large companies (…) has underemphasized 
the role that different financing instruments can play to provide investors better risk diversification. (…) 
Empirically, the emphasis on large companies has led us to ignore (or study less than necessary) the rest 
of the universe: the young and small firms, who do not have access to public markets.”  
The interest in small firms however has grown considerably over the last decade, especially in 
developed economies, raising numerous new questions on the determinants of financial decisions at SME 
level (Chittenden, Hall, and Hutchinson 1996). One of the major theories in this field –known as “life-cycle 
theory”– hypothesizes that financing decisions are closely dependent on the age of the firms and their 
growth potential. The argument is that since young and small firms usually lack access to capital markets, 
they tend to rely entirely on the owners’ personal resources during the initial phases. If the firms survive 
the initial period of undercapitalization, they gain easier access to debt markets, in particular supplier 
finance and short-term finance from commercial banks. The lack of access to long-term finance however 
can put the enterprise in a “financing gap” where it has to “choose between reducing its growth to keep 
pace with its internally generated funds, acquire a costly stock market quotation, or seek that most elusive 
form of finance - venture capital” (Chittenden, Hall, and Hutchinson 1996:61). Michaelas, Chittenden, and 
Poutziouris (1998) make a qualitative analysis of capital structure in small firms and argue that financial 
decisions are influenced by many behavioral and non-financial factors as well, including risk propensity as 
well as personal perceptions and beliefs (see Table 7). 
 
 
Table 7: Factors influencing capital structure in small businesses. (Source: Michaelas, Chittenden, and Poutziouris, 1998) 
Owner’s characteristics Firm Characteristics Other external characteristics 
Need for control Age State of the economy 
Knowledge Size Conditions of the market 
Experience Growth Availability of funds 
Goals Profitability Industry characteristics 
Risk propensity Cash-flow Government policy 
Perceptions and beliefs on external finance Asset composition  
 Trade debtors  
 Trade creditors  
 Stock  
 Nature of operations  
 Ownership (family business 
dynamics) 
 
 
 
On an empirical level, a growing number of large scale studies have been conducted at the SME 
level over the last few years. Berger and Udell (1998) for example analyze the US market and find that 
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firms use equity and debt finance at almost equal levels. Even more importantly, they show that firms use 
a wide variety of financial instruments: they identify four types of equity finance instruments and nine 
types of debt finance. The most important type of equity is the principal owner’s funds followed by “other 
equity”', which includes the financing from other shareholders during start-up phase as well as 
unconventional sources such as family and friends. For debt finance, bank credit is the most important 
source of finance followed by trade credit. Berger and Udell however confirm that analyzing capital 
structure at the SME level is complicated by the problem of “informational opacity”. They argue that the 
lack of detailed micro data on SMEs is “a major reason why until very recently small business finance has 
been one of the most underresearched areas in finance” (1998:617). This emphasizes the importance of 
the research objectives pursued in the study, and also indicates the difficulty of obtaining reliable data on 
businesses that are informationally opaque. This is particularly the case in a context like Kenya, which is 
characterized by relatively high levels of informality and generally poor record keeping.  
 
2.2.4 Adapting capital structure theory for businesses in developing countries:  
The previous section has shown that shifting focus from the corporate to the level of small 
businesses requires a substantial redesign of the research approach. Shifting the geographical focus on 
developing countries may add further complications, because of the weak institutional environment and 
an even more problematic scarcity of micro-level data. Notable exceptions in the literature are Booth et 
al. (2001) comparison of large firms in ten developing markets. At the SME level, important studies have 
been conducted by Abor (2007) who compares Ghanaian and South African firms (2007) and Abor and 
Biekpe (2009), who apply the life cycle theory of capital structure to study manufacturing SMEs in Ghana. 
The latter study shows that there is a positive relation between long-term debt and the age of the firm, 
but they do not support the hypothesized negative relationship between short-term debt ratio and age 
of the firm18, proving that Ghanaian firms do not decrease their reliance on short-term debt as they grow. 
From a methodological point of view, Abor and Biekpe (2009) tackle the problem of informational opacity 
by focusing on formal (i.e. registered) businesses which are members of the Ghana Association of 
Manufacturers and were able to produce credible financial statements. If we want to penetrate our 
                                                          
18 Long term debt ratio is calculated as “long-term debt/(total equity + total debt)”. The short term debt ratio is calculated as 
“Short-term debt/(total equity + total debt). 
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analysis further down market and include micro and small enterprises –which is the core objective of this 
study – the research design requires further modifications.  
As mentioned in the introduction, this research will make a number of adaptations to the research 
approach in order to contextualize it to the environment of informal and semi-formal enterprises. First, 
we take into account that the constraints to access to finance are much more daunting for small firms in 
Africa compared to EU and US markets. This raises the problem of whether the capital structure is the 
product of the financing decisions and preferences of small businesses or whether, on the contrary, these 
structures are entirely determined by external constraints. This issue has methodological implications: 
whereas “conventional” capital structure literature focuses on debt-to-equity ratios and the degree of 
leverage of firms, “access to finance” literature is concerned with the actual capacity of small businesses 
of accessing (formal) external finance. Debt-to-capital ratio usually comes as a continuous variable, 
whereas access to finance is often treated as a binary variable, or “dummy”, standing for ‘access’, or ‘not 
access’, to one or more financial instruments. Although this may sound like a technicality, it actually 
reflects the fact that the core concern for many African small firms is not their degree of leverage or their 
debt to equity ratio, but their actual capacity of accessing external funding.    
The second adaptation follows Zingales (2000) and Berger and Udell’s (1998) suggestion that 
studying smaller firms means analyzing a wider array of financial instrument. Since we want to focus on 
the “margins” of the market and include informal businesses, the more heterodox financial instruments 
described in the previous sections (e.g. rotating savings and credit associations, accumulating savings and 
credit associations, family and friends as well as cooperative societies) must be included (Johnson 2004; 
Malkamäki, Johnson, and Nino-Zarazua 2009; Akoten and Otsuka 2007; Akoten, Sawada, and Otsuka 
2006; Atieno 2001) . Excluding these instruments from our models would mean neglecting a big part of 
the firms’ financing structures.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1 QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
In line with the review of literature conducted in the previous sections, the objective of this study 
is to explore the financial landscapes of micro and small enterprises operating in the selected research 
locations and to analyse the determinants of access to finance among different segments of the local 
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economy. This will shed light of the formal and informal financial instruments that diverse types of 
businesses use to manage their daily cash-flows and access credit when needed. The focus will be on 
commercial banks, formal microfinance institutions and credit cooperatives, which represent the more 
formal segment of the financial sector as outlined in Figure 3. On the informal side of the spectrum, the 
focus is on the role of informal financing mechanisms such as savings groups, ROSCAs, moneylenders and 
family/friends. Section 3.3 provides an in-depth analysis of the mix of formal and informal financial 
services used in the three research locations and the rationale behind it. The core objective is to explore 
the determinants of access and usage of formal and informal financial instruments among small 
enterprises: the focus is on the role played by (i) enterprise informality, (ii) social networks and (iii) firm 
life cycle as emerged in the literature survey.  
The empirical analysis takes a dual approach: following studies such as Craig and Hardee (2007) 
Magri (2002) and Uzzi (1999), the objective is to understand on the one hand how informality, social 
networks and the firms’ life-cycle affect the probability of using different types of credit (bank, 
microfinance, ROSCAs, etc.). On the other, how these explanatory variables affect the actual size of the 
loans obtained. This portrays a more comprehensive picture of what factors help entrepreneurs become 
eligible (or not) for credit, and which factors actually affect the size of the credit facilities that they are 
able to obtain. Informality is operationalized in two ways: first, we analyse firm-level informality, which is 
calculated as the degree of compliance with government regulation. Second, we study the entrepreneur-
level informality, quantified as the length of job experiences in formal VS informal sector firm. 
Participation in social networks on the other hand is categorized in three ways: (i) participation in 
investment networks, (ii) participation in savings and credit groups, (iii) participation in solidarity 
networks19. Firm life-cycle is operationalized simply in terms of the age (years of operation) of the 
enterprise. In addition to these variables, we also control for a variety of firm-level and entrepreneur-level 
characteristics, including gender, education and age of the entrepreneurs and size of the businesses.  The 
list of variables is discusses in greater detail in Table 11. 
3.2 DATA 
The empirical analysis described in the next sections is based on 344 questionnaires and a series of 
qualitative interviews conducted with entrepreneurs and key informants in Kariobangi – a low-income 
neighbourhood about 10 kilometres north-east of Nairobi – between September 2011 and June 2012. The 
                                                          
19 A more detailed description of the difference between the three types of networks is provided in section 3.3.3. 
36 
 
questionnaire is composed of four main sections which focused on i) the background and characteristics 
of the entrepreneurs (age, education, job experience, etc.), ii) the enterprise (years of operation, sector, 
size, capital, profitability, investments, etc.); iii) access to finance (usage of bank accounts and MFIs, 
outstanding formal and informal loans, etc.). And iv) participation in social networks (purpose, frequency 
of meetings, number of members, etc.)20.  
The research location was selected after consultations with key informants with an expertise on 
private sector development, informal economy and access to finance in the Kenyan context. This included 
academics from the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Nairobi, Financial Sector 
Deepening Kenya –an organization focusing on pro-poor financial sector development in Kenya, and other 
researchers with an expertise on economic informality and local economic clusters in Kenya. A first 
decision point was to focus on the capital Nairobi instead of secondary towns or rural areas. Nairobi is the 
central economic hub in Kenya, concentrating the majority of formal large and medium-sized firms in the 
country as well as the micro and small enterprises, mostly in the informal sector. Most importantly, 
Nairobi has a unique diversity of operators in both the demand-side of small business finance (formal, 
semi-formal and informal enterprises) and the supply-side (formal and informal financial sector 
providers), which allows us to map the different landscapes and dynamics affecting the development of 
the private sector.    
After consultations and visits to different parts of the city, we decided to choose Kariobangi as the 
core research area for the empirical investigation. Kariobangi and its surroundings are characterized by a 
thriving semi-formal and informal economy and a uniquely diversified population of micro and small 
enterprises concentrated in a relatively small area. In order to represent the variety of businesses 
operating in the neighbourhood, the sample was divided across three specific research areas: one is 
known as Kariobangi Light Industries, which is a manufacturing cluster with an estimated population of 
300 enterprises in 2005-2006 (Sonobe, Akoten, and Otsuka 2011) but currently has expanded to 
approximately 450-500 businesses. This cluster specializes in a variety of manufacturing activities, 
including woodwork, metalwork, car-repair, hardware retail, and paint manufacturing among others. The 
second research location is a tailoring cluster known as Kariobangi Market, which is made of about 600 
micro-enterprises involved in tailoring, dress-making, embroidering and retail of tailoring products and 
                                                          
20 See full questionnaire in Appendix 1, 
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equipment21. Finally, the Korogocho Market is a street market specializing in the sale of vegetables and 
second hand clothes. The sample is almost equally divided across the research locations (see Table 8). 
The striking feature of Kariobangi is that although the three productive areas are located in close 
proximity one another, enterprises are heterogeneous and can be categorized in different “degrees of 
informality” depending on their degree of compliance with government regulation and the location where 
they operate the business. The classification used in this study is based on whether entrepreneurs have 
(i) registered the business name at the Attorney General, (ii) obtained the Single Business Permit from the 
City Council, (iii) registered with the Kenya Revenue Authority for tax purposes, (iv) provided written 
contracts to the workers, (v) operated from an authorized location or in public space (e.g. on the side of 
the road). By taking this approach, we notice that virtually all enterprises in Korogocho are completely 
informal: businesses do not comply with the licensing, registration and tax requirements and operate in 
shacks on the side of the road. Businesses in the Kariobangi Market instead comply with the license 
requirement and operate in spaces authorized by the City Council. All entrepreneurs in this location were 
required to obtain a special type of permit designed by the government for informal enterprises which 
allows firms not to register their name at the Attorney General’s office22. Finally, manufacturing firms in 
the Kariobangi Light Industries are characterized on average by the highest degree of formality in the 
sample, as the majority of them comply with both the license and registration requirements, but only a 
few pay taxes or comply with labor laws23. The descriptive characteristics of the sample are shown in Table 
8. 
 The choice of the research location stemmed also from the interest of this dissertation on informal 
economic clusters, and their capacity to incentivize firm specialization, inter-firm networks and increase 
the productivity of local economic systems (McCormick 1999; McCormick, Kinyanjui, and Ongile 1997; 
Mead and Liedholm 1998; van Dijk and Rabellotti 2005; Mehrotra and Biggeri 2007). Responding to the 
critical literature described in the introductory chapter (see Bateman and Chang, 2012), this dissertation 
tries to emphasize diverse types of businesses operating in the informal economy, ranging from the micro 
                                                          
21 The area has also a considerable number of hairdressers and beauty-shops serving mostly, but not only, the 
women working the market. Some of these businesses were included in the sample. 
22 In order to obtain a business permit firms are normally required to register their business name. For more 
information see Devas and Kelly (2001) and Abuodha and Bowles (2000).  
23 Compared to Korogocho and Kariobangi Market where the large majority of businesses is very similar in terms of 
regulatory compliance, in the Kariobangi Light Industries there is higher variability. Some businesses are close to 
being “completely formal” while others comply only with the license requirement. Though, on average the degree 
of compliance tends to be higher than in the other two locations. 
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informal enterprises (e.g. Korogocho street traders) to the semi-formal small businesses in the 
manufacturing and tailoring clusters (Kariobangi Light Industries and Kariobangi Tailoring market). While 
these clusters are mostly composed of informal activities,  it is known that agglomeration and economic 
clustering can help raise enterprise productivity and specialisation, reducing transaction costs and 
capturing positive external economies and synergies (Mehrotra and Biggeri 2007:366).   
After choosing the research locations, we designed the sampling strategy and proceeded with the 
piloting and implementation of the survey24. There are no lists of enterprises operating in the areas and 
therefore there is no sampling frame from which selecting the enterprises to interview. In order to select 
the sample, we therefore conducted a mapping of the research areas, outlining all the main roads, paths 
and precise delimitations where businesses were located. In the second step we used a systematic 
sampling approach to to ensure that the sample of enterprises was distributed across the research areas 
and did not miss out certain zones. However some areas in the Kariobangi Light Industry were left out of 
the research mostly because of security and unwillingness of entrepreneurs to participate in the research. 
The Kariobangi Light Industries are known in Nairobi for the production of counterfeited goods, such as 
beverages and clothes. While this was not confirmed during the research, some parts of the cluster were 
particularly difficult to access and the businesses tended to be extremely reluctant to talk to strangers. 
We therefore had to leave them out from the survey25.  
The data was collected with an in-depth questionnaire conducted face-to-face with the owners of 
the businesses in the premise where they operate (see full questionnaire in Annex 1). Finalizing each 
questionnaire took relatively long time, from a minimum of about 35 minutes to a maximum of 1 hour 
and 20 minutes, depending on the characteristics of the business and how busy was the respondent at 
the moment of the interview. In some occasions, more than one meeting was necessary in order to 
complete the questionnaire. The research team was composed of the principal researcher (myself) and 
two research assistants who worked on the project on a full-time basis. Each questionnaire was validated 
after the interviews and in case of inconsistencies or missing data then a follow-up meeting was organized 
                                                          
24 The piloting of the research lasted approximately 4 weeks and was used to train the research assistants and 
revise the questionnaire based on the feedback from the field. 
25 This dissertation focuses on the issue of economic informality, but is important to make the distinction between 
illegal processes or arrangements and illegal goods and services (Chen, 2012). While production or employment 
arrangements in the informal economy are often semi-legal or illegal, most informal workers and enterprises 
produce and distribute legal goods and services. On the other side, the criminal economy operates entirely illegally. 
This dissertation does not focus on the latter category. 
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with the entrepreneurs. After the questionnaires were finalized, the data entry was conducted by a local 
IT company with familiarity with Stata and data cleaning processes. All these procedures were supervised 
by the principal researcher. 
It is important also to discuss the difficulties and limitations that this research necessarily had to 
encounter. This survey had the very ambitious objective of building a rich and complex dataset of micro 
and small enterprises in areas characterized by informality and relatively low incomes. After the piloting 
of the questionnaire, it became clear that without proper planning, the survey could have produced a high 
number of missing values or inaccurate data –this would have made the data impossible to use. The main 
problem is that informal and semi-formal entrepreneurs rarely keep accounting books or have any 
documentation about the net worth of the business, yearly turnover, business profits or many other 
variables listed above. This research however surveyed all the key methodological literature on the subject 
to ensure the maximum possible accuracy in the estimations (e.g. Daniels 2001a; 2001b; de Mel, 
McKenzie, and Woodruff 2009). The research team also built strong relationships with the local 
community of entrepreneurs and was able to gain the trust of the respondents. 
 
3.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL LANDSCAPES 
3.3.1 Basic characteristics of the sample 
Table 8 provides an overview of the histories of entrepreneurs before they started the enterprise 
in Kariobangi and the current characteristics of their businesses. During the survey, entrepreneurs were 
asked to provide a list of previous job experiences and the length of their employment. They were also 
asked whether the firm they worked for was formal or informal. The boundary between the two is 
notoriously blurry, so respondents were asked to provide additional details about the firm such as size, 
ownership, age as well as whether (to their knowledge) the firm was registered with the Kenya Revenue 
Authority. Although in a few cases it was not possible to determine the formality status of the firm, most 
of the times it was quite straightforward.  
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Table 8 – Overview of entrepreneurs’ and firms’ characteristics in the three research locations (Source: own elaboration) 
 Degree 
of 
formality 
Age of the 
entrepreneur 
(years) 
Age of 
the 
business 
(years) 
Total 
previous 
job 
experience 
(months) 
Experience 
in formal 
enterprises 
(months) 
Capital value 
(machinery + buildings + 
raw material and 
finished products, in 
KSh) 
Sample size 
Kariobangi 
Light 
Industries 
High/ 
medium 
40.8 8.4 119.1 44.7 693,646 118 
Kariobangi 
market 
Medium 38.9 11.0 56.4 16.2 314,664 117 
Korogocho Low 39.3 9.7 53.9 7.3 26,576 108 
 
Table 8 shows that entrepreneurs in the Kariobangi Light Industries had the highest average age 
(40.8 years) but had the youngest firms (8.44 years of average).  During the interviews we found two main 
explanations for this apparently contradicting data. First, in the Kariobangi Light Industry the life cycle of 
firms was shorter. Every month there were new firms moving in and out of the cluster, either because the 
firm did not survive or because it moved to other parts of Nairobi. Kariobangi in fact was in the peculiar 
situation of being simultaneously very expensive and badly served by infrastructure. It is expensive 
because it is a well-known area where customers go to purchase different types of goods/services and 
skilled labour is easily available. That has driven up demand for premises in the area and pushed rental 
prices to relatively high levels. Small 20 m2 premises could easily cost up to 15,000 KSh per month (135 
euro). At the same time Kariobangi is poorly served by infrastructure. The road is not paved and it 
becomes unusable during the rainy season, power cuts are a daily occurrence and waste management is 
poorly organized. Moreover, although the cluster was initially assigned to light industries by the local 
government, it eventually became a mixed industrial/residential area. Housing investors took advantage 
of the growing demand for housing in the area and built buildings with workshop spaces on the ground 
floor and residential apartments above. This poses limits to the expansion of premises, the type of work 
that can be done and the hours in which the firms are allowed to operate.   
A second reason for the mismatch between entrepreneur’s age and firm’s age is related to longer 
job experiences of entrepreneurs in the light industries. Many of them worked for several years in formal 
manufacturing plants in Nairobi’s industrial area, where they learnt the skills, saved the money for start-
up capital and eventually started their own business. Their experience in formal firms is reflected in the 
table as well: entrepreneurs in the light industries have the highest formal sector experience at almost 44 
months, compared to 16 in Kariobangi market and 7 in Korogocho. However not all entrepreneurs in the 
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light industries had extensive experience in the formal sector. Some entrepreneurs built their entire job 
career in the Kariobangi light industries or comparable informal/semi-formal manufacturing clusters in 
other areas in Nairobi: they often started as apprentices or employees for some local firms, when they 
learnt the skills, many of them became “fundis” (technicians) working for different firms within the cluster 
that required specialized skills. Eventually, after saving some money and creating networks of suppliers 
and customers they started their own businesses. 
Entrepreneurs in the Kariobangi market instead learnt their skills mostly within the tailoring sector 
and in technical colleges. They often entered the market as employees and apprentices in businesses 
owned by family members or friends and eventually started their own. There was also a number of older 
entrepreneurs who worked as public employees for several years until the structural adjustment 
programs imposed to cut public spending in the nineties. Many of them used the savings from these jobs 
and retirement money to start their businesses as tailors in Kariobangi market. Entrepreneurs in 
Korogocho instead rarely worked for formal firms or the public sector. Most of them had several casual 
jobs or had periods of unemployment and underemployment before they were able to save enough 
money to start businesses in the Korogocho market. Since casual jobs could change on a weekly, or even 
daily basis, the length of their previous experience was the most difficult to track.  
   
3.3.2 Start-up financing and the role of informal finance 
Starting the business was a very different experience for entrepreneurs in the three locations. We 
asked them to recall the initial phase of their enterprise and indicate the main sources of funding between 
formal and informal sources26. Figure 4 shows that own savings and family and friends play a crucial role 
as start-up finance instruments, 69 and 46 percent of all firms respectively used them when they had to 
finance initial operations. However, there is a considerable difference between men and women: whereas 
man relied on own savings as primary finance instruments (83 percent), women used loans (usually 
without interest) or grants from family and friends (61 percent). In qualitative interviews we tried to 
understand whether these “grant” or “donations” should be considered as equity investments (i.e. the 
donor became a partner of the business) or whether they were simply a form of help. We found that in 
the majority of cases they were a rather hybrid instrument. Although the “donors” did not acquire a stake 
in the business, nor they required a share of the profits, they often required the women to become 
economically independent in financing the household expenses. In many Kenyan families, the wealthier 
                                                          
26 Multiple answers were allowed. 
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members have a duty to take care of the poorer ones in case of emergencies. We found that these 
donations were used as a way to make women economically independent and minimize their potential 
requests for further funding in the future.  
 
Figure 4 – Sources of start-up capital by gender (percentages). 
 
Note1: the figure reports the percentage of positive responses in each category among male and female respondents and across 
the sample. Respondents were allowed to provide multiple answers in case their start-up capital came from multiple sources.  
Note2: The category “Financial self-help groups” include all types of groups identified in Table 5. 
Note3: The category “other” includes responses such as inheritance and sale of assets among others. 
 
Figure 4 shows that financial self-help groups like ROSCA, ASCA and savings groups are relatively 
less relevant compared to own savings and friends. The reason is arguably that many entrepreneurs are 
able to become members only once they become entrepreneurs and are able to have relatively stable 
incomes. On the other hand, it is clear that the more formal sources of finance, such as commercial banks 
and MFIs are almost irrelevant for the start-up of the business. This shows that formal financial institutions 
are unable to assess business plans in the start-up phase and that they prefer to finance enterprises that 
have already been in business for some time and have real collateral to provide to the banks.   
Figure 5 focuses on the current usage of financial self-help groups in the three locations surveyed 
in the research. The dynamics are somewhat more complex. It shows that only about 16 per cent of the 
sample in our research study did not belong to any financial group, whereas over 80 per cent belonged to 
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one or more groups,27 which confirms the important role played by informal financial instruments in the 
local economy. However, the differences within the sample are noteworthy. Enterprises in Kariobangi 
Light Industries, which are characterized by higher degrees of formality, appeared to make the least use 
of informal financial institutions: over 24 per cent in our survey did not participate in any such institutions; 
whereas in Korogocho, where businesses are highly informal, the proportion was only 9 per cent. 
Respondents who did not participate in networks can be grouped into two types. First were the “network 
sceptics” who tended to distrust groups because of the risk of fraudulent behaviour. Some also rejected 
groups because they considered them as being for women, stressing the gender connotation traditionally 
attributed to groups. Second, there were entrepreneurs who were simply constrained by a lack of 
resources, either because they were new in the market and still had low earnings, or because they were 
experiencing difficulties and were unable to pay the regular contributions to the groups.  
 
 
Figure 5 – Entrepreneurs’ current participation in financial self-help groups in different research locations 
 
 
Participation in ROSCAs, savings clubs, and mixed financial networks follows a similar pattern: the 
higher the degree of informality, the higher the participation in these informal networks. In particular, the 
survey revealed a very high use of mixed financial networks and ROSCAs in Korogocho (55 percent and 56 
percent respectively) and in Kariobangi Market (37 percent and 44 percent respectively) – which is 
                                                          
27 This result is only moderately different from that of Johnson, Brown, and Fouillet (2012). In that study, 27 per 
cent of the sample was observed as not belonging to any financial group. 
No group ROSCA ASCA
Mixed
financial
networks
Savings club
Investment
Clubs
Welfare
groups
Kariobangi Light Industries 23.73% 22.03% 11.02% 16.10% 5.93% 17.80% 50.00%
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considerably higher than the percentage found in the Kariobangi Light Industries. The pattern of 
participation in ASCAs was slightly different, as the Kariobangi market registered the highest levels of 
participation, followed by Korogocho and the Kariobangi Light Industries.  
In the analysis of Figure 5 it is important to take two factors into account. First, the results are 
affected not only by the degree of formality, but also by the gender composition of the sample in the 
three locations. The Kariobangi Light Industries were largely populated by male entrepreneurs whereas 
Kariobangi Market and Korogocho had a larger number of women. As mentioned in the literature survey, 
women tend participate in informal groups more often than men (Johnson 2004; Collins et al. 2009). 
Second, when we look at the different levels of participation between ROSCA, ASCA, and mixed financial 
networks we have to keep in mind that businesses in Korogocho often combined ROSCA and ASCA 
activities with welfare-oriented activities, such as helping each another in case of emergencies. Thus, 
many groups are categorized under the “mixed financial networks” type, but in fact they operated in very 
similar ways as ROSCA and ASCAs. The fact that incomes in Korogocho were lower and more volatile, as 
well as more vulnerable to financial shocks made entrepreneurs include welfare activities to their 
networks in addition to conducting normal revolving funds like ROSCAs or ASCA. 
Figure 5 shows also that entrepreneurs in the Light Industries appeared to have a high level of 
participation in welfare groups (50 percent); these can be categorized into two main types. The first 
resemble formal insurance products: contributions are made on a regular basis (usually monthly) to a 
trusted group representative, and the amount is kept in a shared bank account or by the group’s treasurer. 
Members of the group can ask for money only in specific circumstances as specified in the group’s 
constitution, usually for hospitalization or funerals, but smaller groups tend to be more flexible and will 
consider other emergencies as well. The second type of insurance group is both simpler and more 
common – a family network or a clan-based insurance group28 which work on an irregular basis. When 
emergencies occur, entrepreneurs can rely on these networks (often with the mediation of network 
elders), but the amounts received are uncertain and depend on the capacity of members to help during 
the specific period. The findings on welfare networks and their high frequency in the Kariobangi Light 
Industries seem to contradict the previous results.  
Without a proper explanation this finding is indeed misleading. First of all, many groups under the 
category of “mixed financial networks” have a welfare component as well, thus the finding is not that 
Korogocho firms do not participate in welfare groups, but rather that the welfare activity is often 
                                                          
28 This terminology is borrowed from Johnson (2004). 
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combined with ROSCA and ASCA activities among the most informal enterprises. Second, participation in 
welfare groups is reciprocal, and therefore participation in welfare groups could mean actively providing 
help to other people in the network more often than receiving it, especially when entrepreneurs could 
count on relatively higher incomes. Many entrepreneurs in the Light Industries therefore reported 
participating to these family networks or clan-based groups, but this does not necessarily mean that they 
heavily relied on them in case of emergency. In many cases, entrepreneurs actually considered themselves 
as net contributors to these networks rather than net recipients of help. 
In addition to welfare groups, entrepreneurs in the Light Industries reported having a relatively 
greater preference for investment clubs (18 per cent) compared with those in the other two locations. 
Investment clubs normally invest in land or other productive activities, while some are active also in the 
stock market.29 
 
3.3.3 The role of social networks: a descriptive analysis 
After spending time in the fieldwork and interviewing entrepreneurs and financial self-help groups, 
we realized that studying social networks is a very complex task. Not only networks are intangible and 
therefore difficult to quantify: they also tend to be dynamic and to evolve over time in terms of 
membership and key objectives. We therefore decided to divide social networks in three broad categories, 
depending on the main utility they have for entrepreneurs. We asked respondent to identify the main 
purpose of the networks they participated in, and asked them to choose between 3 broad categories: (i) 
investment/business networks, (ii) saving and credit networks and (iii) solidarity networks. Barr (2002) 
identifies only two groups –innovation and solidarity networks – depending on the type of activities they 
undertake (see more detail in section 2.2.2). However during the research we realized that networks 
tended to be characterized by a large heterogeneity and that it was important to separate at least three 
groups. The difference from Barr’s research is arguably in the nature of the sample: whereas she focused 
only on the manufacturing sector and included medium-sized firms (over 30 employees), virtually none of 
the firms in Kariobangi reached that size. The nature of networks and their purpose is arguably different 
among micro and small enterprises in contexts of informality. The network characteristics and their main 
purpose are outlined in Table 9. 
 
                                                          
29 In the period between 2006 and 2010 there were several highly oversubscribed initial public offerings (IPOs) at 
the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE), which also attracted sections of Kenya’s low-income population. For a socio-
economic analysis of this, see Yenkey (2010). 
46 
 
 
Table 9: structure of networks in Kariobangi. (Source: own elaboration) 
 
Average Number 
of meetings per 
year 
Average number of 
members 
Main activities 
Investment/business 
networks 
37.2 41.3 
Information sharing 
Investment opportunities 
Learning 
Savings and credit networks 91.3 31.0 
Financial management 
Common goals 
Mutual help 
Solidarity networks 35.6 73.5 
Socialization 
Reciprocal support 
Emergencies 
Recreational 
Religious 
 
Investment/business networks were very important among growth-oriented enterprises. They 
were usually formed by businessmen in both related and unrelated sectors with the purpose of making 
common investments, promoting organizational and technological innovation and sharing of information 
about new opportunities in the market. Savings and credit associations on the other hand were by far the 
most common and their purpose was purely financial –promoting savings and credit among members. As 
we discussed in the previous section, they included groups like ROSCA, ASCAs and savings club, which 
helped entrepreneurs to manage their finances and working capital for the business’ daily operations. 
Finally, the last type of group, “solidarity networks”, usually had the purpose of helping members in case 
of necessity (funerals, hospitalization, illness, etc.), and to strengthen the ties with different types of 
communities. Solidarity networks were in fact very different one another; they can be based on ethnicity, 
family, religion or neighbourhood. 
The core question in this categorization of groups is whether they are characterized by weak or 
strong ties, and whether their purpose is business or non-business. Table 7 shows that the three groups 
differed in terms of frequency of meetings and size of the networks, and therefore in terms of 
“cohesiveness” of the network. Solidarity networks tended to be larger and meet less frequently 
compared to the savings and credit networks, which instead were smaller and tended to meet rather 
frequently. Entrepreneurial/business networks are somewhere between the two. Savings and credit 
networks were usually membership based and required a high degree of trust and interaction among 
members. Their ties therefore tended to be strongest. Solidarity networks on the other hand often 
represented different types of communities and the nature of the ties was either based on family and 
ethnicity, but also on neighbourhood (i.e. neighbourhood associations) or religion (religious groups). The 
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decision to participate in these groups can be considered to some extent exogenous: family and ethnic 
networks often existed since childhood and religious/neighbourhood associations were based on where 
the household was located. This is different compared to entrepreneurial/business networks, which 
aggregated people sharing a business-oriented focus. These ties tended to be more purpose-oriented and 
to change membership over time depending on the opportunities in the market. Thus, differently from 
previous studies we argue that it is not only the number of interactions and number of members to 
determine the strength of network ties. This also depends very strongly on the nature of the network and 
the main rationale for their establishment. 
 
3.3.4 Access to finance in the three research locations 
This section introduces the core topic of this research –the mix of formal and informal financial 
instruments used in Kariobangi and their determinants. Differently from the previous section, the set of 
financial instruments is simplified in five main typologies, three informal and two formal. Among the 
informal instruments we included moneylenders, friends and family while groups such as ROSCAs, ASCAs, 
and mixed financial networks were clustered under one category. Formal finance includes credit from 
commercial banks and MFIs.   
Figure 6 shows the number of outstanding loans that firms were repaying at the moment of the 
interview, divided by formal and informal type and location of the firm. The figures show that informal 
business in Korogocho tend to rely on informal financial instruments more than firms in the other two 
locations. Firms in the Kariobangi Light Industries instead had higher access to bank finance and the 
tailoring market used microfinance institutions more than other firms. This arguably indicates that the 
degree of formality is relevant for access to finance: higher degrees of formality simplify the access to 
bank loans whereas semi-formality facilitates the usage of microfinance institutions. Completely informal 
firms on the other hand have to rely almost entirely on savings and credit clubs for all their financial needs. 
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 Figure 6: Usage of formal and informal financial instruments in the three research locations (source: author 
fieldwork) 
 
 
Although the five financial instruments are grouped into “formal” and “informal”, this is admittedly 
an arbitrary simplification of a reality that is both complex and fast-evolving. For example, the boundaries 
between microfinance and commercial banking are somehow blurred in the Kenyan market. Many 
financial institutions that focus on the micro segment obtained a commercial banking license and 
therefore they are considered banks even though they operate similarly to MFIs30. In the MFI segment 
there is one further distinction to make between the regulated and the non-regulated MFIs. The Central 
Bank of Kenya has currently licensed eight deposit-taking microfinance institutions. The biggest one –
Kenya Women Finance Trust, has over 90 percent of the market. However there is a high number of MFIs 
that operate outside the supervisory umbrella of the CBK and their services were used by MSEs in 
Kariobangi. Thus, MFI loans should be considered at the border between formal and semi-formal finance.   
The sphere of informal is even more complex. First, the type of networks involved is very different. 
Loans from family and friends rely on personal one-to-one networks outside of the market mechanism. In 
the large majority of cases loans do not bear interest and are provided for a flexible period of time, until 
the borrower is able to pay back. Often the loans are not returned at all –they are given as some sort of 
donation31. In some occasions the donation is given from the husband to the wife and it is not expected 
back. In some cases, loans turn into donations because the borrower is unable to pay back or because the 
                                                          
30 See for example, K-REP, Jamii Bora and Equity Bank. 
31 However, the research considers only loans, not donations or grants, from family and friends. 
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lender, who usually is a wealthy friend or relative, does not put any pressure on the borrower to pay back. 
Moreover these lenders/donors do not expect a share of the profits –thus they do not own a share of the 
firm. But they are anyway in the position to ask for favors when necessary and to increase their sphere of 
influence over the borrowers in their respective family or friends’ networks. The case of donations was 
frequent but it usually involved relatively small sums. However, we found several examples in the 
Kariobangi Light Industries where the involvement of family/friends was rather different. We encountered 
the situation where a family member with a formal job reinvested its money into a business in Kariobangi 
for a share of the profits, becoming a de facto shareholder of the firm. In some cases, being able to provide 
a job to the brother or cousin was the real objective of the investment, rather than the profits themselves. 
Figure 6 (above) provides an overview of how many businesses used formal and informal financial 
instruments in the three research locations; however, it provided no details about the size of lending and 
the difference between men and women in accessing finance. Table 10 shows that banks provide the 
largest loans on average (almost 500,000 KSh), followed at a distance by moneylenders (85,000 KSh), 
which however were used by a smaller number of entrepreneurs in the sample. The only clear statistically 
significant difference between men and women concerns the size of bank loans. However, note that the 
table focuses on the average loans size among loan recipients (excluding the zeros from non-recipients). 
It does not indicate the number of entrepreneurs using these financial instruments. If we take that aspect 
into consideration, then instruments such as MFIs and informal financial networks are substantially more 
common among women than men. 
Table 10: Average size of outstanding (formal and informal) loans among men and women (in KSh). 
 Bank MFI Friend/family Financial self-help 
groups 
Moneylenders 
Male 771,548 56,000 21,558 28,677 115,100 
Female 122,330 68,944 25,080 24,860 35,867 
F-statistic 5.50** 0.33 0.1 0.83 1.48 
Average 495,030 66,130 25,584 26,488 85,071 
 
3.4 DETERMINANTS OF ACCESS TO FINANCE 
The next sections go more in-depth into the analysis of the determinants of access to finance and 
describe several models related to financial preferences and firm performance. Traditional research on 
SME access bank credit usually uses logit or probit models, and therefore they use dichotomous 
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dependent variables which take the value of 1 if the firm has access to a loan, 0 otherwise. In this research 
we try to expand the research approach by comparing the probability of receiving loans to the actual size 
of loans obtained by entrepreneurs. The probability of obtaining a loan is calculated with the multivariate 
probit model, whereas the size of loans obtained is analyzed through a multivariate OLS regression 
model32. As it will be described in the following sections, the key advantage of using multivariate models 
instead of individual probit and OLS regression is that they allow us to analyse several dependent variables 
jointly and to assess the correlation between the   residuals of the different regression equations. The two 
set of models (multivariate probit and multivariate regression) will illustrate the different determinants 
of accessing finance per se and the actual magnitude (size) of the financing instruments.  
 
3.4.1 Access to finance as a dichotomous variable (multivariate probit) 
Following Akoten, Sawada, and Otsuka (2006) we will estimate access to finance through a 
multivariate probit model which takes into consideration that since entrepreneurs use different financial 
instruments simultaneously their determinants should be analyzed jointly in a system of equations. These 
equations use a set of binary dependent variables that assume the value 1 if the entrepreneur is using the 
financial instrument at the moment of the interview and 0 otherwise. In a standard probit model with a 
single independent variable X, the cumulative distribution function is calculated as follows:  
𝑃(𝑌 = 1|𝑋 = 𝑥) =
1
√2𝜋
∫ 𝑒−𝑧
2
𝑑𝑧
𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥
−∞
 1 
where z is a standardized normal variable and e is the natural base of the log. However this paper 
studies the joint probabilities of several dependent variables, under the assumption that the probability 
of accessing different types of loans are not independent from each other. The multivariate probit model 
is therefore used to estimate several correlated binary outcomes (access or not to different types of loans) 
jointly (Greene, 2011). 
In the case of 5 dependent variables studied in this paper, there are 32 joint probabilities to be 
estimated, which correspond to 32 possible combinations of Yi=1 and Yi=0 for the five dependent 
                                                          
32 A similar research approach (comparing probability and the size of loans) was used by Craig and Hardee (2007) in 
the US and Magri (2005) in Italy. However, their context is profoundly different because Craig and Hardee (2007) 
look at the effect of bank consolidation on small businesses. Magri (2002) instead focuses on the household level 
and does not include the array of financial instruments that are analysed in this study. 
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variables. In the case of Y1=1 for all five dependent variables, Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) formalize it as 
follows33: 
P(y1 = 1, y2 = 1, y3 = 1, y4=1, y5=1) 
= P(ε1 ≤ β1′ X1, ε2 ≤ β2′ X2, ε3 ≤ β3′ X3, ε4 ≤β4′ X4,  ε5 ≤ β5′ X5 ) 
= P(ε 5 ≤ β5′ X5 | ε 4 ≤ β4′ X4 , ε 3 ≤ β3′ X3,  ε 2 ≤ β2′ X2,  ε 1 ≤ β1′ X1) x P(ε 4 ≤ 
β4′ X4 | ε 3 ≤ β3′ X3,  ε 2 ≤ β2′ X2,  ε 1 ≤ β1′ X1) x P(ε 3 ≤ β3′ X3 |  ε 2 ≤ β2′ X2,  
ε 1 ≤ β1′ X1) x P(ε 2 ≤ β2′ X2, | ε 1 ≤ β1′ X1) x P(ε 1 ≤ β1X1) 
2 
 
The same approach will be then applied to the remaining combinations of ones and zeros, which 
correspond to the different combinations of loan sources that entrepreneurs might be using 
simultaneously. 
The independent variables include a variety of characteristics related to the firm, the entrepreneur 
and the social networks he/she participates in. The equations (estimated simultaneously) include the 
presence of outstanding loans from i) Banks, ii) Family and friends, iii) microfinance institutions, iv) 
financial self-help groups such as ASCAs, ROSCAs and mixed financial networks, and v) moneylenders. The 
models are formalized as follows: 
 
{
 
 
 
 
𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 =  𝑓(𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝛽1 + 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎L_𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠𝑖 𝑖𝛽2 + 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝛽3 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝛽4 +  1𝑖)
𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 =  𝑓 (𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝛽5 + 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙_𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠𝑖𝛽6 + 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒_𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝛽7 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝛽8 +  2𝑖)
𝑆𝐻𝐺𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 =  𝑓 (𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝛽9 + 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙_𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠𝑖𝛽10 + 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒_𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝛽11 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝛽12 +  3𝑖)
𝑀𝐹𝐼𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 =  𝑓 (𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝛽13 + 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙_𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠𝑖𝛽14 + 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒_𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝛽15 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝛽16 +  4𝑖)
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 =  𝑓 (𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝛽17 + 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙_𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠𝑖𝛽18 + 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒_𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝛽19 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝛽20 +  5𝑖)}
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝒃𝒂𝒏𝒌𝒅𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚𝒊  = 1 if the entrepreneur has an outstanding loan from a bank, 0 otherwise 
𝒇𝒓𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒅𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚𝒊= 1 the entrepreneur has an outstanding loan from a friend, 0 otherwise 
𝑺𝑯𝑮𝒅𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚𝒊= 1 if the entrepreneur has an outstanding loan from a financial self-help group, 0 otherwise 
𝑴𝑭𝑰𝒅𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚𝒊= 1 if the entrepreneur has an outstanding loan from a MFI, 0 otherwise 
𝒎𝒐𝒏𝒆𝒚𝒍𝒆𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒓𝒅𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚𝒊= 1 the entrepreneur has an outstanding loan from a moneylender, 0 otherwise 
 
The variables measuring informality, networks, life-cycle and control variables are defined in Table 
11.  is an error term for which we impose the condition that Var (1i ) = Var (2i  ) = Var (3i  ) = Var (4i  ) = 
Var (5i) assuming that the mi follow a joint normal distribution.  
 
                                                          
33 The subscript I is dropped for convenience. The model then estimates 31 other combinations of possible outcomes.  
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The multivariate probit model uses a simulated maximum likelihood (SML) estimator that compares 
all those using one of the financial instruments defined in Table 11. While similar to the traditional probit 
specification, the multivariate probit model allows estimating several correlated binary outcomes jointly 
(Cappellari and Jenkins 2003). The regressions are conducted using a maximum likelihood estimator with 
a Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) smooth recursive conditioning simulator. This has several 
advantages, such as the fact that simulated probabilities are unbiased, bounded within the (0,1) interval 
and more eﬃcient in terms of the variance of the estimators of probabilities than other simulators 
(Börsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou 1993). The multivariate probit also returns a coefficient "rho" which is 
the correlation coefficient between the residuals of each of the five probit regressions. If rho is 
significantly different from zero, then the residuals of two probit regressions are found to be correlated. 
This is relevant in this research as we’ll be able to understand the correlation between the usage of 
different financial instruments.  
 
3.4.2 Access to finance as a continuous variable (multivariate regression) 
As mentioned in the previous section, in addition to assessing the probability of accessing finance 
(through the multivariate probit model), this research also investigates the determinants for the 
magnitude (size) of the financing secured from different sources. This is pursued with a multivariate 
regression model.  
Multivariate regressions differ from the more traditional multiple regressions because they allow 
several dependent variables to be regressed jointly on the same independent variables. The regression 
coefficients and standard errors are similar to those estimated through separate regression equations. 
However the key difference is that the multivariate regression estimates also the between-equation 
covariance. This is important considering that the decisions about the financial instruments (and the 
quantity borrowed) are hypothesized to be taken jointly by the entrepreneurs. In order to test the 
correlation between residuals a Breusch–Pagan test is used (Breusch and Pagan 1980). 
The identification strategy is therefore similar to the one proposed for the multivariate probit, with 
the main difference that the dependent variable is the size of loans that entrepreneurs borrowed from 
the different sources: 
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{
 
 
 
 
𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 =  𝑓(𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝛽1 + 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎L_𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠𝑖 𝑖𝛽2 + 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝛽3 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝛽4 +  1𝑖)
𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 =  𝑓 (𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝛽5 + 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙_𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠𝑖𝛽6 + 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒_𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝛽7 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝛽8 +  2𝑖)
𝑆𝐻𝐺𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 =  𝑓 (𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝛽9 + 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙_𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠𝑖𝛽10 + 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒_𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝛽11 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝛽12 +  3𝑖)
𝑀𝐹𝐼𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 =  𝑓 (𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝛽13 + 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙_𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠𝑖𝛽14 + 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒_𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝛽15 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝛽16 +  4𝑖)
𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 =  𝑓 (𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝛽17 + 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙_𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑠𝑖𝛽18 + 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒_𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑖𝛽19 +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝛽20 +  5𝑖)}
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 11: definition of explanatory variables 
Variable grouping Variable name Variable description 
Firm-level 
Formality 
Highformality Dummy=1 for businesses complying with 3 or more 
government requirements (tax, registration, license, labor 
contracts, authorized location) 
Mediumformality Dummy=1 for businesses complying with 1 or 2 
government requirements 
Lowformality  
(reference dummy - omitted from 
regression results) 
Dummy=1 for businesses not complying with any 
government requirement. This variable is used as 
reference variable and therefore does not appear in the 
regression results in Table 12. 
Entrepreneur-level 
formality 
Formalexp Number of months of employment in formal sector firms 
before starting this enterprise 
Informalexp Number of months of employment in informal sector firms 
before starting this enterprise 
Social networks 
Invnetdummy Dummy=1 for entrepreneurs participating in networks 
whose main purpose is to promote investments and 
business opportunities. 
Savnetdummy Dummy=1 for entrepreneurs participating in networks 
whose main purpose is to promote savings and credit 
among members 
Solnetdummy Dummy=1 for entrepreneurs participating in networks 
whose main purpose is to tackle emergencies when they 
arise 
Life-cycle Ageofbusiness Number of years a business has been in operation 
Controls 
Genderdummy Dummy=1 for women 
Education Number of years of formal schooling 
Networth Value of capital for machinery, buildings, furniture and 
vehicles owned by the business 
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A number of clarifications are necessary for the two modes estimated in Table 12. First, we are 
including the original loan size for the credits that were still being repaid at the moment of the interview.  
We did not consider the current “balance” of the loan (amount still to be repaid), otherwise we would 
have lost information about the size of loans that entrepreneurs are able to obtain. So if an entrepreneur 
still had to pay the equivalent of $50 out of a loan of $5,000, we considered the original loan size of $5,000. 
Second, for the category “family/friends” we considered only the sums that were supposed to be paid 
back to the lender, even if they had a zero percent interest rate. So we decided not to include the 
donations or grants given for charitable purposes, because we decided to focus on the debt instruments 
itself and not on other instruments in these empirical models34.  
When it comes to finance from financial self-help groups the question is whether certain sums 
should be considered loans or simple savings mechanisms. The issue is particularly evident in ROSCAs, as 
the money is given to members on a rotating basis, not as a loan. The line between credit and savings is 
however very thin, as it depends on whether the entrepreneur receives the “pot” at the beginning of the 
cycle or at the end. If the pot is received at the beginning, it can be considered as a type of loan with no 
interest, as the member will be required to participate at every single meeting and progressively pay back 
the amount that was advanced to him/her by the group. If the entrepreneur is at the end of the cycle, 
then the system resembles a form of saving mechanism. The line between the two is therefore a very thin 
one, but we decided to include it as a debt instrument because the lump-sum received was often very 
important for the financing of the firms. The size of the lump-sum that we included in this model was the 
amount disbursed by the ROSCA in any one cycle. For example, if a ROSCA was composed of ten members 
who contributed 1,000 Ksh monthly, then the lump-sum distributed on a rotating-basis was calculated to 
be 10,000 KSh during the last cycle under consideration. Finally, when it comes to moneylenders, the main 
difficulty was that respondents sometimes did not like sharing the information or they masked it as “loans 
from a friend”. The wrong information was easy to capture however because we asked about the interest 
rates on the loans. If it was very high, we asked again if the lender was a friend or a “shylock” as it is 
commonly called in Nairobi, so in most cases we could categorize the loan accurately. In some cases, we 
might have missed the data point completely. The difficulty to get information on moneylenders is 
arguably one of the reasons why almost all studies on the firm’s finance show a very low reliance of 
                                                          
34 Although this issue is not discussed explicitly in most literature, other studies make similar assumptions and 
focus on loans from relative or friends rather than charitable donations. For more information on the difference 
between the two see Collins et al (2009) and Armendàriz and Murdoch (2010). 
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entrepreneurs on this source of finance (see for example, Fafchamps et al. 1994, and Akoten, Sawada, 
and Otsuka 2006, among others).           
As mentioned before, this study tries to compare the influence of explanatory variables on both 
the usage of different financial instruments (binary variable) as well as the size of loans from the different 
sources (continuous variable). Table 12 shows side-by-side the results of the multivariate probit model 
(column A) and the multivariate regression model (column B).   
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Table 12: The determinants of the probability of accessing formal and informal finance. Multivariate probit analysis (column a), and multivariate regression (column b).  
  (1) 
Bank 
(2) 
MFI 
(3) 
Self-Help groups 
(4) 
Friends/Family 
(5) 
Moneylenders 
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Loan usage 
(binary) 
Loan size Loan usage 
(binary) 
Loan size Loan usage 
(binary) 
Loan size Loan usage 
(binary) 
Loan size Loan usage 
(binary) 
Loan size 
           
formalexp 0.00555*** 883.0**  0.000391    11.55    -0.00369*   -36.02    -0.00487*   -23.14    -0.00126    -228.6    
 (3.00)    (2.11)    (0.15)    (0.47)    (-1.80)    (-1.14)    (-1.93)    (-1.28)    (-0.56)    (-1.62)    
           
informalexp 0.000202    344.3    0.000353    15.61    -0.00345**  -31.97    -0.000565    11.84    -0.00296    -52.97    
 (0.19)    (1.27)    (0.20)    (0.98)    (-2.41)    (-1.56)    (-0.45)    (1.01)    (-1.61)    (-0.58)    
           
highformality 0.681**  -18077.8    0.657*   2851.8    -0.298    2958.1    -0.439    -460.2    0.159    45068.9**  
 (2.20)    (-0.29)    (1.74)    (0.77)    (-0.92)    (0.62)    (-1.41)    (-0.17)    (0.50)    (2.11)    
           
genderummy 0.488**  -6430.8    0.781*** 7016.5*** 0.528**  1850.8    -0.193    -1018.2    0.0866    -11513.8    
 (2.23)    (-0.16)    (2.92)    (2.89)    (2.38)    (0.59)    (-1.13)    (-0.57)    (0.39)    (-0.82)    
           
mediumformality 0.195    -65390.9    0.159    4412.0*   -0.0463    2465.7    0.0700    5325.3*** -0.241    2692.8    
 (0.83)    (-1.48)    (0.55)    (1.70)    (-0.19)    (0.74)    (0.37)    (2.79)    (-0.96)    (0.18)    
           
Networth35 0.000569**  0.324*** -0.000200    0.00123    0.000126    0.0103*** -0.000398    -0.000344    0.000075    0.0186**  
 (2.53)    (12.53)    (-0.77)    (0.81)    (1.05)    (5.24)    (-1.36)    (-0.31)    (0.67)    (2.12)    
           
                                                          
35 Measurement unit for this variable is in thousands (‘000) Kenyan Shillings 
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ageofbusiness 0.0128    3920.4    0.00599    67.62    0.00205    -304.9    0.00876    -40.43    0.00839    124.1    
 (0.86)    (1.33)    (0.33)    (0.39)    (0.13)    (-1.37)    (0.68)    (-0.32)    (0.53)    (0.12)    
           
educ -0.00328    -3998.4    0.0846*   672.6    -0.0125    -662.3    0.0374    378.5    0.00467    -737.2    
 (-0.10)    (-0.56)    (1.82)    (1.60)    (-0.31)    (-1.22)    (1.15)    (1.22)    (0.11)    (-0.30)    
           
Invnetdummy 0.266    192484.6*** 0.0369    -2819.8    1.359*** 17344.6*** -0.0930    -1096.7    0.476    -5276.7    
 (0.91)    (3.04)    (0.10)    (-0.76)    (4.08)    (3.62)    (-0.31)    (-0.40)    (1.61)    (-0.25)    
           
Savnetdummy -0.195    -16635.9    0.463*   2394.9    2.483*** 16538.3*** 0.0573    482.4    0.127    15160.1    
 (-0.92)    (-0.39)    (1.65)    (0.95)    (11.21)    (5.12)    (0.32)    (0.26)    (0.55)    (1.05)    
           
Solnetdummy 0.174    28648.2    0.417*   4764.4**  0.356*   1987.5    -0.0979    -1281.2    0.0661    9251.4    
 (0.91)    (0.75)    (1.79)    (2.11)    (1.70)    (0.69)    (-0.59)    (-0.77)    (0.33)    (0.71)    
           
_cons -1.919*** -57865.6    -3.561*** -13571.1**  -1.138**  10530.8    -0.884**  900.3    -1.504*** 1599.9    
 (-4.04)    (-0.62)    (-5.28)    (-2.46)    (-2.22)    (1.49)    (-2.11)    (0.22)    (-2.83)    (0.05)    
Multivariate Probit: Wald chi2(55) = 235.83. Prob > Chi2 = 0.000 
Multivariate regression: F(11, 313) = 1.50. Prob > F = 0.1288 
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3.5 ESTIMATION RESULTS  
Comparing the multivariate probit model and multivariate OLS regressions show interesting 
patterns of access to finance in Kariobangi for the five financial instruments analysed in this study. 
The first main finding is that differently from what was hypothesized in the life cycle theory of 
capital structure, the age of the firm does not seem to be related to the type of financial instruments used 
by entrepreneurs. Although the previous section has shown that formal finance (from banks and MFIs) is 
indeed very rare in the start-up phase of the business (see Figure 4), and therefore it seems to indicate 
that the life-cycle theory is relevant in the early stages of the business, there seem to be no empirical 
evidence on the relation between age of the firm and the reliance on external finance. The relation 
between bank finance and age of the firm is positive, both in terms of probability of having a loan and size 
of the loans obtained, however the relation is not statistically significant. More research is however 
needed in this field.   
 On the other hand, formality and informality at the entrepreneur and enterprise level seem to 
play a very important role, especially when we analyse access to bank finance. In particular, an important 
determinant for access to bank finance is the experience of entrepreneurs in formal sector firms. Banks 
seem to value formal sector experience because they see it as a proxy for higher skills, knowledge of the 
sector, reliability and ability to repay. In fact longer experience in the formal sector was associated with 
both a higher probability of accessing bank loans as well as larger average loan sizes. At the same time, 
experience in the formal sector is negatively associated with probability and size of loans from family and 
friends as well as financial self-help groups, which arguably become a second best option once the 
entrepreneur gain access to bank finance. The length of experience in informal sector firms is also 
negatively associated with the usage of financial self-help groups. This finding is interesting, because it 
shows that reliance on self-help groups tends to be more common among entrepreneurs who recently 
entered the market, especially those with little job experience in both formal and informal sector.  
Firm-level formality seem to play an important role as well in the Kenyan market of small enterprise 
finance. The regression shows that having a high degree of formality (higher compliance with government 
regulation) increases the probability of having access to bank finance as well as MFI finance. However it 
does not affect the size of the loan that entrepreneurs are able to secure from these institutions. The size 
of the firms’ capital (networth in Table 12) is evidently a much stronger determinant of both access to 
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credit and size of the loans. This suggests that most of the financing available for MSEs is still collateral-
based lending, although micro-enterprises are by definition lacking this sort of capital.  
At the same time, high formality seems to be associated with larger loans from moneylenders. This 
may appear as an unexpected finding. However during fieldwork we noticed two very different ways of 
using “shylocks” in the market: one, which we found more often among the Korogocho street traders, is 
the “emergency-lending” – entrepreneurs did not have sufficient capital to purchase new material (or 
stock) and they indebted themselves with local moneylenders. In several occasions they had difficulties 
repaying the loans or even had to discontinue their business. Other businesses used moneylenders in a 
more dynamic way, almost regularly during the year. Although moneylenders are generally expensive, 
they tend to be flexible and much faster than formal banks and informal self-help groups. Some growth-
oriented businesses, especially those in the Kariobangi light industries, used moneylenders to finance 
cash-flows or other sudden expenses that were necessary to expand their activities. Other businesses also 
used moneylenders as an additional source of money to retained earnings to finance capital investments, 
mostly because banks were reluctant to provide credit with maturity above 12 months. This will be 
analysed more in-depth in the essay 2.  
What was more surprising, however, is that the regression shows that other things being equal, 
women had a higher probability of using loans from banks. This is a rather unique finding, which is 
arguably affected by the structure of the sample and the characteristics of the research location. In 
particular, we found a relatively high number of women in Kariobangi market having the possibility of 
accessing group loans from formal institutions. Many businesses in Kariobangi market in fact operated for 
a relatively long period of time and although they were small in size and turnover, they were well 
established and could count on relatively stable flows of income. The specific characteristics of Kariobangi 
Market therefore plays a key role in explaining the findings of the research, but this finding is unlikely to 
be confirmed if we do research on a wider population of small businesses in Nairobi. 
Finally, the regression model looks at how medium-formality affects access to finance. Table 12 
shows that this variable is associated with larger average loans from microfinance institutions and from 
friends and relatives, while it is not significantly associated with loans from commercial banks. The reason 
is that sometimes semi-formal firms do not qualify for individual loans from banks and they have to rely 
on the group lending model used by MFIs. Also, it is important to remind that many semi-formal firms in 
the sample were owned by women, especially those in the Kariobangi market, who have been an 
important target market for microfinance institutions. The regression results also show that semi-formal 
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firms do not increase the probability of using loans from family and friends, but the sums received are 
larger compared to other firms. This shows that medium-formality tends to increase the size of lending 
transactions within the personal network of family and friends. 
 The role of social networks in access to finance brings mixed evidence. Quite predictably, 
participation in social networks is strongly correlated with usage of loans from financial self-help groups, 
especially investment networks and savings and credit associations, whereas solidarity networks are less 
important for enterprise finance. The more interesting finding however is that participation in investment 
networks seems associated with larger loans from commercial banks. Many entrepreneurs, in fact, 
decided to participate in investment networks because they tended to be on the lookout for growth 
opportunities. These networks often stimulates investments either through the sharing of information 
about business opportunities or through the creation of joint ventures among members. This role of 
investment networks was confirmed during the qualitative interviews.  
 Participation in solidarity networks on the other hand seems to be associated only with the 
reliance on MFI financing. The reason is quite predictable: since MFI largely rely on group lending in the 
relationship with their clients, then these solidarity networks represent a stepping stone for engaging with 
microfinance institutions. Participation in MFIs is strongly correlated also with gender, in fact women 
continue to represent the largest share of MFI clients. The data also shows that businesses characterized 
by medium formality tend to have access to larger loans.    
 Finally, it is important to analyze the results of the variance-covariance matrix of the error terms 
(“rho”) of the multivariate probit model described above. The positive or negative covariance of the error 
terms between two credit sources indicates that unobserved factors affect the chances that an 
entrepreneur uses simultaneously two different credit sources. A positive coefficient between two credit 
sources indicate that usage of one credit source increases the chances that the entrepreneur uses the 
other. A negative coefficient on the other hand indicates that two credit sources are unlikely to be used 
simultaneously.    
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Table 13: variance-covariance matrix of the residual terms 
  Coeff Std Error Z P>|z| 95% confidence interval 
rho21 Banks-MFIs    -.2722141    .2102666 -1.29    0.195 -.6195969     .1643394 
rho31 Banks – 
Financial self-
help groups 
    .1729258    .1399469 1.24    0.217 -.1076462     .4279849 
rho41    Banks-
Friends/family 
 .2130297    .1052799 2.02    0.043 .0001887     .4074061 
rho51    Banks-
Moneylenders 
-.0268121    .1317464 -0.20    0.839 -.2777317     .2275323 
rho32    MFI- Financial 
self-help 
groups 
-.1044424    .1764913 -0.59    0.554 -.4256369     .2401251 
rho42    MFI-
Friends/family 
-.1302455    .1365979 -0.95    0.340 -.3828004     .1404234 
rho52    MFIs – 
Moneylenders 
 .3423807    .1508187 2.27    0.023 .0219312     .5990339 
rho43    Financial self-
help groups – 
Friends/Family 
-.0103702    .1133815 -0.09    0.927 -.2285113     .2087624 
rho53    Moneylenders 
- Financial SHG 
-.0027379    .1480093 -0.02    0.985 -.2847402     .2797006 
rho54    Moneylenders 
–Friend/family 
 .0708552    .1299441 0.55    0.586 -.1829148      .315773 
Likelihood ratio test of  rho21 = rho31 = rho41 = rho51= rho32 = rho42 = rho52 = rho43 = rho53 = rho54 = 0: chi2(10) =  12.3947   
Prob> chi2 = 0.2595 
 
 
Table 13 shows that the error term between banks and family/friends is positively and significantly 
correlated. We encountered in fact numerous businesses that combined the two types of credit sources 
to finance their working capital and investments: on the one hand, banks provided the larger sums used 
to finance the bigger expenses like capital investments and large purchases of raw material or stock of 
products. On the other hand, businesses had to face the day-to-day expenses, such as paying rent for the 
premise and paying the casual labour, which required higher disbursement flexibility and usually much 
smaller amounts. An unexpected finding was that some entrepreneurs combined usage of MFIs and 
moneylenders. There is in fact a large body of literature describing cases of microfinance clients who are 
unable to repay the loans and therefore indebt themselves with ruthless moneylenders (see Roodman, 
2012). Even though many entrepreneurs complained about the high cost of borrowing from MFIs during 
our fieldwork, only a few entrepreneurs referred to the need to borrow extra money from moneylenders 
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to repay these loans. Nevertheless, the statistically significant result brings further evidence that 
microfinance and moneylenders often serve and compete for the same market segment.  
 
 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This research has shown that the financial landscape for MSEs in Nairobi is very rich and 
diversified, and that entrepreneurs tend to borrow simultaneously from different sources, formal and 
informal, market and non-market, depending on the characteristics of the businesses and the personal 
preferences of entrepreneurs. Thus, an important finding of this research is that far from operating in an 
“institutional vacuum” or suffering from a complete lack of financing options, MSEs in Nairobi are likely 
to use a mix of financial instruments and, surprisingly, are actively connected with both financial self-help 
groups (ROSCAs, ASCAs, etc.) and formal financial institutions (banks, MFIs). The focus of most literature 
on the limited access (or exclusion) of MSEs to formal finance is not useful because it overlooks the 
complex dynamics within the context of informality and the potential for unconventional financial 
instruments to promote the survival and growth of MSEs. 
The descriptive section has quantified the vital importance of financial self-help groups in the daily 
operations of MSEs. Figure 6 as shown that financial self-help groups are by far the most common 
financing instrument used by entrepreneurs, followed by loans from family and friends and commercial 
banks as third. However, the credit sources vary widely between the three research locations (Kariobangi 
Light Industries, Kariobangi Market, Korogocho second-hand market) arguably because the businesses 
differ in terms of size, main activity and degree of formality.  Figure 5 in fact shows that only 16 percent 
of the sample in our research study did not belong to any financial group, but there are large within-
sample differences: almost one quarter of MSEs in the Kariobangi Light Industries (which tend to have a 
higher degree of formality) did not participate in any such institutions; whereas for MSEs in Korogocho, 
which tend to be highly informal, the proportion was only 9 per cent. The finding therefore seems to 
confirm our hypothesis that the reliance on formal or informal credit sources is related to the degree of 
formality of the business.  
The descriptive section also brought evidence that financial self-help groups tend to play a less 
important role in the start-up phase of a business. Figure 4 shows that the majority used their own savings 
from previous jobs and loans (or grants) from family or friends. The contribution of financial self-help 
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groups was significant but limited, especially for men. This finding seems to indicate that personal ties 
such as friends or family are more important than informal financial groups for new entrepreneurs, 
whereas more complex organizational forms such as ASCAs and ROSCAs become important when the 
business is established and functioning. However, further analysis is needed to test the hypotheses 
emerging from the field research. 
 Sections 3.5 and 3.6 of the paper used multivariate regression models (probit and OLS) to study 
the determinants of access to finance. In particular, they looked at the role of (i) informality (ii) social 
networks and (iii) the firm life-cycle in addition to control variables on the size of businesses, gender, age 
and education.  Informality was separated in two components: firm-level informality, which indicates the 
degree of compliance of the business with government regulations (taxes, business registration, licenses, 
labour contracts, etc.); and entrepreneur-level informality, which looks at how long entrepreneurs had 
worked in formal/informal firms before starting the business. The latter variable was analysed in a rather 
exploratory fashion, since there is very little literature available on this topic. The only indication found in 
the literature is related to the notion of “managerial capital” proposed by Bruhn et al (2010), which 
stresses the importance of previous job experience in enterprise performance. Nevertheless, it proved to 
have a strong explanatory power: Table 12 shows that longer periods of employment in formal businesses 
are associated with a higher chance of using bank finance and overall larger loan amounts from banks. At 
the same time, they are associated with lower probability of relying on financial self-help groups and 
family and friends. Firm-level formality proved to be important as well: it is associated with a higher 
probability of borrowing from commercial banks. However, being “highly formal” is not significantly 
associated with the ability to borrow larger sums from banks. The size of capital owned by the business 
(machinery, buildings, vehicles, inventory, etc.) was by far the strongest determinant for the size of loans 
that entrepreneurs were able to obtain from commercial banks. This arguably proves the fact that most 
lending from banks is dependent on the collateral owned by firms. 
 The life-cycle hypothesis explained in section 2.1.3 was not supported by the data. The main 
variable used to test this hypothesis was the age of the firms (years of operation). However we found no 
evidence that the formality of financing instruments used by entrepreneurs changed over time as the 
business becomes more mature. We found partial evidence for this hypothesis in the descriptive statistics: 
comparing Figure 4 and Figure 6 shows that whereas bank finance was almost inexistent during the start-
up phase, it became more important over time. However, the research shows that it is not the age of the 
firm per se that increases the chances of accessing formal credit, but rather other variables such as the 
formality of the firm, social networks and the job experience of the entrepreneurs. It is important to 
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consider that MSEs in the sample were rather heterogeneous, involving some growth-oriented small firms 
as well as survival micro-enterprises, which hardly changed in size and operations over the course of the 
years. Our impression is that further research is necessary in this field: although our study does not 
support the life-cycle hypothesis, we believe that it should not be discarded entirely, as it may be relevant 
for firms operating in specific industry segments and that show stronger growth potential.  
The role of social networks in access to finance has shown mixed evidence as well. This study has 
tried to develop an exploratory approach, where entrepreneurs were divided according to their 
participation in (i) investment/entrepreneurial networks, (ii) saving and credit networks and (iii) solidarity 
networks. The objective was to understand whether participation in these networks had an effect on the 
probability of using external (formal or informal) finance, and the size of loans that entrepreneurs were 
able to borrow. A noteworthy finding is that participation in investment networks is associated with larger 
loan sizes from commercial banks. The reason is arguably the fact that investment networks tended to 
stimulate investments either through the sharing of information about business opportunities or through 
the creation of joint ventures among members. However, a more comprehensive analysis of the network 
effects on access to finance should be conducted on a larger scale, either through the analysis of larger 
samples or through the analysis of more specific industry segments. In fact, although the empirical data-
collection focused on MSEs in a specific area of Nairobi (Kariobangi), the types of businesses were 
considerably diverse.  
The fact that businesses were characterized by different degrees of formality allowed us to isolate 
the role of informality on access to finance, knowing that other important factors could be left constant, 
such as the geographical distance from financial providers and average incomes among others. This has 
shed light on how compliance with Government regulation and experience in the formal sector affect 
access and usage of financial service. At the same time, having a sample of firms with different degrees of 
informality made the analysis more difficult on other dimensions. For example, certain variables such as 
age and education might have had a significant effect in a subpopulation of firms, but not in others. The 
small sample size however made it difficult to conduct analyses within the subpopulations. The paper has 
nevertheless addressed some important gaps in the literature on access to finance by small businesses, 
applying a financial landscape approach and showing that there are numerous factors affecting access 
and usage of credit. It contributed with an improved understanding of the role of social networks in access 
to finance and the role played by enterprise and entrepreneur’s informality. 
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Essay 2 
 
Access to finance and firm performance 
Analysing the effects of different loan sources on the performance of micro and small 
enterprises in Nairobi (Kenya) 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in promoting financial inclusion among micro 
and small enterprises (MSEs) as a means to alleviate poverty, generate employment and fuel economic 
growth. Core strategies to promote MSE growth have been the improvement of access to credit, under 
the assumption that many entrepreneurs lack resources to finance capital investments, and are 
hampered by cash-flow and working capital problems. The theoretical argument embraced by the 
field of microfinance is that if small entrepreneurs are granted access to external finance, they will 
trigger a virtuous cycle of business expansion and will be able to generate employment and growth. 
Recent studies have investigated whether this is actually the case, and have employed 
randomized control trial (RCT) techniques to investigate whether access to external credit or grants 
leads to increased investments, profits and return to capital among microenterprises (De Mel, 
McKenzie, and Woodruff 2008; Zinman and Karlan 2009; McKenzie and Woodruff 2008). Many studies 
found heterogeneity in the results, often noticing a marked gender difference in performance and 
limited, even negative impact on investments. These studies however focus on either grants or on one 
type of credit - formal microfinance loans - while we know that financial landscapes in low-income 
areas are extremely diverse and entrepreneurs often borrow from a variety of sources, such as friends 
and family, commercial banks, moneylenders and rotating credit and savings associations (Akoten, 
Sawada, and Otsuka 2006; Johnson 2004; Collins et al. 2009). While money is fungible, and therefore 
a money injection should have the same effects on enterprise performance irrespective of its source, 
very little research has been conducted to confirm this hypothesis. 
The hypothesis in this study is that the effects of credit on firm performance are related to the 
source of the loan: since social ties involved in lending transactions are very different, so is the risk-
aversion of the entrepreneurs as well as the attitudes and preferences towards investing the money 
received. On the one hand, these effects are related to the different terms and conditions attached to 
the loans, such as interest rates, maturity, repayment schedule and size of the loan. A loan from a 
relative is likely to be both smaller and more flexible than a loan from a commercial bank. In addition 
71 
 
to the different terms and conditions, the source of the loan might affect firm performance also 
because the social capital involved in these lending transactions is very different. Loans from relatives 
or friends can be tangled in a web of social ties, whereas loans from commercial banks are more 
impersonal and rely on the presence of physical collateral. The different social ties linking creditor and 
borrower might affect how the loan is used in multiple ways, for example by changing the attitude 
towards risk or by affecting the investment preferences and behaviors. For example, loans within the 
family might increase the expectations of reciprocity on the borrower, who could be expected to 
provide jobs or favors to the lender at the expense of profitability. On the other hand, bank loans 
could incentivize risk-taking behaviors and investments because they are more impersonal. However 
little literature has focused on these questions.  
Testing this hypothesis requires a carefully designed methodology. This study is based on 
observational data, which is normally considered less effective than randomized control trials in the 
analysis of impact. However, our argument is that the approach of RCTs would be very difficult to 
implement for the type of questions addressed in this study. If the effect of loans is affected by the 
relationship with the borrower, this means that RCT-type experiments (i.e. randomized loans or 
grants) would produce different results than loans received from other sources. Many RCTs simply 
provide “increased access” to loans from specific microfinance institutions. Others, such as Fafchamps 
et al. (2014) and De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2008) directly provide randomized grants to 
microentrepreneurs without relying on any formal or informal institutions. While these studies have 
the advantage of reducing the self-selection bias and producing reliable estimates for borrowers and 
non-borrowers, they also create situation where capital injections are detached and decontextualized 
from the reality where entrepreneurs operate. If an entrepreneur receives 1,000 USD from her sister, 
from a self-help group of entrepreneurs or from a research institute providing randomized grants, we 
have reasons to believe that the money will be used differently, in part because these amounts come 
with different terms and conditions, in part because the different social ties attached to them lead to 
different risk propensity, preferences and attitudes towards investments. The effects on firm 
performance therefore might differ as well. 
In this research we look at the impact on enterprise performance of formal and informal credit 
in a real (i.e. non-experimental) setting. Taking into account the methodological drawbacks of RCTs, 
this paper analyses micro and small enterprises which are comparable in size, location, type of 
business36 and background of the entrepreneurs but differ in the type of loan they have used. 
                                                          
36 As described in Essay 1, the sample of businesses studied in the survey could be categorized in three groups: 
small manufacturing firms, tailoring activities and retail traders. While the three groups differed in size and 
core activity, the homogeneity within these groups was relatively high. This represent an appropriate scenario 
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Propensity score matching is used to estimate whether access to formal and informal credit has 
different impacts on firm performance. Statistical matching is a methodology where “treated” 
individuals (e.g. entrepreneurs who had access to a bank loan) are compared to a control group of 
individuals whose observable characteristics (age, sector, size of business, etc.) are similar but differ 
because they did not participate in the treatment (i.e. in this case, they did not borrow). Since we 
focus on a local neighbourhood in Nairobi where businesses have comparable characteristics, it is 
easier to control for external conditions such as distance to the service providers and income levels. 
The research looks at five financial instruments: loan from commercial banks, loan from MFIs, loan 
from moneylenders, loans from family/friends and loans from financial self-help groups such as 
ROSCAs and ASCAs. The effect on firm performance is calculated by analysing the business 
investments, profitability and employment growth. 
The findings of the empirical investigation show that loans from commercial banks tend to lead 
to both higher investments and employment growth, but they do not seem to have a significant impact 
on firms’ profitability. Informal loans from family and friends or money-lenders seem to affect 
positively investments, though the results are not very robust. On the other hand, there is no 
indication that informal loans have an impact on employment growth or profitability. One of the 
interesting results of the study is that loans from microfinance institutions seem to have a negative 
and significant effect of firm investments. The reasons identified for this finding are qualitative in 
nature, and they involve the drivers that encourage entrepreneurs to apply for a loan at a microfinance 
institution instead of a bank, and the fact that although many MFI loans are obtained for business 
purposes, they are actually invested at the household level. This confirms the findings of other studies 
such as Zinman and Karlan (2009) and De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2008).    
Next sections are organized as follows: section 2 reviews the literature on access to finance and 
firm performance as well as literature on behavioral finance and mental accounting. The latter 
literature is used to explain why the source of the loan might affect how the money is used and 
ultimately the impact on firm performance. Section 3 describes the study objectives and limitations 
and section 4 describe the econometric strategy used in the empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses the 
results and section 6 concludes. 
                                                          
for the study design used in this paper which matches observations with similar characteristics. This will be 
described in more detail in the methodological section. 
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2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The next sections review strands of literature related to finance and micro-enterprise 
performance as well as mental accounting and behavioral aspects of financial management. Section 
2.1 reviews literature that deals with the impact of credit and other financial services on firm 
performance and section 2.2 looks at the impact of in-kind and cash grants on the performance of 
micro-enterprise. These studies often use the term “exogenous shocks” because their key objective is 
to understand the effects of additional capital injections on enterprise performance rather than the 
effects of specific financial services per se. Section 2.3 reviews a rather different literature on mental 
accounting and the role of behavioral finance in order to understand how different loan sources might 
affect the performance of firms.  
2.1 ACCESS TO FINANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Does increased access to finance promote business growth? This question has been tested in 
experimental settings by various scholars over the last few years, and the results have varied 
depending on the characteristics of the sample, the location of the research or the design of the 
experiment.   
In one of the most notorious studies in this field, Zinman and Karlan (2009) use an RCT to test 
whether increased access to microfinance lending leads to microenterprise growth in the Philippines. 
In order to do so, they drew a sample of 1600 businesses from a pool of microenterprises which had 
applied for a loan at a local bank and were considered marginally creditworthy by the institution. The 
creditworthiness of the applicants was computed with a credit scoring algorithm that had been 
recently introduced by the bank, and takes account of business skills, financial resources and 
demographic characteristics among other variables. The scores ranged from 0 to 100: applicants 
below 31 were rejected, and those above 59 were approved automatically. Those in between 31 and 
59 were considered partially creditworthy.  After identifying the sample37, the authors randomized 
the provision of loans to some of the businesses considered partially creditworthy and studied the 
effects on business performance.   
The findings are very surprising. First, they find some evidence that profits increased for treated 
male entrepreneurs, but the profitability of female-owned businesses remained unaffected. Zinman 
and Karlan (2009) specify that since they have a small sample, they cannot analyze whether these 
                                                          
37 The majority of these businesses were run by women (85 percent) with relatively high levels of education 
(93 percent had high-school degrees) and relatively wealthy compared to the national average 
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differences are driven by social status, household bargaining or occupational choice, which are likely 
to play an important role. The authors also find that the treatment group in addition to having access 
to the loan reported also increased usage of informal credit arrangements, mostly used to absorb 
shocks. Thus, differently from popular belief, access to formal credit does not seem to crowd-out 
informal borrowing. Finally, they find that the size of treated businesses shrank after receiving credit: 
“In all, we find that increased access to microcredit leads to less investment in the targeted business, 
to substitution away from labor and into education, and to substitution away from insurance (both 
explicit/formal, and implicit/informal) even as overall access to risk-sharing  mechanisms increases” 
(Zinman and Karlan 2009:5)  The authors therefore argue that microcredit does have important effects 
in the livelihood of borrowers, but these effects are different from those advertised by the 
microfinance movement: the main benefits are related to improved risk management and increased 
investments at the household level; though the effects on microenterprise development are very 
limited. 
Another important study was conducted by Banerjee and Duflo (2014) in India, who study 
whether medium and large firms are credit constrained and would borrow more given the 
opportunity. The firms studied in this research were formally registered and had a relatively large 
capital compared to Indian firms, therefore the target group here is rather different from the 
microenterprises studied by Zinman and Karlan (2009). However the study is particularly important 
from a methodological point of view, and it allows to understand the effect of finance beyond the 
informal, micro-enterprise level. Banerjee and Duflo (2014) take advantage of a rather unique 
combination of policies that affected an identifiable subset of enterprises in India which initially gained 
and then lost eligibility for directed credit. The Indian Government in fact made two changes in the 
definition of their “priority sector” which was entitled to obtain bank loans at favorable conditions. 
Before 1998, the program targeted smaller businesses with an asset size below 6.5 million rupees. A 
policy change in 1998 expanded the eligibility to the program to larger firms, increasing the maximum 
capital size up to 30 million Rupees. The second policy change occurred two years later in 2000, when 
the eligibility was decreased again to firms with capital below 10 million Rupees. These two policy 
changes allowed Banerjee and Duflo (2014) to identify whether firms are credit constrained. The idea 
is that while both unconstrained and constrained businesses would prefer directed credit to other 
sources of credit because of its more favourable conditions; constrained firms would use it to invest 
and expand production, unconstrained firms would primarily use it as a substitute for other 
borrowing. Banerjee and Duflo (2014) use a triple difference approach: they observe the rate of 
change in variables such as borrowing, profits and investments before and after firms became eligible 
to the program in 1998, and compare these results to firms which were already eligible. After the 
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second policy change in 2000, they exploit the fact that a large portion of these firms lost their 
eligibility and look at their borrowing behavior and effects on performance. 
The study shows that firms are in fact credit constrained and willing to borrow more once given 
the opportunity: when larger firms qualified for directed credit in 1998, they expanded their 
borrowing relatively faster than those that were already eligible as well as those that were never 
included. When the eligibility was discontinued, these larger firms reduced borrowing much more 
than other firms. The analysis of sales and probability for the two groups of businesses38 show that 
when directed credit was extended to larger firms, it was not used to substitute other sources of 
credit, but rather it was used to finance investments and expand production: sales and profits in fact 
grew for larger firms in 1998, and declined correspondingly in 2000 after the second policy change. 
There was no change instead for the small firms. 
In another study in rural Mongolia, Attanasio et al. (2014) conduct a randomized experiment to 
understand the effect of microfinance services on business creation and expansion. Differently from 
most other RCTs reviewed in this section, they randomize at the village level instead of the individual 
level and they have a particular focus on low-income women borrowers. Their experiment started in 
2008 when loan officers from a local bank and representatives of the Mongolian Women's Federation 
organized information sessions in 40 rural villages. In these sessions they explained that there was a 
two-thirds probability that a microfinance service would start in their village and that lending could 
be either individual or group loans. In order to keep the focus on poor women, eligible participants 
had to own less than approximately 900 US dollars in assets and less than 174 US Dollars in monthly 
profits. The study finds that group loans had a positive impact on food consumption, entrepreneurship 
and profits, which increased 10 percent faster in the treatment villages and even 30 percent among 
the less educated women. Their findings on individual lending are weaker. Women in the sample did 
acquire more assets such as VCRs, radios or other household appliances, however they do not find 
significant increases in income or consumption.  
Finally, another study worth mentioning was conducted in Western Kenya by Dupas and 
Robinson (2013). This RCT is different compared to the other studies because instead of providing 
increased access to credit, the researchers facilitated access to a basic bank savings account. The 
sample frame was randomly divided into treatment and control groups, stratified by gender and 
occupation. There were two main occupations studied in the research: market vendors, most of whom 
were women, and bicycle drivers, usually called boda boda in Swahili, all of whom were men. The 
                                                          
38 The two groups are (i) small firms which were always eligible to directed credit; (ii) larger firms who first 
gained and then lost eligibility to directed credit. 
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treatment group was offered the option to open an account at a local bank at no cost39, but they still 
had to pay for the withdrawal fees. The control group did not receive any such assistance.  
The study shows three very interesting findings. First, market vendors in the treatment group  
(who were largely women) made more frequent use of the bank account and increased their savings 
substantially more compared to the treatment group in the bicycle taxi sector (all of whom were men). 
The authors argue that since the bank account had relatively high withdrawal fees and de facto 
negative interest rates, this finding demonstrates that female vendors have enjoyed additional 
benefits from saving formally, such as the lack of social pressure to share resources or increased self-
control over the personal finances. The second finding is that market women in the treatment group 
registered a substantial increase in business investments compared to the control group. They 
estimate that the treatment group increased daily investments between 38 and 56 percent over a 
period of 4 to 6 months. The authors argue that this estimate is very large but the standard errors are 
also very large. Thus, they suggest focusing on the fact that there is a positive impact rather than its 
exact magnitude. Finally, the study finds that the group of market women with access to a bank 
account had significantly higher expenditures (37 percent increase) compared to the control group.  
The findings are interesting because they contradict the studies mentioned above by Zinman 
and Karlan (2009) and De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2008), which will be discussed in section 2.2. 
First, these RCTs focused on access to credit, whereas Dupas and Robinson (2013) studied increased 
access to a savings account, which registered a substantially higher uptake from the sample. 
Randomized expansion of microcredit have observed relatively low uptake: only 27 percent in India 
(Banerjee and Duflo 2014) and 16 percent in Morocco (Crépon et al. 2014) took out a loan when 
barriers to access were lowered. In Dupas and Robinson’s RCT in rural Kenya (2013) 87 percent of 
people took up the savings account offered to them. Second, differently from the aforementioned 
studies Dupas and Robinson (2013) find evidence that access to a savings account helped businesses 
increase investment. As mentioned earlier, most studies found no effect or even negative effect on 
investment (Zinman and Karlan 2009). 
2.2 EXOGENOUS CAPITAL SHOCKS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Compared to the studies reviewed above, which focus on access to financial services and firm 
performance, De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2008) use a different approach in their RCT in Sri 
Lanka. They argue that studies like Zinman and Karlan (2009) do not represent the universe of 
                                                          
39 The research team however paid the account opening fee and provided the minimum balance of Ksh 100 
(US$1.13), which they were not allowed to withdraw. 
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microenterprises because they reach only MFI clients who applied for credit: these studies however 
lack information about firms that do not borrow and do not apply for loans at formal institutions. They 
therefore decide to set up an experimental setting where micro-entrepreneurs were randomly 
assigned to grants of either 100 or 200 USD independently of whether they received loans from formal 
institutions. They measure the effects on capital stock, profits, and hours worked by the owner, and 
find that the returns to capital are well above market rate, ranging from 4.6% to 5.3% per month, on 
the order of 60% per year. The heterogeneity of the treatment effects is noteworthy however. The 
authors show that the returns to capital were higher for entrepreneurs with stronger capital 
constraints, for those with higher ability and entrepreneurs who have fewer wage-earners in their 
households40. One of the main findings of this research is in line with Zinman and Karlan (2009): De 
Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2008) confirm the gender difference in returns to capital, with men 
having higher average returns to capital compared to women. The authors therefore suggest that the 
traditional focus of microfinance on the poorest women might not be optimal, since the highest 
returns are made from male entrepreneurs, especially those who have relatively higher incomes. 
The approach of randomizing the provision of cash and in-kind grants to micro-entrepreneurs 
was applied also in different settings, by McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) in Mexico and Fafchamps et 
al (2014) in Ghana. McKenzie and Woodruff (2008) provided cash and in-kind grants to small firms in 
the retail sector (capital below 1000 US Dollars), in order to provide an exogenous shock to capital and 
evaluate its impact. Like in De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2008) the researchers decided to provide 
grants instead of loans in order to assess the marginal return to capital for the average small 
enterprise, not the subset of enterprises that decide to apply for a loan. The study found that the 
exogenous shock generated large increases in profits and returns to capital of about 20 to 33 percent 
every month, highly above market rate. Fafchamps et al (2014) use a similar approach in Ghana and 
test whether cash or in-kind grants have a different impact on the returns to capital. The firms selected 
for the experiment were randomly allocated to one of three groups: a control group of 396 
enterprises, and two groups of around 200 firms that received the equivalent of 120 US Dollars in cash 
or in-kind. The in-kind grants was selected by the respondents and purchased by the researchers 
without any sort of advice. According to the authors, in most cases entrepreneurs decided to buy 
inventory products for their firm or raw material and in only 24 percent of the sample they purchased 
physical capital, these were 33 percent men and 19 percent women. Their findings are in line with 
previous studies. Women running subsistence firms saw no increase in profits no matter what type of 
grants they received. On the other hand, women with relatively larger enterprises increased their 
                                                          
40 According to the authors, households with more wage earners are likely to be less credit-constrained, since 
they have easier access to liquidity from (salaried) family members 
78 
 
profits when they received in-kind grants, but there was no effect in case of cash grants. Male 
entrepreneurs also saw higher returns when they received in-kind grants, but the difference is less 
robust. According to Fafchamps et al (2014), the stronger impact of in-kind grants is attributable to 
the fungibility of cash (e.g. money was used for household expenses instead of the business) and, to 
a lower extent, exposure to external pressures.  
 
2.3 BEYOND MONEY FUNGIBILITY: MENTAL ACCOUNTING AND BEHAVIOURAL RESEARCH IN 
FINANCIAL INCLUSION 
Fungibility –the notion that money has no labels and that any unit of money is perfectly 
substitutable for another one– has been a central assumption in economics. In theory, no matter what 
the source of the money is, it should be perfectly substitutable with any other source of money of 
equal amount. Recent advances in behavioral economics however have questioned this notion, and 
have proposed new views about how people separate their money with a mechanism known as 
“mental accounting” (Abeler and Marklein 2008; Thaler 1990). The idea is that instead of being 
perfectly substitutable, money is managed by individuals, businesses and households through a set of 
cognitive operations that organize, track and evaluate financial activities (Thaler 1985): “Rather than 
pooling all assets into a single comprehensive account, in which a dollar is a dollar and perfect 
fungibility holds, people compartmentalize their resources, even money, into discrete qualitative 
categories, accounts, or budgets linked to different needs” (McGraw, Tetlock, and Kristel 2003:219). 
The notion of mental accounting has been investigated in numerous studies in the context of 
savings and spending, but much less on the specific case of borrowing. In the context of savings among 
lower-income individuals, the idea of mental accounting has been applied to the fact that individuals 
discipline themselves and seek better self-control by attaching specific objectives to specific financial 
instruments, instead of using a single saving account as a place to accumulate funds for all purposes 
(Morduch 2010). In the context of spending, a typical example of mental accounting is the distinction 
between the money that individuals intend to spend immediately (e.g. a current income account) and 
those that are kept aside for specific future events. Money does not transfer easily between mental 
accounts, and this lack of transferability can lead people to over-consume or under-consume 
depending on how the mental budgets are organized (McGraw, Tetlock, and Kristel 2003).  
Another relevant concept for this study is the one of source-dependence. The concept was 
initially proposed in behavioral economics by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and then developed by 
Loewenstein and Issacharoff (1994) in a different context. Their key question was whether individuals 
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assign different monetary value to objects depending on the modalities in which they received it. They 
run an experiments in which they distributed mugs to students who received top grades in a classroom 
exercise. Half of the students were told that the mugs were randomly assigned and half students were 
told that they won it due to their performance in the exercise41. When the authors asked students to 
give an estimation of the monetary value of the mugs, the two groups gave significantly different 
answers: those who believed to have won it by chance consistently assigned lower values compared 
to the other group. In another study, McGraw, Tetlock, and Kristel (2003) examined whether the 
valuation of objects changes significantly depending on the social relationships with the people who 
provided the objects. The authors use the so-called “Fiske’s Taxonomy of Relational Schemata” to 
distinguish between types of social relations42. The study finds that the evaluation is highly affected 
by the relational history with the object. Objects received in communal‐sharing relationships (e.g. 
from close family member or friend) were valued very high compared to their real market price 
and people were reluctant to sell them or give them away. On the other hand, objects that were 
received via market‐pricing relationships (customer-seller type of relationship) were valued 
considerably less compared to the same object acquired through other relationships with the 
giver (McGraw, Tetlock, and Kristel 2003). 
In the context of borrowing, much less research has been conducted to understand how the 
source of the loan affects its usage and, ultimately, the effect on welfare or firm performance. 
However, as the previous sections have shown, there are studies that have indirectly addressed this 
issue. The studies by Fafchamps et al. (2014) and De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2008) discussed 
in section 2.2 showed that entrepreneurs used money in different ways depending on whether they 
received the grant in cash or in-kind, and in turn this provoked substantially different effects on firm 
performance. Fafchamps et al (2014:7) argue that there is a form of “source-dependence” and that 
cash and in-kind grants might be used differently because of mental accounting:  “individuals who 
receive a cash grant may think of it as part of their income account, which they earmark for 
consumption and are free to spend; individuals who receive an in-kind grant think of it as part of their 
asset account which is earmarked as investment.”  
From an anthropological perspective, this question was investigated by Guérin et al (2012) in 
Southern India. The authors take a qualitative and descriptive statistical approach to investigate on 
                                                          
41 The prizes were distributed only to students with top grades in order to minimize what they call a “mood 
effect”, which could have created bias in the monetary evaluation of the mugs. For more detail see 
Loewenstein and Issacharoff (1994). 
42 The four types of relationships include communal sharing, market pricing, equality matching and authority 
ranking. For more information see Fiske (1992). 
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the one hand how low-income households and individuals handle a wide range of borrowing sources; 
on the other hand, whether each of these sources serves different purposes in their financial lives. 
Through the analysis of a sample of 212 households, they show that households borrowed from an 
average of 2.72 sources, including moneylenders, shopkeepers, pawnbrokers, relatives and friends, 
self-help groups, banks and microfinance institutions. When they look at how these loans are used, 
they show that the source of the loan plays a crucial role. The authors do not discuss whether this can 
be considered as a form of mental accounting applied to the informal credit market. However, as 
hypothesized in this research, they argue that both the terms and conditions attached to the different 
types of loans, and the social relations that link the lender to the borrower, play a relevant role in how 
people use the borrowed capital: “there is a highly diversified financial landscape where households 
use various borrowing sources, and each serves a very specific purpose. Mobile lenders are well suited 
to emergency requirements. Pawnbrokers play a fundamental role in topping up and smoothing 
income. SHGs are in fact used in a similar way and also to a certain extent for economic investments. 
Well‐known individuals are mainly approached for long‐term and large loans, especially for financing 
ceremonies. Bank loans remain the primary source of funding for economic investments” (Guérin et 
al. 2012:133).  
Understanding how the relational ties between lender and borrower affects the lending 
transaction has been a topic of research in several previous studies. However, the main focus has 
always been on how social ties affect the suppliers of credit, rather than how they affect the 
borrowers’ use of the loans. Uzzi (1999) for example studies how the relationship between borrower 
and lender affects the terms and conditions attached to the loans. He finds that when there are 
stronger ties between counterparts then the interest rates charged are significantly lower. However, 
these relationships do not seem to affect the probability of accessing credit: if the loan applicant does 
not meet the requirements for obtaining credit, then social ties are of no help. Similar findings were 
found by Mizruchi and Stearns (2001) in the context of corporate lending.  
 
3. STUDY OBJECTIVES AND LIMITATIONS 
The objective of this study is to understand the effect of access to credit on firm performance. 
Since in Kenya financial landscapes are very complex and entrepreneurs often borrow from a variety 
of sources which are both formal (e.g. banks and microfinance institutions) and informal (money-
lenders, savings groups, friends and family, etc.), this study hypothesizes that different types of loans 
have different effects on performance. These different effects can be caused by the fact that different 
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loans have different terms and conditions (e.g. interest rates, maturity, etc.). Furthermore, the social 
ties between borrowers and lenders are very different and this can lead to different risk propensities 
in the usage of the loans, different attitudes and preferences towards investments and therefore 
different effects on firm performance. 
The main limitations of the study are related to the small sample size, which can affect the 
significance of some results and its external validity. As mentioned earlier, the study is based on the 
analysis of one research site (a low income neighborhood in eastern Nairobi) which cannot be 
considered representative of the entire country or the population of micro and small entrepreneurs 
in Kenya. The other limitation is related to the conclusions that can be drawn from the study. While 
we are able to determine whether for example loans from a bank lead to more or less investments 
than loans from a family member, we cannot assess the qualitative reasons that lead to these different 
outcomes (e.g. different risk propensity and attitudes towards investing, the type of relation with the 
borrowers, the social pressures to repay or reciprocate with favors, etc.). These questions can 
represent relevant topics of research in future studies. 
4. ECONOMETRIC APPROACH 
As mentioned in the introduction, this research tries to go beyond the RCT approach and to 
analyze the impact of formal and informal credit with propensity score matching. The hypothesis is 
that different types of loans (from friends, from moneylenders, banks, MFIs etc.) would have a 
different impact on enterprise performance because of the different terms and conditions and, even 
more importantly, because the social ties attached to these loans are very different. These social ties 
in turn affect the risk propensity of entrepreneurs, their attitudes and preferences towards 
investments; the impact on firm performance therefore could be different.  
 
4.1 PROPENSITY SCORE MATCHING 
In their seminal study, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that in the context of 
observational studies, it is possible to calculate treatment-effect models by calculating a “propensity 
score” that estimates the probability being treated conditional on a number of selected covariates. 
Propensity score matching (PSM) is a type of statistical matching technique which establishes a 
counterfactual (i.e. control group) which is similar to the treatment group along observable 
characteristics. The caveat is that the similarity between treatment and control group has to be 
measured on characteristics that are not affected by the treatment variable. Each treated 
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entrepreneur is matched with a non-treated one who shares similar characteristics, and the average 
difference in the dependent variable measures the treatment effect.  
The procedure for this econometric analysis is based on two steps. The first one is to calculate 
the propensity score, which is the probability that a subject with characteristics X1, X2, X3,.., Xn chooses 
treatment. In order to calculate the propensity score it is necessary to run a probit or logit model 
regressing the observable characteristics of the business to the binary [0,1] treatment variable Iitreat, 
so that: 
  
 Ii
treat = β0+ β1 Xi1 + β2 Xi2 + ..+ βn Xin + εi (1) 
The decision point then concerns the actual specification of the model (i.e. which variables to 
include in the calculation of the propensity score). Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) review several studies 
on this issue and provide important suggestions on the model specification (see Heckman, Ichimura, 
and Todd 1998; Smith and Todd 2001; Sianesi 2004). One of the crucial choices concerns the number 
of variables to include in the model –more specifically, the question is whether it is better to include 
too many rather than too few variables (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008:38). They report studies arguing 
that over-parameterized studies can increase variance in the model and reduce the significance of the 
propensity score estimation43. Other studies, such as Rubin and Thomas (1996) argue in favour of 
including rather than excluding variables especially when there is theoretical evidence confirming 
their relevance. 
The model specification in this research is facilitated by two main factors. First, it can count on 
the findings of the previous chapter, which focused entirely on the determinants of access to finance. 
The study found that in addition to the common firm-level and entrepreneur-level characteristics (age, 
gender, education, size of the business, etc.), other often-neglected variables can be very important. 
In particular, the length of experience of entrepreneurs in the formal sector was proven to be an 
important determinant of access to formal finance, representing to some extent a measure of 
managerial ability and growth-orientation44. Second, this research benefits from the close proximity 
of the research locations. While this might reduce the external validity of the research (the findings 
are significant only for the specific location), it also means that groups of businesses have a relatively 
high level of comparability, because they tend to be similar in size, sector of operation and background 
                                                          
43 See more details in Augurzky and Schmidt (2001). 
44 As it will be shown in equation 2, one of the main variables not included in the model is enterprise 
informality. The reason for not including this variable is that because of the small sample size, adding extra 
variables to the model were affecting the balancing properties, and the propensity score matching was not 
applicable. The model however includes the formality/informality of the job experience of the entrepreneur 
and the asset size of the firm, which often reflect the formality status as well. 
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of entrepreneurs. One of the important determinants of access to finance in low-income countries 
like Kenya is the physical distance to banks (or other financial providers). However this is controlled 
for because it is the same for all businesses in the sample. Thus, the identification strategy for the 
probit model is organized as follows: 
 
 Ii
treat = β0+ β1 networthi + β2 formalexpi +  β3genderdummy i + β4educ i + β5age 
i +  β6ageofbusiness i + β7othercredit i + εi 
(2) 
   
The propensity score is calculated for 5 separate types of treatment, and therefore the Iitreat is 
equal to 1 in case of a (i) loan from a commercial bank, (ii) loan from a MFI, (iii) loan from a 
moneylender, (iv) loan from a friend\relative and (v) loan from a financial self-help group such as a 
ROSCA or an ASCA in the timeframe between six to twelve months before the interview. The variable 
othercredit is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the entrepreneur received other loans (in addition to the 
“treatment” loan) during the same period. It is important to include this variable because it can inform 
us whether the entrepreneur relied on any sort of external finance or not during the period under 
consideration. Ideally the variable othercredit could be disaggregated in five separate dummies (loan 
from banks, from MFI, moneylenders, etc.), however adding too many variables in the probit model 
excessively increased the error. Because of the relatively small sample size, over-parameterizing the 
probit model led to estimations of the propensity score which did not satisfy the required balancing 
properties45. The other variables in the model networhi, formalexpi, genderdummy i , educ i , age I,  
ageofbusiness i (see description in Table 11) are used to match similar enterprises and entrepreneurs 
who differ in their access (or lack thereof) to credit from different sources. It is crucial to to include 
these variables in the calculation of the propensity score in order to match businesses that are very 
similar along observable characteristics, such as size, years of operation and exposure to the formal 
sector, but differ in terms of access to credit46. The results of the probit regression and the balancing 
tests in the estimation of the propensity score are shown in annex 1 at the end of the paper. 
After estimating the propensity score, it is possible to proceed with the matching exercise. 
Formally, let i index the population of 344 entrepreneurs under consideration. Yi1 indicates the 
variable of interest, namely investments (investm), profitability (averageproft), employment growth 
(empgrowth), when unit i is subject to treatment (1), and Yi0 is the value of the same variable when 
the unit is exposed to the control (0). Following Dehejia and Wahba (2002), let’s define the average 
                                                          
45 More details on the assumptions and conditions in PSM are explained later in this section. 
46 For more detailed analysis on how to specify the probit model in the context of propensity score matching 
see Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) and Heinrich, Maffioli, and Vazquez (2010). 
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treatment effect ATE as i = E(Yi1 - Yi0)and the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which 
measures the impact of a program (or, in this case, a business loan) on those individuals who obtained 
it:  
 
 𝜏|𝑇=1 = 𝐸(𝜏𝑖|𝑇𝑖 = 1) (3) 
 = 𝐸(𝑌𝑖1|𝑇𝑖 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑌𝑖0|𝑇𝑖 = 1) 
 
(4) 
where Ti=1 if the unit i was treated and Ti=0 otherwise. The average treatment effect on the 
untreated (ATU) on the other hand measures the impact that a specific treatment (such as program 
participation, or a loan) would have had on those who did not participate. However this is what 
Holland (1986) famously called “the fundamental problem of causal inference”: all impact research 
must cope with the impossibility to observe what would have happened to “treated” individuals had 
they decided not to be treated. In formal terms, it is possible to estimate E(Yi1|Ti=1), but not 
E(Yi0|Ti=1)). In randomized studies that problem is not faced because E(Yi0|T=1) could be estimated by 
E(Yi0|T=0), therefore treated and non-treated observations would not differ on average, so that 
E(Yi0|T=1)=E(Yi0|T=0). However, randomization cannot be applied in this research. As mentioned in 
the previous sections, social ties attached to a lending/borrowing transaction cannot be randomized 
especially when the source of the loan is informal. 
Letting p(Xi) be the probability of a unit i having been assigned to treatment, so that : 
 
 𝑝(𝑋𝑖) =  𝑃𝑟(𝑇𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖) =  𝐸(𝑇𝑖|𝑋𝑖) (5) 
then:  
 (𝑌𝑖1, 𝑌𝑖0)  𝑇𝑖 | 𝑋𝑖−
||   (6) 
 = (𝑌𝑖1, 𝑌𝑖0)  𝑇𝑖 | 𝑝(𝑋𝑖)−
||   (7) 
 
The goal of the PSM approach is to reduce the dimensionality of the exercise by pairing firms 
that were treated (had access to a loan) and non-treated (did not access a loan) though they are very 
similar in the values of P(X). The average treatment effect on the treated can be written as follows: 
 
 𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸𝑃(𝑋)|𝑇=1 {𝐸 [𝑌𝑖|𝑇 = 1, 𝑃(𝑋)] − 𝐸[𝑌0 | 𝑇 = 0, 𝑃(𝑋)]} (8) 
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Equation (6) formalizes the conditional independence assumption (CIA) or unconfoundedness 
assumption, which states that there is a set of X observable covariates; after controlling for these 
covariates, the potential outcomes are independent of the treatment status. This is crucial in the 
application of propensity score matching and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) warn that matching is by 
no means a “magic bullet” that will solve all evaluation problems. They argue that this methodological 
approach can be applied only if “the underlying identifying assumption can be credibly invoked based 
on the informational richness of the data and a detailed understanding of the institutional set-up by 
which selection into treatment takes place” (ibid: 32). As mentioned earlier in this essay, the strength 
of this dataset is that it focuses on a specific area where physical access to financial services and the 
types of firms analyzed are easier to compare than in large-scale and more heterogeneous surveys. 
Moreover, the analysis done in Essay 1 has identified some important determinants of access to 
finance and these are therefore included in the calculation of the propensity score.  
The second assumption is known as the common support condition, which states that the 
probability of being treated or non-treated lies between 0 and 1: 
 0 < 𝑃 (𝑇 = 1 |𝑋) < 1 (9) 
 
This assumption relies on another condition, known as the overlap condition which states that 
treated and untreated units must have common (i.e. overlapping) characteristics in order for the 
model to make appropriate matching between units. This means that for any given propensity score, 
exposure to treatment is random and treated and control units should therefore be observationally 
identical on average (Heinrich, Maffioli, and Vazquez 2010). 
These properties are checked automatically in the statistical software Stata which was used in 
this paper. The pscore function designed by Becker and Ichino (2002) follows a 4-step procedure: first, 
it fits a probit model using the observable characteristics for the calculation of the propensity score. 
The specification of the probit model was outlined in equation (2). Second, it splits the sample into 
propensity score quintiles and it checks that the average propensity score does not differ between 
treated and control groups within each interval. If the test fails in one or more intervals, it splits the 
interval into two and repeats the test. Finally, in order to satisfy the balancing hypothesis, the pscore 
command tests that the mean of each characteristic does not differ between treatment and control 
groups. If the balancing property is not satisfied, it requires the user to change the specification of the 
probit model.  
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4.2 MATCHING ALGORITHMS 
Once the propensity score is calculated, there are several algorithms that can be used to match 
treated and non-treated observations on the basis of the propensity score. The most common ones 
are kernel matching, nearest-neighbor (NN) matching, caliper matching and radius matching among 
others. This study will focus on the first two. 
Nearest-neighbor matching is one of the most frequently used matching techniques in 
treatment-effect studies (Khandker, Koolwal, and Samad 2010). This approach matches each treated 
observation of the treatment group to the comparison unit with the closest propensity score (i.e. most 
similar observed characteristics). Formally, we denote T and C as the set of treated and untreated 
units respectively, and YTi and YCj as their observed outcomes. We then define C(i) as the set of 
untreated observations matched to the treated unit i with a propensity score of pi. Nearest-neighbor 
matching can be described as: 
 
 𝐶(𝑖) = min ||
𝑗
𝑝𝑖 − 𝑝𝑗|| (10) 
 
Depending on the type of research, the researcher can predetermine a number n of nearest 
neighbors used in the matching exercise, usually n = 5, in order to limit the matching of treated and 
non-treated observations. There are several variants of the nearest neighbor matching algorithm, for 
example one can specify if matching occurs with or without replacement. In the former case, an 
untreated individual can be used multiple times as a match, whereas in the second case (without 
replacement) it is considered only once47. 
Another important algorithm is the Kernel matching method. Differently from the nearest 
neighbor algorithm (as well as most other PSM algorithms) where only a few non-treated observations 
are used to construct the counterfactual, Kernel matching is a non-parametric estimator using the 
weighted averages of all individuals in the control group to construct the counterfactual outcome. The 
kernel matching is formalized as follows: 
 
 
𝜏𝐾 = 
1
𝑁𝑇
∑{𝑌𝑖
𝑇 − 
∑ 𝑌𝑗
𝐶  𝐺 (
𝑝𝑗 − 𝑝𝑖
ℎ𝑛
)𝑗∈𝐶
∑ 𝐺𝑘∈𝐶 (
𝑝𝑘 − 𝑝𝑡
ℎ𝑛
)
}
𝑖∈𝑇
 
(11) 
 
Where G is the kernel function and hn is the parameter chosen as bandwith (Becker and Ichino, 
2002). According to Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), the main advantage of Kernel matching is the lower 
                                                          
47 For more details, see Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008). 
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variance of the model, while the main weakness is that matches might have a relative low degree of 
similarity in the observational characteristics. In order to check for the robustness of the results, both 
matching types (nearest neighbor and kernel) are shown in the empirical section. 
4.3 VARIABLES AND DATA 
The data were collected with a survey questionnaire with 344 micro and small enterprises in 
Nairobi. The survey was conducted in Kariobangi, a neighbourhood in the east side of Nairobi with a 
thriving informal and semi-formal economy48. Three main types of businesses were studied in the 
survey: (i) micro/small-scale manufacturing businesses, (ii) micro/small-scale tailoring firms, (iii) 
micro/small-scale retail activities.    
This section looks at how the usage of different financial instruments influence performance 
indicators including i) firm investments, ii) average profits and iii) employment growth. Investments 
are calculated as the sum of money invested in assets such as equipment, machinery, premises 
(buildings), premise improvements, furniture and furnishings, and vehicles over the 12 months before 
the interview. We decided to focus on this time-period because it is sufficiently indicative of the firms’ 
recent investments behaviours and the time span is not too long for the entrepreneur to have 
difficulties recollecting the sums invested: if we asked about investments over a 3 to 5 years period, 
the data would arguably have suffered from a larger error and recollection bias.  
The second dependent variable is the average monthly profits made by firms over the last 12 
months. Economists have always struggled to obtain reliable data on firms’ profits in informal 
contexts. The main problem is that revenues fluctuate strongly every month, depending on the 
season, luck and other unobservable variables. Furthermore, entrepreneurs are rarely able to account 
for the various costs of the business, and they often tend to mix up household expenditures with 
business and vice versa. The exact figures for these variables are extremely difficult to obtain in survey 
questionnaires. 
Recent studies in fact have compared several empirical methods to obtain data on firms’ profits 
and have shown the most effective strategies. In particular, (Daniels 2001a 2001b) compares five ways 
of finding out the microenterprise profits in survey questionnaires, which differ in the wording and 
complexity of the questions. She concludes that the simplest methods (i.e. asking directly about profit 
figures) tend to be the most accurate. Another important study was conducted by de Mel, McKenzie, 
and Woodruff (2009); using two relatively large samples of microenterprises from Sri Lanka and 
Mexico, they conduct a test for estimating the accuracy of self-reported enterprise profits. They 
                                                          
48 More details on the survey are described in the previous chapter. 
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conclude that simple questions are more effective and more accurate than complex measures, “asking 
firm owners directly for their profits including using business revenues used to pay household expenses 
provides a measure which appears at least as reasonable as asking for all the ingredients in terms of 
detailed revenue and expenses” (2009:20)  Although detailed questions on sales and costs can provide 
interesting details of the firm’s production function, “Our results just show that directly eliciting profits 
can provide useful information when this is the prime object of interest” (Ibid). These studies prompted 
us to use direct questions to estimate the firms’ profits, including questions on the fluctuation of 
profits over the year and the estimation of household expenses. These were used to triangulate the 
data and confirm the reliability of the figures that were provided by the entrepreneurs. 
There are five main loan types analyzed in this study as treatment variables: (i) loans from 
commercial banks, (ii) loans from microfinance institutions, (iii) loans from family and friends, (iv) 
loans from moneylenders and (v) loans from financial self-help groups such as ROSCAs and ASCAs. The 
five binary treatment variables are equal to 1 if the business obtained a loan from these sources from 
six months to one year before the interview, 0 otherwise. The objective for using this time period is 
to capture adequately the loans that could affect firm performance and exclude the loans that are too 
recent to have an effect on the various outcome variables measuring firm performance. The full list of 
variables used in the model is outlined in Table 14. 
 
 
Table 14: list of variables 
Variable name Variable description 
Formalexp Number of months of employment in formal sector firms 
before starting this enterprise 
Ageofbusiness N° of years since the business started 
Age Age of the entrepreneur 
Genderdummy Dummy=1 for women 
Educ Number of years of formal schooling 
Networth Value of capital for machinery, buildings, furniture and 
vehicles owned by the business 
Bankdummy Dummy = 1 if a business obtained a loan from a commercial 
bank from 6 to 12 months before the interview 
MFIdummy Dummy = 1 if a business obtained a loan from a microfinance 
institution from 6 to 12 months before the interview 
Moneylenderdummy Dummy = 1 if a business obtained a loan from a moneylender 
from 6 to 12 months before the interview 
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Chamadummy Dummy = 1 if a business obtained a loan from a financial self-
help group from 6 to 12 months before the interview 
Frienddummy Dummy = 1 if a business obtained a loan from a friend or a 
relative from 6 to 12 months before the interview 
Empgrowth Change (positive or negative) in number of employees in the 
last 12 months 
Investment Investment in machinery, equipment, vehicles, premises and 
premise maintenance, furniture and furnishings over the 12 
months 
Averageprofits Average monthly profits over the last 12 months 
 
 
5. RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
Table 15, Table 16, and Table 17 show the results of the propensity score matching using 5 
different treatment variables on three main outcome variables: investments, profitability and 
employment growth. The matching algorithms used in the model are among the most common in PSM 
exercises, namely the Kernel and nearest neighbour matching.   
The most significant results are related to the effect of different financial instruments on 
business investments.  Table 15 shows that using the Kernel matching method, all types of loans seem 
to have a positive effect on investments, except for loans from financial self-help groups which are 
not significant and loans from microfinance institutions, which show a strongly significant negative 
relation with investments. When we use the nearest neighbour matching method, the signs of the 
coefficients are confirmed for all treatments except self-help groups; however, only bank loans are 
statistically significant while the others do not reach the 10 percent significance level. The overall 
finding of the research therefore seem to be that lending to micro and small enterprises increases 
investments, however loans from MFIs have a negative effect when we use the Kernel matching 
method: what can explain these results? Why does lending from all formal and informal sources seem 
to incentivize investments, whereas loans from microfinance institutions seem to have an opposite 
effect? 
The results of this study partly confirm the finding of Zinman and Karlan (2009), who show that 
access to microfinance loans tend to decrease business investments. They argue that treated 
enterprises tended to favour investment in education and other household investments at the 
expense of business-level investments. This research can only confirm part of the argument, namely 
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that business investments decrease, but it cannot state that investment at the household level 
increased because this data point was not collected in the questionnaire. However the question 
remains of why entrepreneurs would increase investments in the business if they received the loan 
from banks, moneylenders and family/friends while they decrease investments if the loan comes from 
a microfinance institution.  
Some of the reasons for these findings emerged during the qualitative interviews. The first one 
is related to the motivation that often encourages entrepreneurs to apply for a loan at a MFI instead 
of using other borrowing options. What we noticed during the interviews and focus groups is that the 
reason that triggers many entrepreneurs to apply for membership at a MFI is often a response to a 
period of crisis rather than an investment opportunity that arises. When entrepreneurs are in a crisis 
and borrowing from friends, family or self-help groups is not possible or not sufficient, then the group 
lending mechanism offered in microfinance institutions may be one of the only options left. This might 
explain the finding that MSE borrowers invest significantly less on their business compared to other 
entrepreneurs. 
Second, we noticed during several interviews that entrepreneurs applied for business loans at 
microfinance institutions, but in fact the loan was used in part or even mostly for other household 
level expenses. It is important to note that the questionnaire specifically asked for loans that were 
received in part or completely for business purposes –if a loan was received entirely for household 
expenses (i.e. paying tuition fees for the children), then the loan was not recorded in the 
questionnaire. However very often the loans were asked for business purposes and then part of them 
was used for other purposes. It is also important to notice that MFI clients are largely women, and 
they may have stronger pressures to pay for household expenses instead of business investments. The 
gender difference in enterprise performance was proven empirically by Zinman and Karlan (2009) and 
De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2008); this study seems to confirm these findings. 
Finally, another reason for this finding is related to the terms and conditions of MFI loans, which 
tend to be very expensive and rather strict in the repayment schedule compared to informal loans. A 
number of entrepreneurs felt in a constant pressure to repay the loan and overall were not satisfied 
with the services provided by the MFI. This pressure to repay the debt might have made entrepreneurs 
more risk averse instead of risk-takers and their overall propensity to invest might have gone down –
exactly the opposite of what theorized in microfinance literature. Nevertheless, more evidence is 
necessary to prove these arguments.  
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Table 15: Investments: average treatment effects 
 Kernel Matching Nearest neighbour 
 ATT SE t-Value ATT SE t-Value 
Commercial bank 
loan 
601339.3** 262000 2.29 522223.9* 281000 1.86 
MFI loan -55847.5*** 18271.3 -3.06 -26411.8   28497 -0.93 
Moneylender 430822.0* 249000 1.73 438478.8 269000 1.63 
Friend 208316.4* 109000 1.92 144407.7 133000 1.08 
Financial self-
help groups 
-20441 6870 -0.30 1110.2 1220 0.09 
 
Table 16: Average profits 
 Kernel Matching Nearest neighbor 
 ATT SE t-Value ATT SE t-Value 
Commercial 
bank loan 
11699.0 9540 1.23 9315.8 13783 0.68 
MFI loan 6142.2 4907 1.25 8864.0 7728 1.15 
Moneylender 3662.7 7236 0.51 -6326.3 10576 -0.60 
Friend -4529.8 4925 -0.92 -7212.3 7743 -0.93 
Financial self-
help groups 
-2427.1 4665 -0.52 -5687.4 7200 -0.79 
  
Table 17: Employment growth 
 Kernel Matching Nearest neighbor 
 ATT SE t-Value ATT SE t-Value 
Commercial 
bank loan 
1.275** 0.560 2.27 1.268** 0.641 1.98 
MFI loan -0.227 0.393 -0.58 0.110 0.423      0.26 
Moneylender 0.600    0.531     1.13 0.135     0.729     0,19 
Friend -0.0907 0.390 -0.23 -0.392 0.4101     -0.98 
Financial self-
help group 
-0.104 0.347 -0.30 0.198 0.449 0.44 
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The effect on access to finance on firm profitability and growth in number of employees is less 
robust, with few significant results. Loans from commercial banks and MFIs seem to have a positive 
relation with profitability, whereas loans from family and friends have a negative relation with the 
outcome variable. However these results are not significant, probably because of the small size of the 
sample, and therefore require further evidence. The question remains however about why loans from 
banks seem to increase investments and number of employees without having an effect of 
profitability. Arguably there are two answers to this question: high cost of credit and spiraling inflation, 
which were caused by the period of macro-economic instability that Kenya suffered between the end 
of 2011 and 2012. Even though this will be discussed more in-depth in Essay 4, it is important to 
mention that between the end of 2011 and 2012 the Kenyan currency lost 25 percent of its value and 
inflation increased fast from about 5 percent to 20 percent in late 2011. In order to tackle this 
instability, the Central Bank of Kenya increased its core interest rate from 6.25 to 18 percent in three 
months. Thus, over a relatively short period of time, bank loans became more expensive and prices 
for business inputs (raw material, stock, etc.) increased very fast, eroding the profits that business 
were able to make. In 2013 inflation and the central bank interest rate have returned to lower levels. 
However, the cost of credit remained relatively high, making it difficult for firms to grow their 
profitability.  
The positive relation between loans from commercial banks and employment growth is 
however an important finding: both the Kernel and nearest neighbour matching methods show a 
positive and statistically significant correlation with growth in the number of employees, while other 
types of credit do not seem to have the same effect. This arguably confirms that entrepreneurs rely 
on commercial banks when they identify opportunities for business growth (as seen in the investment 
variable). This confirms the argument proposed by Fafchamps and Schündeln (2013) that firms seek 
access to formal external finance in the presence of growth opportunities. Keeping the business 
unchanged only requires replacement investment, which is usually financed with the entrepreneurs’ 
own earnings or other forms of informal finance. When the capital is needed for expanding the 
business, bank finance seems to be the preferred channel. The effect of loans from moneylenders, 
loans from family and friends and MFIs on employment creation seems inconclusive or close to zero.  
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Improving access to finance for micro and small enterprises has become a core tool for 
employment creation and poverty alleviation in many developing countries. The assumption is that 
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small scale entrepreneurs are credit-constrained and lack resources to finance the growth of their 
business. The theoretical argument embraced by the field of finance and development is that if small 
entrepreneurs are granted access to external finance, they will trigger a virtuous cycle of business 
expansion and will be able to generate employment and growth.  
Recent studies have investigated the link between enterprise finance and growth of the firms 
and have used RCT approaches to quantify this impact. These studies however focus on either grants 
or on one type of credit - formal microfinance loans - while we know that financial landscapes in low-
income areas are extremely diverse and entrepreneurs often borrow from a variety of sources. While 
a capital injection should have the same effects on enterprise performance irrespective of its source, 
very little research has been conducted to actually confirm this hypothesis. The question that we 
address is whether the source of the loan affects how the credit is used and, as a consequence, firm 
performance. We hypothesize that these different effects are related to the different terms and 
conditions of the loans as well as the type of social ties linking lender and borrower in the lending 
transactions. These different social ties could affect the risk propensity of entrepreneurs, their 
investment preferences as well as the likelihood that a loan requested for business purposes will be 
used for household expenses or vice versa. 
The research has tried to fill this gap by investigating the effect of different types of formal and 
informal loans on enterprise performance indicators, namely (i) investments, (ii) profitability (iii) 
employment growth. Differently from previous studies which used RCTs to study the effect of 
microfinance loans or randomized grants, this research modifies the research approach in two ways. 
First, instead of analyzing MFI loans alone, the research looks at a 5 separate types of loans which are 
common in informal and semi-formal markets: (i) loans from commercial banks (ii) loans from MFIs, 
(iii) loans from relatives or friends, (iv) loans from moneylenders, (v) loans from financial self-help 
groups such as ROSCAs and ASCAs. Second, the study uses a propensity score matching approach to 
account for an aspect that is usually neglected in RCT-type of studies: the social ties that link lenders 
and borrowers. Statistical matching is a methodology where “treated” individuals (e.g. entrepreneurs 
who had access to a bank loan) are compared to a control group of individuals whose observable 
characteristics (age, sector, size of business, etc.) are similar but differ because they did not participate 
in the treatment (i.e. in this case, they did not borrow). In line with the findings of McGraw, Tetlock, 
and Kristel (2003) our argument is that “objects” (in this case loans or grants) are given a different 
value depending on the  social relation with the person or institution that is providing them.  Thus, 
different loans sources should have different effects on firm performance. 
The strongest finding of the paper is that loans from commercial banks seem to have the most 
positive effects on firm performance: firms that obtained a loan from a commercial bank have invested 
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more, have created more employment and seem to be more profitable (though the evidence on 
profitability is not significant) than the control group of firms that did not borrow from banks. Loans 
from MFIs on the other hand seem to have a negative effect on business investments: firms that 
borrowed from MFIs have invested significantly less than comparable firms that did not use 
microfinance loans. The paper identified a number of explanations for these results. The most 
important ones are that MFI are often used to face difficult periods rather than capturing investment 
opportunities. Moreover, MFI clients are largely women, and this might have an effect on the results, 
since women might face more pressure to use MFI loans for household expenses instead making 
business investments. Informal loans from moneylenders, family/friends and financial self-help groups 
seem to have a positive, though not very strong effect on investments, while their effect on 
profitability and employment growth are insignificant. 
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8. ANNEX 1 – PROBIT REGRESSION AND CALCULATION OF PROPENSITY 
SCORE 
8.1 BANK 
Probit regression Number of obs 326 
 LR chi2(7) 59.63 
 Prob > chi2 0 
Log likelihood = -135.78256 Pseudo R2 0.18 
 
bank_loan Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
Educ 0.001100 0.031235 0.35 0.724 -0.05019 0.072244 
Age 0.002855 0.010898 0.26 0.793 -0.01851 0.024215 
Ageofbusiness 0.015063 0.015365 0.98 0.327 -0.01505 0.045178 
Formalexp 0.005706 0.001861 3.07 0.002 0.002059 0.009353 
Networth 7.85E-07 2.01E-07 3.91 0 3.91E-07 1.18E-06 
womendummy -0.00676 0.181577 -0.04 0.97 -0.36264 0.349124 
nonbankdebt 0.010399 0.180383 0.06 0.954 -0.34314 0.363943 
_cons -1.64288 0.532755 -3.08 0.002 -2.68706 -0.5987 
 
Description of the estimated propensity score in the region of common support 
 Percentiles Smallest   
1% 0.086404 0.08621   
5% 0.091886 0.086346   
10% 0.095328 0.086404 Obs 292 
25% 0.111929 0.087732 Sum of Wgt. 292 
     
50% 0.137132  Mean 0.218327 
  Largest Std. Dev. 0.193859 
75% 0.233988 0.99984   
90% 0.490238 0.999977 Variance 0.037581 
95% 0.705622 1 Skewness 2.369282 
99% 0.999977 1 Kurtosis 8.267721 
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8.2 MFI 
 Probit regression Number of obs 326 
 LR chi2(7) 13.33 
 Prob > chi2 0.0646 
Log likelihood = =-174.992 Pseudo R2 0.0367 
 
MFI_loan Coef. Std. Err. Z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
Educ 0.058505 0.028334 2.06 0.039 0.002972 0.114037 
Age 0.009509 0.00979 0.97 0.331 -0.00968 0.028697 
Ageofbusiness 0.00486 0.014186 0.34 0.732 -0.02294 0.032664 
Formalexp -0.00379 0.002117 -1.79 0.073 -0.00794 0.000356 
Networth -1.88E-07 1.68E-07 -1.12 0.264 -5.18E-07 1.42E-07 
Womendummy 0.26511 0.158459 1.67 0.094 -0.04547 0.575684 
nonMFIdebt 0.153488 0.231094 0.66 0.507 -0.29945 0.606423 
_cons -1.85741 0.535473 -3.47 0.001 -2.90692 -0.80791 
 
Description of the estimated propensity score in the region of common support 
 Percentiles Smallest   
1% 0.08107 0.07334   
5% 0.122596 0.07508   
10% 0.147817 0.078937 Obs 317 
25% 0.194878 0.08107 Sum of Wgt. 317 
     
50% 0.247767  Mean 0.248879 
  Largest Std. Dev. 0.076398 
75% 0.300024 0.407718   
90% 0.354865 0.417875 Variance 0.005837 
95% 0.374641 0.421729 Skewness 0.038907 
99% 0.407718 0.441579 Kurtosis 2.446656 
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8.3 MONEYLENDER 
Probit regression Number of obs 326 
 LR chi2(7) 18.4 
 Prob > chi2 0.0103 
Log likelihood = -157.74014 Pseudo R2 0.0551 
 
moneylender_loan Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
Educ -0.0183 0.029567 -0.62 0.536 -0.07625 0.039654 
Age 0.017591 0.010141 1.73 0.083 -0.00228 0.037466 
ageofbusin~s -0.03493 0.014935 -2.34 0.019 -0.0642 -0.00565 
Formalexp 1.28E-03 1.78E-03 0.72 0.471 -2.20E-03 4.76E-03 
Networth 2.05E-07 1.07E-07 1.92 0.055 -4.44E-09 4.15E-07 
Womendummy -0.12947 0.170769 -0.76 0.448 -0.46417 0.205229 
nonmoneyle~t 0.537266 0.281502 1.91 0.056 -0.01447 1.089001 
_cons -1.52631 0.575086 -2.65 0.008 -2.65346 -0.39916 
 
Description of the estimated propensity score in the region of common support 
 Percentiles Smallest   
1% 0.075748 0.071028   
5% 0.0969 0.071189   
10% 0.129921 0.075658 Obs 317 
25% 0.154994 0.075748 Sum of Wgt. 317 
     
50% 0.189442  Mean 0.212968 
  Largest Std. Dev. 0.10065 
75% 0.23983 0.694101   
90% 0.310501 0.760465 Variance 0.01013 
95% 0.365771 0.79025 Skewness 2.743009 
99% 0.694101 0.832517 Kurtosis 14.71872 
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8.4 FRIEND 
Probit regression Number of obs 326 
 LR chi2(7) 15.15 
 Prob > chi2 0.0341 
Log likelihood = -213.55768 Pseudo R2 0.0343 
 
friend_loan Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
Educ 0.021962 0.026013 0.84 0.399 -0.02902 0.072946 
Age -0.01325 0.009155 -1.45 0.148 -0.0312 0.00469 
ageofbusin~s 0.021484 0.013052 1.65 0.1 -0.0041 0.047065 
formalexp -0.00436 0.001949 -2.24 0.025 -0.00818 -0.00054 
networth 1.78E-07 1.03E-07 1.73 0.084 -2.38E-08 3.80E-07 
womendummy -0.0983 0.147344 -0.67 0.505 -0.38708 0.190492 
nonfriendd~t 0.141039 0.191888 0.74 0.462 -0.23506 0.517133 
_cons -0.17567 0.468125 -0.38 0.707 -1.09317 0.741843 
 
Description of the estimated propensity score in the region of common support 
 Percentiles Smallest   
1% 0.263931 0.251086   
5% 0.291333 0.253836   
10% 0.32617 0.262508 Obs 305 
25% 0.376763 0.263931 Sum of Wgt. 305 
     
50% 0.429048  Mean 0.430673 
  Largest Std. Dev. 0.083781 
75% 0.473328 0.678265   
90% 0.526094 0.717362 Variance 0.007019 
95% 0.574374 0.743851 Skewness 0.691731 
99% 0.678265 0.829542 Kurtosis 5.142277 
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8.5 FINANCIAL SELF-HELP GROUPS 
Probit regression Number of obs 326 
 LR chi2(7) 47.26 
 Prob > chi2 0 
Log likelihood = -190.31223 Pseudo R2 0.1104 
 
chama_loan Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
Educ -0.06204 0.027262 -2.28 0.023 -0.11547 -0.0086 
Age -0.01837 0.009492 -1.94 0.053 -0.03698 0.000229 
ageofbusin~s 0.029535 0.013918 2.12 0.034 0.002256 0.056814 
formalexp -0.00073 0.001731 -0.42 0.675 -0.00412 0.002668 
networth 6.94E-11 9.27E-08 0 0.999 -1.82E-07 1.82E-07 
womendummy 0.762179 0.156275 4.88 0 0.455885 1.068473 
nonchamadebt 0.066629 0.164351 0.41 0.685 -0.25549 0.388751 
_cons 1.094644 0.458483 2.39 0.017 0.196033 1.993254 
 
Description of the estimated propensity score in the region of common support 
 Percentiles Smallest   
1% 0.33351 0.326686   
5% 0.369832 0.32821   
10% 0.420132 0.329061 Obs 313 
25% 0.511052 0.33351 Sum of Wgt. 313 
     
50% 0.649198  Mean 0.649611 
  Largest Std. Dev. 0.165989 
75% 0.800284 0.930078   
90% 0.850757 0.937983 Variance 0.027552 
95% 0.87379 0.938967 Skewness -0.20387 
99% 0.930078 0.976372 Kurtosis 1.836319 
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Essay 3 
 
 
Financial development and economic 
growth in Kenya 
Results of a time-series vector error correction model (1970 – 2010) 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Ever since Schumpeter (1911), and more recently Patrick (1966) McKinnon (1973) and Shaw 
(1973), the relationship between financial development and economic growth has become a core 
topic of research in finance and economics. A wide number of studies have looked at whether financial 
development is a consequence of economic growth or whether it can fuel economic growth over the 
long term by promoting savings and an efficient allocation of credit, reducing transaction costs or 
improving productivity growth (Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000; King 
and Levine 1993b; King and Levine 1993a). This question is of extreme importance for development 
policy. In recent years governments in low-income countries and donors alike have increased their 
investments in the financial sector in order to fuel wealth creation, employment and alleviate poverty. 
This paper tries to contribute to this discussion by understanding the relation between financial 
development and economic growth, and assessing the channels in which financial intermediation 
might contribute to pro-poor economic development over the long-term in Kenya. 
Following previous studies such as Gries, Kraft, and Meierrieks (2009); Ang and McKibbin (2007) 
and Odhiambo (2008), the core hypothesis of this research is that the relation between the deepening 
of the financial sector and GDP growth is not direct, but occurs through specific intermediary variables 
that affect both financial development and GDP growth. This paper looks in particular at gross 
investments and gross savings, under the hypothesis that they can play a key role in linking financial 
sector development to economic growth. Previous studies have taken a similar approach, but they 
differ in either the conditioning variables used in the model, the definition of financial development 
or the timeframe of the research. In particular, this paper uses a composite index variable for financial 
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development, which combines several proxy variables such as private credit to GDP, liquid liabilities 
as a percentage of GDP and the relevance of the commercial banking sector relative to the central 
bank, arguing that these variables taken alone do not reflect appropriately financial sector 
development as a whole. This is an improvement from most previous studies that often rely on single 
proxies. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the literature on financial 
development and economic growth and shows the diversity of approaches and results obtained in 
previous empirical studies. Section 3 explores the different approaches used to define financial sector 
development and section 4 looks at the characteristics of financial development in Kenya, from the 
bank failures of the nineties to the raise of Equity bank and mobile banking in recent years.  Section 5 
describes the data used in the empirical research and shows the results of the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller test, Johansen Co-integration Model and Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). Section 6 
summarizes the findings and concludes. 
2. FINANCE AND GROWTH - A REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
The relation between financial development and economic growth started being discussed as 
soon as the beginning of the last century (Schumpeter, 1911; McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973), and 
gained primary importance over the past two decades (King and Levine, 1993a, 1993b; Rajan and 
Zingales 1998; Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000). Economists have 
proposed widely contrasting views on the subject (Levine 2005), arguing, on the one hand, that finance 
is an “overstressed” determinant of economic growth (Lucas 1998); that financial development occurs 
as a consequence, not a cause, of economic growth (Robinson 1953); and that the development of the 
financial sector can improve stability, but only up to a limit as it may denote higher leverage of firms 
and higher risks for the overall economy  (Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz 2001; Cecchetti et al. 2012). 
However, in recent years a growing consensus has emerged on the fact that financial 
development and economic growth are closely interrelated, and the debate has shifted towards 
understanding the direction of causality –whether financial development fuels economic growth or, 
on the contrary, it is economic growth to drive financial development. An influential paper by King and 
Levine (1993a) showed that over a 30-years period, between 1960 and 1989, the average per capita 
GDP growth in 77 countries was robustly correlated to several measures of financial development, 
including the size of financial intermediaries, private sector credit as a percentage of GDP, the ratio 
between commercial bank credit and the total credit (commercial banks plus central bank credit); and 
finally the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. They showed that even after controlling for education levels, 
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quality of the legal systems and openness to trade, financial development had a robust and significant 
impact on GDP growth as well as other measures of economic development such as physical capital 
accumulation, productivity and the efficiency of capital allocation (see Table 18). 
 
Table 18: Regression results for the model on financial sector development and economic growth (Source: 
adapted from King and Levine, 1993a) 
Dependent 
Variable 
LLY BANK PRIVATE PRIVY 
GYP 0.024*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 
 [0.007] [0.005] [0.002] [0.002] 
GK 0.022*** 0.022** 0.020** 0.025*** 
 [0.001] [0.012] [0.011] [0.001] 
INV 0.097*** 0.133*** 0.115*** 0.102*** 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.004] 
Note: p-value in parenthesis. *significant at the 0.10 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, *** significant at the 0.01 level.  
GYP = Real per capita GDP growth rate, GK = Average growth rate of the real per capita capital stock, 1960-1989, INV = Ratio 
of average annual investment to GDP, 1960-1989.  LLY = Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, BANK = Deposit bank domestic 
credit divided by deposit money bank plus central bank domestic credit, PRIVATE = Ratio of claims on nonfinancial private 
sector to domestic credit, PRIVY = Ratio of claims on the nonfinancial private sector to GDP. 
 
King and Levine’s paper –titled “Schumpeter might be right” – brought the finance and growth 
literature at the center of economics, showing that the financial sector is not simply a by-product of 
economic development but an engine of growth (Cecchetti et al 2012). It was followed by a number 
of studies that confirmed the causal relationship with different datasets and methodological 
approaches. Levine (2006) conducts a survey of literature and identifies three main econometric 
approaches: cross-country studies, some of them using an instrumental variable approach; panel-time 
series and industry and firm-level analysis of finance and growth. Two studies that greatly contributed 
to the validation of the finance and growth literature were by Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) and 
subsequently Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) which dealt successfully with the issue of endogeneity, 
or reverse causality, and provided further clarity about the “channels” in which financial 
intermediaries contribute to economic growth. In particular, they look at the effects of financial 
intermediary development on (i) private savings rates, (ii) capital accumulation, (iii) total factor 
productivity growth, and (iv) overall real per capita GDP growth, and find a large and significant impact 
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of financial intermediary development on per capita GDP growth and total factor productivity growth. 
They find a weak relation with physical capital growth and private savings rates. These studies tackle 
the problem of simultaneity bias by using two econometric techniques: a cross-sectional instrumental 
variable technique49 and a dynamic panel model. 
An alternative approach was developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998), who study the finance-
growth nexus at the industry level across countries. They argue that existing studies suffer from two 
main weaknesses: first, both financial development and growth could be influenced simultaneously 
by common omitted variables such as the households’ propensity to save, which are difficult to 
account for in standard cross-country comparisons. Second, they critique the main variables used to 
measure financial development, such as private credit to GDP or the size of the stock market, because 
these variables may simply anticipate future growth rather than causing it: the stock market often 
functions to capitalize on the present value of future growth opportunities, while the banking system 
provide more credit to sectors they expect to grow in the near term (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). In 
order to overcome these shortcomings, they estimate the need for external finance at the industry-
level by computing the difference between investments and cash generated from operations50. Under 
the assumption that capital markets are relatively frictionless, they investigate whether industries that 
are more dependent on external finance (such as Drugs and Pharmaceuticals) grow relatively faster 
than other sectors (such as Tobacco) which relies less on external financing, in countries that a priori 
are more financially developed. Their study shows that in countries with well-developed financial 
systems, industries that make heavy use of external finance grow faster than other industries. They 
argue that financial development reduces the costs to access to finance for firms, therefore 
accelerating the formation of new businesses and the expansion of existing ones.  
The direction of causality outlined above from financial development to economic growth is 
usually labelled as “supply-leading” hypothesis whereas the opposite hypothesis, that economic 
growth cause financial development, is known as “demand-following” (Patrick, 1966). Some 
economists, however, take a third position and argue that the relation is actually bi-directional.  For 
example, Calderón and Liu (2003) study a sample of 109 developed and developing countries and find 
evidence of bidirectional causality developing countries, with the supply-leading relationship being 
the main source of linear dependence. They also find birectional causality in developed countries. 
However, the demand-following relationship plays a stronger role to the causal relationship. Similarly, 
Luintel and Khan (1999) analyze a sample of 10 countries and examine the long-run causality between 
financial development and economic growth in low-income countries. Using a multivariate time-series 
                                                          
49 The study uses the legal origin of countries as instruments 
50 The calculations are based on the US firms data from the United States Census Bureau. 
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framework, their study does not dismiss the finance-growth argument, but they find a bi-directional 
causality nexus between finance and growth. Similar conclusions were reached in different settings 
by Demetriades and Hussein (1996) and Odhiambo (2004).  More empirical findings from other studies 
are listed in Table 19. 
  
Table 19: Summary of findings from empirical studies 
Authors Regions/countries Results 
King and Levine (1993) 77 countries Unidirectional (finance growth) 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) 65 developed and 
developing countries 
Unidirectional (finance growth) 
Beck, Levine, and Loayza 
(2000) 
70 developed and 
developing countrues 
Unidirectional (finance growth) 
Hassan, Sanchez, and Yu 
(2011) 
119 countries in all 
regions 
Bi-directional in all but 2 regions  
Unidirectional in Sub Saharan Africa and East Asia and 
Pacific (growthfinance) 
Gries, Kraft, and Meierrieks 
(2009) 
16 Sub Saharan African 
countries 
Unidirectional long-run causality (finance  growth) for 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone.  
Unidirectional long-run causality (growth  finance) for 
Ghana and Nigeria 
Bi-directional for Senegal 
Inconclusive evidence for other countries 
Christopoulos and Tsionas 
(2004) 
10 developing 
countries 
Unidirectional (finance growth) 
Demetriades and Hussein 
(1996) 
16 developing counties Bi-directional 
De Gregorio and Guidotti 
(1995) 
100+ developed and 
developing countries 
Mixed results, Unidirectional (financegrowth) for most 
countries. Negative relationship (financial development 
harms growth) for Latin American countries 
Cecchetti et al (2012) 16 developed countries 
Mixed results: financial development contributes to 
(productivity) growth only to a certain extent. Beyond a 
certain limit financial development can be detrimental 
Gaffeo and Garalova (2014) 
13 transition 
economies 
Unidirectional in the long-run (finance growth) 
however possibly detrimental in the short-run 
Hondroyiannis, Lolos, and 
Papapetrou (2005) 
Greece Bi-directional 
Johannes, Njong, and Cletus 
(2011) 
Cameroon Unidirectional (financegrowth) 
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Odhiambo (2004) South Africa Unidirectional (Growth finance) 
Odhiambo (2008) Kenya Unidirectional (Growth finance) 
Kar and Pentecost (2000) Turkey 
Mixed results: causality changed depending on the proxy 
used for financial development 
Luintel and Khan (1999) 
10 developing 
countries 
Bi-directional 
 
 The main studies conducted in the Kenyan context include Gries, Kraft, and Meierrieks (2009) 
and Odhiambo (2008). The two studies differ in the econometric approach in two main ways: first, 
while Gries, Kraft, and Meierrieks (2009) look at trade openness as the main conditioning variable, 
arguing that financial development might benefit economic growth by encouraging countries to open 
up their trade. Odhiambo (2008) on the other hand uses the savings ratio as the third conditional 
variable. The second difference concerns how financial development is defined: whereas Gries, Kraft, 
and Meierrieks (2009) create a composite indicator that keeps into account several measures of 
financial sector development, Odhiambo (2008) relies on a simple proxy of money supply (M2 as a 
percentage of GDP). Their findings are also very different: Gries, Kraft, and Meierrieks (2009) find no 
evidence of long run causality between the three variables (financial development, trade openness 
and economic growth), whereas Odhiambo (2008) finds long run relationship in his model, however 
the causality test suggests that it is growth to fuel financial development and savings, not the other 
way around.  
3. MEASURING FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
The conceptualization and measurement of financial sector development has improved 
considerably over the last few years, and the availability of benchmarking indicators has increased the 
ability to track changes over time across industry, academia and policy-makers. The majority of studies 
use single proxies to study financial development, usually measurements of money supply such as M3 
as percentage of GDP, or private credit as a percentage of GDP (see King and Levine, 1993a, 1993b; 
Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Levine, Loayza, and Beck 2000) . Others use econometric techniques 
to create composite indicators based on principal component analysis (Ang and McKibbin, 2007; Gries, 
Kraft, and Meierrieks (2009). The objective is to create a more comprehensive variable that accounts 
for several dimensions of financial development. This paper uses the latter method in the empirical 
analysis.  
However in recent years it has become clear that financial development is complex and 
multidimensional and in order to address its evolution over time it is necessary to have a more 
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comprehensive conceptual framework. The 2013 World Bank Global Financial Development Report 
(GFDR) developed a 4 by 2 matrix that keep track of four pillars of financial sector development: depth, 
stability, efficiency and access (see Table 20). It also divides the financial landscape in financial markets 
and financial institutions. The idea is that all these dimensions are crucial and cannot develop in 
isolation from the others. 
 
Table 20: 4x2 framework of financial development. Source: World Bank, 2013 
Pillars Financial Institutions Financial Markets 
Depth Private sector credit to GDP 
Financial institutions’ assets to GDP 
Money (M2 aggregate) to GDP 
Deposits to GDP 
Value-added of the financial sector to 
GDP 
Stock market capitalization plus outstanding 
domestic private debt securities to GDP 
Private debt securities to GDP 
Public debt securities to GDP 
International debt securities to GDP 
Stock market capitalization to GDP 
Stocks traded to GDP 
Access Accounts per thousand adults 
(commercial banks) 
Branches per 100,000 adults 
(commercial banks) 
Percent of people with a bank account 
(from user survey) 
Percent of firms with line of credit (all 
firms) 
Percent of firms with line of credit (small 
firms) 
Percent of market capitalization outside of 
top 
10 largest companies 
Percent of value traded outside of top 10 
traded companies 
Government bond yields (3 month and 10 
year) 
Ratio of domestic to total debt securities 
Ratio of private to total debt securities 
(domestic) 
Ratio of new corporate bond issues to GDP 
Efficiency Net interest margin 
Lending-deposits spread 
Noninterest income to total income 
Overhead costs (percent of total assets) 
Profitability (return on assets, return on 
equity) 
Boone indicator (Herfindahl, or H-
statistic) 
Turnover ratio (turnover/capitalization) for 
stock market 
Price synchronicity (co-movement) 
Price impact 
Liquidity/transaction costs 
Quoted bid-ask spread for government bonds 
Turnover of bonds (private, public) on 
securities exchange 
Settlement efficiency 
Stability z-score (or distance to default) 
Capital adequacy ratios 
Asset quality ratios 
Liquidity ratios 
Other (net foreign exchange position to 
capital, etc.) 
Volatility (standard deviation/average) of 
stock price index, 
sovereign bond index 
Skewness of the index (stock price, sovereign 
bond) 
Price/earnings (P/E) ratio 
Duration 
Ratio of short-term to total bonds (domestic, 
international) 
Correlation with major bond returns (German, 
United States) 
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The World Bank started keeping track of these different indicators across countries and created 
a database called the Financial Sector Development database which has data for all countries across 
the years. 
4. FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA  
Kenya in recent years has become the most cited example of pro-poor financial sector 
development and has attracted the interest of donors, academics and policy-makers alike. The 
banking sector has grown dramatically in terms of value and volume of transactions and financial 
inclusion has increased substantially in the last decade, reaching relevant sections of the low-income 
population. However the recent expansion occurred after turbulent decades where the banking 
system evolved and went through different critical periods. This section briefly goes through the 
evolution of the banking sector in Kenya since the 1950s. Understanding the evolution of the financial 
sector is crucial to understand its current success and its relation to economic development in the 
country. 
4.1 BANKING SECTOR IN KENYA 1950S TO 1970S 
The commercial banking system became relatively well established in Kenya before reaching 
independence in 1963, with the presence of numerous British institutions supporting the colonial 
economy and the white settlers. Until the early 1960s, almost all of the banking business in Kenya was 
handled by three international banks which had headquarters in London (Engberg 1965), which were 
focusing on trade and commerce between the British colonies. Although there was a rapid increase in 
the number of bank branches between the late 1940s and 1950s, (see Table 21), commercial banks 
had no interest in targeting the indigenous population and encouraging savings amongst African or 
financing local businesses (Upadhyaya 2011). 
 
Table 21: Number of bank offices in Kenya before independence (Source: Engberg, 1965) 
Year Number of 
bank offices 
1946 19 
1950 27 
1955 61 
1960 141 
1961 160 
1962 163 
1963 161 
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After reaching independence from the UK in 1963, the Kenyan government led by President 
Jomo Kenyatta embarked in a process of “Africanization” of the economy, and for the first time banks 
began to target the local population and business community. Government intervention in the 
financial system in Kenya had two major goals: to control the money supply and guarantee for 
macroeconomic stability and to influence the development of the financial system in order to benefit 
the indigenous African community (Brownbridge 1996). This led to the establishment of several 
government-owned banks. 
The most important banks that had Government ownership were Co-operative Bank, which was 
incorporated in 1965, National Bank of Kenya (NBK) incorporated in 1968. This was followed in 1970 
by the nationalization of Grindlays's Bank, one of the most important banks during the colonial period, 
which was renamed the Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB). KCB is still nowadays the largest bank in Kenya 
by assets and still has partial Government ownership (see Annex 1). However, during the first half of 
the 1970s Kenya was strongly affected by the first oil price shocks (1973), which worsened the balance 
of payments and caused inflation to rise sharply. This was accompanied by currency devaluations and 
changes in the exchange rate peg from the Sterling pound to the U.S. dollar, and then the Special 
Drawing Rights (SDR)51. In response to the crisis, the Kenyan Government decided to impose 
instruments of control rather than liberalize the economy, such as the selective control of bank 
lending, import quota restrictions, price controls, caps on interest rates and licensing of foreign 
exchange transactions (Durevall and Ndung’u 2001). 
The economic crisis was eased in the late 1970s, with a commodity boom in major export crops 
especially coffee and tea. The export boom was paralleled with the expansion of indigenous financial 
institutions, with the establishment of one private commercial bank and nine local non-bank financial 
institutions. These institutions were mainly owned by Africans from the Kikuyu ethnic group who 
largely benefitted from the coffee and tea exports (Upadhyaya, 2011). However, according to Durevall 
and Ndung’u (2001), the management of this boom was partly responsible for the difficulties 
experienced during the 1980s, when the currency appreciated and there was a tremendous expansion 
in the supply of domestic credit, especially by indigenous financial institutions. 
 
                                                          
51 Special drawing rights (SDR) are a supplementary exchange reserve assets controlled by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The value is defined by a weighted average of a currency basket composed of four 
major currencies: the euro, US dollar, British pound, and Japanese yen. 
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4.2 THE RISE OF INDIGENOUS BANKS AND BANK FAILURES IN THE 1980S AND 1990S 
After the death of Jomo Kenyatta in 1978, Daniel Arap Moi took the Presidency of Kenya and 
kept power for the following twenty-four years until 2002. Early after taking office, Moi encouraged 
the establishment of new indigenous banks in order to fuel growth in the local economy. The 1980s 
saw the establishment of numerous non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs): by 1994 there were 
around 17 indigenous commercial banks and 35 NBFIs in operation, which accounted for almost 25% 
of bank deposits and over 50% of NBFI deposits (Upadhyaya, 2012). Brownbridge (1996) divides local 
banks in three main types depending on the ownership: (i) political banks, which had close relations 
with the political parties and prominent politicians among their shareholders; (ii) independent Asian-
owned financial institutions and (iii) independent African-owned financial institutions52. He identifies 
numerous reasons that triggered the rise of indigenous banks during this period. First, during the ‘70s 
there was a widespread perception that large banks, including the government owned banks, weren’t 
servicing the local business community with affordable credit. Local banks entered the market by 
targeting specifically small businesses that were underserved by the existing financial institutions. 
There was also a growth of demand for services from local entrepreneurs, especially those who 
benefitted from the commodity boom and from the Asian community, who had accumulated capital 
during the previous years through several commercial activities including money-lending. Second, 
many of the institutions established during this period were founded by politicians or by businessmen 
with close links to the political parties. These connections facilitated the flow of public sector deposits 
and simplified the process of mobilizing funds. Finally, the growth of local financial institutions was 
aided by the fact that the government kept very low entry barriers. Minimum capital requirements 
during the ‘80s were set to the equivalent of 200,000 US dollars.  
The growth of indigenous banks brought both benefits and costs for financial markets in Kenya 
and the wider economy. Many institutions introduced financial services such as hire purchase and 
trade credit specifically for the small business community, and greatly benefitted to the expansion of 
the local economy. However a number of institutions, especially those with political affiliations, were 
used for major fraud and/or mismanaged at the expense of taxpayers and depositors. Since the ‘80s 
Kenya experienced a series of bank failures involving mostly political banks and some independent 
banks. Around thirty percent of the local financial institutions were closed down or been placed under 
statutory management by the Central Bank of Kenya because of liquidity problems or violations of 
banking regulations (Brownbridge, 1996). Non-performing loans reached an extremely high level and 
many banks became insolvent. Upadhyaya (2011) shows that the collapse of bank and non-bank 
financial institutions happened in three main phases, the first between 1984 and 1989, the second 
                                                          
52 The term “independent” refers to the lack of influence of politicians 
113 
 
between 1993 and 1995, right during the liberalization period; the third phase happened in 1998 with 
the collapse of six institutions in one year (see Table 22). ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 
  
 
Table 22: List of bank failures between 1984 and 1998. Source: Upadhyaya (2011) 
Years Institutions 
1984 – 1989 
Rural Urban Credit Finance 
Continental Bank, Continental Finance 
Union Bank 
Jimba Credit Corporation 
Estate Finance 
Estate Building Society 
Business Finance 
Nationwide Finance 
Kenya Savings and Mortgages 
Home Savings and Mortgages 
Citizens Building Society 
1993 – 1995 
International Finance Company 
Trade Bank 
Trade Finance 
Diners Finance 
Pan African Bank 
Pan African Credit Finance 
Exchange Bank 
Post Bank Credit 
Thabiti Finance 
Export Bank 
Allied Credit 
United Trustee Finance 
Inter-African Credit Finance 
Middle Africa Finance 
Nairobi Finance Corporation 
Central Finance Kenya 
United Bank 
Heritage Bank 
Meridien BIAO Kenya 
1998 
Bullion Bank 
Fortune Finance 
Trust Bank 
City Finance Bank 
Reliance Bank 
Prudential Bank 
Period Institution 
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4.3 FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND REFORMS 
Kenya embarked in the World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs in the 1980s, which were 
initially focused on budget and debt reform, and then started a process of full scale financial sector 
reforms and liberalization in 1990s. The key policies involved the deregulation of interest rates in 1991 
and the authorization to deal in foreign exchange in 1992. In 1993, the Government established a 
market-determined exchange rate for the Kenya Shilling. Financial liberalization took place in a period 
characterized by extremely important changes in the Kenyan political system. The country had its first 
multi-party elections in 1992 and President Moi was strengthened by a much fractured opposition 
(Upadhyaya, 2011). Funding for the elections was extremely high and government borrowing 
increased substantially during the period, with direct effects on inflation and indebtedness. 
The macroeconomic environment was affected also by an aid embargo imposed on the country, 
which led the Government to expand the money supply with extensive printing of money (Durevall 
and Ndung’u, 2001). When the Government decided to mop up the excess liquidity, the Treasury Bills 
Discount rates shot up attracting massive inflows of foreign capital and foreign currency, with a 
consequent appreciation of the currency. The discount rates eventually decreased and the exchange 
rate stabilized. According to Durevall and Ndung’u (2001:96) “The beginning of the 1990s was 
characterised by a shift in attention away from the real economy to one in which trade in financial 
assets dominates, with rates on secure government paper earning an excess premium, and lending 
for investment or importing inputs was seen as unattractive”. 
Brownbridge (1996) argues that financial liberalization eventually stimulated higher 
competition in the banking sector, especially thanks to the removal of interest rate controls, and led 
to stronger attention to the needs of the local market. Although liberalization had little impact in the 
credit market in its early stages, because local banks were suffering from higher capital constraints 
and higher cost of funds, banks were increasingly focused on attracting local deposits. Many Asian 
owned banks were successful in this and engaged with the Asian business community thanks to the 
stronger networks and knowledge of their financing needs.  
 
4.4 EXPANSION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR (2005-2014) 
The relation between the financial sector and real economy became substantially stronger over 
the last ten years. The financial sector currently consists of a large banking sector, a relatively well-
developed securities market, a large number of insurance and retirement benefits schemes, deposit 
taking microfinance institutions (DTMs) and deposit taking SACCOs (DTSs). There are 44 banking 
institutions (43 commercial banks and 1 mortgage finance company) of which 31 are locally owned 
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banks (six have partial or full Government ownership) and 13 are foreign owned. There are also nine 
Deposit-Taking Microfinance institutions (DTMs), all of which are regulated by the Central Bank, and 
215 deposit-taking savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs), regulated by the SACCO regulatory 
authority (SASRA).  
Research conducted by FSD Kenya in 2006, 2009 and 2013 shows that the usage of financial 
services has increased dramatically over the last decade and exclusion from formal banking has 
dropped. FSD-K (2013)53 divides access to finance in five main “access strands” depending on the type 
of financial institution used by households. These are divided in formal prudential, formal non-
prudential, formal registered, informal and excluded (see description of access strands in Table 23). 
This rather complex stratification of financial access is necessary because of the evolving features of 
Kenyan financial landscape: microfinance banks, for example, are divided in deposit-taking or non-
deposit taking – whereas the first are regulated by the Central Bank of Kenya, the second operate 
outside of the prudential regulatory framework. Similarly, Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCO) 
can be deposit taking or not, which defines their regulatory status and degree of formality. The other 
unique feature of the Kenyan financial system is the importance of mobile finance, a system known in 
Kenya as MPesa54, which is operated by a mobile operator without a banking license.  
 
Figure 7: Evolution of financial inclusion between 2006 and 2013 in Kenya (Source: adapted from FSD-K, 2013) 
 
                                                          
53 The 2013 FinAccess report is available online at http://www.fsdkenya.org/finaccess/ (last accessed 
September 2014) 
54 The term M-Pesa is a combination of words: “M” is the short for “mobile” whereas pesa is the Swahili word 
for “money”  
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Table 23: Access strand definition (Source: adapted from FSD-K, 2013) 
Access strand Definition 
Formal Prudential Individuals whose highest level of reported usage of financial services is through service 
providers which are prudentially regulated and supervised by independent statutory regulatory 
agencies 
Formal Non-
prudential 
Individuals whose highest level of reported usage of financial services is through service 
providers which are subject to non-prudential oversight by regulatory agencies or government 
departments/ ministries with focused legislations 
Formal Registered Individuals whose highest level of reported usage of financial services is through providers that 
are registered under a law and government direct interventions 
Informal Individuals whose highest level of reported usage of financial services is through unregulated 
forms of structured provision 
Excluded Individuals not using either formal or informal services 
 
 Figure 7 shows that usage of formal financial services (formal prudential, formal non-
prudential and formal registered) increased from 27.4 percent in 2006 to 66.7 percent in 2013. At the 
same time, exclusion dropped from 39 percent to roughly 25 percent in 2013. The extent and speed 
of growth in financial inclusion is unprecedented and raised many questions on how Kenya succeeded 
in such a short period of time. While the answer is complex and involves many factors, it can be 
summarized in two success stories of the Kenyan financial system: mobile money (particularly MPesa) 
and the rise of Equity Bank. 
 Mpesa is a financial service launched in 2007 by Safaricom, the leading mobile operator in 
Kenya, which established a SMS‐based money transfer system that allows users to deposit, send, and 
withdraw money using their cell phone. In only seven years after its launch, MPesa has become the 
most widespread financial tool in Kenya, with over 26 million registered users in 201355. The success 
of MPesa is also due to the establishment of a wide network of over 100,000 MPesa agents throughout 
the territory that allows users to deposit and withdraw money from their MPesa account without 
travelling large distances. 56  Before the establishment of MPesa, the most common method to send 
remittances from urban to rural areas was via bus or by physically taking the money to destination. Of 
course this happened at huge transaction costs and risk of losing money along the way.  
 The other success story from the Kenyan financial system is the expansion of Equity Bank, 
which over the last decade has become the second largest bank in terms of assets and the first by far 
in terms of deposit accounts. Equity Bank’s success reflects many of the critical stages that the Kenyan 
financial sector has gone through in the last two decades. It was founded in 1984 as a building society 
                                                          
55 Data taken from the Communication Authority of Kenya in the quarterly report for quarter one 2014. Data is 
available at 
http://www.ca.go.ke/images/downloads/STATISTICS/Sector%20Statistics%20Report%20Q3%202013-2014.pdf 
(last accessed in June 2014) 
56 For more details on the impact of MPesa on low-income users, see (Jack and Suri 2011; 2014). 
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providing mortgages to lower income Kenyans. In the ‘90s and early ‘2000s it went through a period 
of profound crisis when non-performing loans (NPLs) reached over half of its lending portfolio and the 
liquidity ratio stood well below the limit imposed by the Central Bank of Kenya.  The crises of the 
financial sector prompted Equity Bank to change its management system and transform the institution 
from a building society into a fully-fledged commercial bank in 2005. Since the beginning of this new 
phase, Equity identified a gap in financial services amongst the lower income groups and decided to 
focus on the “bottom of the pyramid”.  The bank’s core income-generating products became micro-
finance services for individuals lacking physical collateral. The Data from the Central Bank of Kenya 
show that over the following eight years Equity Bank expanded fast: in 2013 it had over 7 million 
deposit accounts, representing over 44 percent of all bank accounts in Kenya. During the same year, 
Equity Bank provided over 800 thousand loans, representing over 37 percent of total loan accounts in 
Kenya (see Annex 1). 
 It is important to point out that even though the Kenyan financial sector has improved 
substantially in recent years, it still has a number of problems that are hampering its growth. Interest 
rates and spreads have remained extremely high, and the cost of credit remains unaffordable for many 
micro and small scale enterprises. The banking sector is still relatively highly concentrated, with the 
six largest banks having over 50 percent of the market share. There is also evidence that some key 
sectors of the economy such as agriculture still obtains very little credit despite being the backbone 
of the Kenyan economy. This will be analysed more in depth in essay 4. 
 
5. FINANCE AND GROWTH IN KENYA - EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 Next sections will take a deeper look at the data on financial sector development in Kenya and 
will try to assess whether financial development in Kenya was a significant cause of economic growth 
or whether it occurred as a consequence of growth. Following Gries, Kraft, and Meierrieks (2009), Ang 
and McKibbin (2007) and Odhiambo (2008), the paper hypothesizes that the relation between the 
deepening of the financial sector and GDP growth is not direct, but occurs through specific 
“conditioning” variables: this paper looks in particular at the role of gross investments57 and gross 
savings as intermediary steps between financial sector development and economic growth. Previous 
studies have taken a similar approach but have looked at different conditioning variables. In order to 
conduct the econometric analysis the paper uses the variables indicated in Table 24. 
                                                          
57 In the world bank databases, the time series variable on gross investments has been renamed “capital 
formation as a % of GDP”. 
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Table 24: List of variables and sources of the data 
Variable 
name 
Variable content Source 
LM3 log (liquid liabilities or M3 as a % of GDP):  Financial development and structure 
database58 
LBankAssets log [commercial bank assets / (commercial 
bank assets + central bank assets)] 
Financial development and structure 
database 
LCredit log (domestic credit to private sector as % of 
GDP))  
Financial development and structure 
database 
Lgdp log (real GDP per capita) World Bank Development indicators 
LSav log (gross domestic savings as a % of GDP) World Bank Development indicators 
LInv59 log (Gross capital formation as a % of GDP) World Bank Development indicators 
 
The variables LM3, LBankAssets and LCredit have been used widely in the literature as proxies 
for financial sector development (see for example, King and Levine, 1993a; 1993b; Beck, Levine, and 
Loayza 2000). While they are not the only proxies for financial development, they have the advantage 
of having been collected for several decades in Kenya, therefore allowing us to look at trends over the 
long-run. As explained in section 5.2, this paper combines the three variables into a single composite 
indicator through principal component analysis, in order to comprehensively measure the different 
facets of financial development. Lgdp represents real GDP per capita and it is used as the main 
measure for economic growth. LSav and LInv are used as the main conditioning variables for the 
regressions. Whereas the first three variables are taken from the Financial Development and Structure 
Database, the rest are taken from the World Bank databases. The data are converted into natural 
logarithms so that they can be interpreted in growth terms after taking the first difference. This is a 
widely spread technique used in the literature on finance and growth. In fact, if the first lag of a time 
series Yt is Yt-1 and its jth lag is Yt-j then the first difference of the logarithm of Yt is ln(Yt) =ln(Yt) – ln(Yt-1), 
and the percentage change of a time series Yt  is approximately 100*ln(Yt). 
In order to determine the causality linkages between finance and growth, the paper takes the 
following econometric approach. 
1. We create a composite indicator of financial depth by using a principal component 
analysis (PCA) between the financial variables LM3, LBankAssets and LCredit. 
                                                          
58 The Financial Development and Structure Database is compiled annually by Beck and Demigurc-kunt. The 
data used in this paper is from the September 2012 version. 
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2. In the second step we conduct an Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root test (ADF) in order 
to check if the variables are stationary at log-level and/or first difference. 
3. Since all the variables are found to be non-stationary at log-level and stationary at first-
difference, then we check for cointegration using the Johansen cointegration test.  
4. After confirming the presence of cointegration in the models, then we conducts a Vector 
Error Correction Model (VECM) and look for long term and short term Granger-causality 
in the data.  
 
5.1 DATA DESCRIPTIVES 
Figure 8 shows different trends in the financial development variables used in the research. 
Whereas LM3, and LCredit show an upward trend throughout the period, the variable LBankAssets 
shows a more irregular pattern, decreasing before the mid-1990s and then increasing sharply after 
1995 arguably as a result of financial liberalization and reforms. 
 
Figure 8: Trend in financial development indicators 1960 – 2011 (logarithmic scale) 
 
 Figure 9 on the other hand shows the dynamics of the variables Lgdp, LSav and LInv over the 
period between 1960 and 2010. The Lgdp process has a clear upward trend during the period and 
therefore its interpretation is straightforward. On the other hand, gross domestic savings and gross 
investment as a % of GDP follow different patterns. Although they seem related in the period before 
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the mid-nineties, they split after 2000 where LInv has a slight upward trend whereas LSav has a clear 
downward trend.  
 The low level of savings and its downward trend in recent years is a well-known problem in 
Kenya which was flagged by World Bank and the IMF as a key constraint to sustained economic 
growth. The 2013 World Bank “Kenya Economic Update (KEU)”60 in fact shows that the trend in the 
savings rate in Kenya is lower compared to the positive trends registered in neighboring countries such 
as Tanzania and Uganda. In recent years Kenya registered savings rates around 13-14 percent of GDP 
on average whereas Uganda and Tanzania recorded savings rates above 20 percent. Low income 
countries around the world have performed even better in recent years with savings rate at over 26 
percent of GDP on average. The World Bank argues that the reason why investments have slightly 
increased in the last decade despite the fall of domestic savings (see Figure 9) was dependent on 
increased flows of foreign savings. The dependency of capital formation on foreign savings is 
considered a key constraint towards economic development and certainly will not allow Kenya to 
reach the ambitious goal of 10% growth rate envisaged by the Government in its key document “Vision 
2030”. In order to follow the growth pattern of fast growing economies in Asia, the World Bank argues 
that it is necessary to dramatically increase domestic savings rates: “The common feature of these 
‘success stories’ is that they had relatively high saving rates at the beginning and during their ‘high 
growth episode’. High savings rates are particularly common in East Asia -the fastest growing region 
of the world. The average savings rate in East Asia during the 2000s was 30 percent of GDP, compared 
to the global average of about 19 percent”. 
 
                                                          
60 Available at http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Africa/Kenya/kenya-economic-
update-june-2013.pdf (last accessed, September 2014) 
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Figure 9: Trends in GDP per capita, savings and investments, 1960-2012 (logarithmic scale) 
 
 An additional descriptive analysis of the time series processes can be done by analyzing the 
correlation coefficients among the key variables. Table 25 shows that the sign and significance of the 
correlation coefficients substantially confirm the description done above. The dependent variable of 
interest Lgdp shows relatively strong and significant correlation with LM3, which represent the 
logarithm of money supply as a percentage of GDP. It also shows strong correlation with LCredit, which 
represent private sector credit as a percentage of GDP. The correlation with LInv (0.18) is not 
significant whereas it is negative and significant for the savings variable LSav (-0.51)61. Understanding 
these patterns is extremely important in the analysis of the rest of the paper, because savings and 
investments are used as key conditioning variables in the interpretation of the finance-growth nexus. 
Moreover, the relatively high correlation coefficients between LM3, LCredit and LBankAssets confirm 
the necessity to construct a single index of financial development via principle component analysis, 
which is conducted in the next section. 
 
 
                                                          
61 The correlation coefficients in Table 25 were calculated without considering the lagged values for the 
different variables. A variety of tests were conducted in order to determine whether lags of up to five years 
changed significantly the correlation coefficients, but there were only minor differences. For example, we 
notice that the correlation coefficient between LInv and Lgdp is maximized when we consider the lag 1 for the 
variable LInv (0.2011), and the correlation coefficient between Lgdp and LSav remains negative also when we 
consider lagged variables, but the coefficient decreases slightly. 
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Table 25: pairwise correlation among variables 
 LM3 LBankAssets LCredit LSav LInv Lgdp 
LM3 1      
LBankAssets -0.5691*** 1     
LCredit 0.9444*** -0.5794*** 1    
LSav 0.2686 -0.5774*** -0.0143 1   
LInv -0.1053 -0.1807 0.2661* 0.2104 1  
Lgdp 0.7009*** -0.0862 0.8378*** -0.5095** 0.1826 1 
  
5.2 PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS 
One of the core decisions made in this paper is to create a composite index of financial inclusion 
instead of relying on single proxies. This is one of the major differences from previous studies such as 
Odhiambo (2008) which uses money supply (M2 as a % of GDP) as the only proxy for financial 
development. The hypothesis is that while single proxies may indicate some trends of financial 
development over time, we need to combine different variables in order to have a more 
comprehensive picture (Gries, Kraft, and Meierrieks 2009). The construction of the composite 
indicator is done through principle component analysis, which combines the variables LCredit, 
LBankAssets, and LM3, and creates a single index variable which we’ll call depth. According to Ang and 
McKibbin (2007), although some variables such as LBankAssets, LCredit and LM3 are very common in 
the financial development literature, there is no consensus over the superiority of any of these 
indicators. Therefore it is advisable to construct a composite indicator that is as broad as possible and 
retains as much information as possible about the original datasets. Since the financial development 
variables used in this paper are significantly correlated, the development of a single index variable 
using principal component analysis can be effective in dealing with the issues of multicollinearity and 
over-parameterization.  
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) is a common statistical tool used to identify patterns and 
reduce the dimensionality of the data. By combining the variables into principal components it is 
possible to construct a composite indicator and observe the overall patterns in the time series. As 
seen in the Table below, the eigenvalues of the first component (renamed depth) explain over 80 
percent of the standardized variance, while the second and third explain 18 percent and 2 percent of 
the standardized variance respectively. We therefore decided to use the first component as our 
measure of financial development. In the calculation of the first component, we see that each variable 
has a different contribution: LBankAsset is negative, whereas LM3 and LCredit are positive. These 
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trends are in fact reflected in Figure 8, which shows that LM3 and LCredit have an increasing trend 
throughout the period, whereas LBankAsset has a decreasing trend until the mid-1990s, and then 
grows in the late 1990s up to 2010. The reason for this trend was explained in Section 4, which 
described the bank failures occurred between the 1980s and 1990s. During this period about 30 
percent of the local institutions were closed down or been placed under statutory management by 
the Central Bank of Kenya, therefore decreasing the weight of commercial bank relative to the central 
bank in the financial system. This gradually changed after the mid-1990s with the liberalization of the 
market, the reforms of the banking system and the entry of new institutions62. All these fluctuations 
in the banking system are captured by the principal component, which reflects the different variations 
in the three variables over the period under consideration. The resulting index variable depth is shown 
in Figure 10.  
 
Table 26: Principal component analysis 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion  Cumulative 
Comp1 2.40686 1.87062 0.8023 0.8023 
Comp2 0.536236 0.479328 0.1787 0.981 
Comp3 0.056908 . 0.019 1 
 
Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Unexplained 
LM3 0.6128 0.3559 -0.7056 0 
LBankAssets -0.4979 0.8672 0.005 0 
LCredit 0.6137 0.3483 0.7086 0 
 
 
Figure 10 shows that the index variable depth follows a clear upward trend dynamic during the 
period analyzed in this research. The key question is whether the evolution of the financial sector 
which emerges from the index variable depth in Figure 10 reflects the descriptive analysis on the 
evolution of the financial sector discussed in section 4. As most studies reviewed in the literature are 
                                                          
62 While the variable depth reduces the dimensionality of the data and allows to construct a broad composite 
indicator for financial sector development, the analysis would benefit by a sectoral disaggregation of the data. 
This would allow to conduct a more fined-grained analysis of the drivers of growth. However this Essay uses 
historical data that is not available on a sectoral basis. A basic analysis on the distribution of lending among 
SMEs is conducted in Essay 4 of this dissertation. The data collected is available for the years 2009, 2011 and 
2013, and therefore not viable for the time-series analysis done in this paper. 
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based on cross-country comparisons, they rarely conduct a qualitative inspection to link specific 
historical or political/economic events at the local level to trends in the financial development data. 
Since this study focuses only on one country making these linkages and including them in the 
interpretation of the data is of uttermost importance. 
 
Figure 10: Financial sector deepening in Kenya from 1968 to 2010 
 
The overall assessment of Figure 10 is that the trends in the data match appropriately the 
historical events discussed in the previous sections regarding economic development and the 
evolution of the financial sector. While the decades between the 1970s and 1990s have been 
extremely turbulent with strong fluctuations between growth and downturns, the upward trends in 
the depth variable seem to closely reflect the expansion of the financial sector. In fact, while the 
financial system was primarily used by the colonial economy and the white settlers until 
independence, the chart shows a clear upward dynamic between 1970 and 1980, which reflects the 
establishment of Government owned banks and the increased focus on servicing the local population, 
especially thanks to the commodity boom in the late 1970s. In the 1980s financial development seem 
to have stalled and Figure 10 does not show any clear upward or downward trend. As explained in 
section 4.2, this was the period characterized by the establishment of indigenous institutions, which 
had some positive effects on the development of the financial system, though it also led to the 
politicization of some institutions and spreading mismanagement practices. The strong upward trend 
of the depth variable in the early 1990s arguably shows what Durevall and Ndung’u (2001) called a 
shift of attention “away from the real economy” and into the “trade of financial assets”. This therefore 
might not reflect an improvement in financial inclusion but simply an expansion of the financial sector. 
The downward trend in the mid-1990s shows the numerous bank failures during the period (see Table 
22) and the economic crisis that followed the first years of liberalization of the economy. The rise after 
2005 reflects the recent expansion of the financial sector described in Section 4.4.   
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5.3 AUTO-CORRELATIONS AND CROSS-CORRELOGRAMS  
 In order to analyze the characteristics of the depth variable and its relation to the other variables 
used in the econometric analysis, it is important to inspect the variables in a visual format. This will 
help understanding the key relations between the time-series data and guide some of the decisions in 
the econometric approach and in the interpretation of the data. Next figures show the autocorrelation 
plots and cross-correlograms between the variables used in the study, which will inform the approach 
used in the stationarity analysis in section 5.4 as well as the interpretation of the VECM model results.   
 
Figure 11: Autocorrelation plots 
 
 Figure 11 shows the autocorrelation plots for the main variables of interest, namely Lgdp, LInv, 
LSav and depth. The gray area displays the 95% confidence level, showing therefore that the 
autocorrelation for the variables depth and LInv is significant at 3 lags, whereas the economic growth 
variable Lgdp is at 4 lags and LSav at only 1 lag. The autocorrelation plots confirm what was observed 
A B 
Note: Each chart in the figure represents the autocorrelation plot for different variables (Chart A: Depth. Chart B: Lgdp. 
Chart C: LSav. Chart D: LInv)  
C D 
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above about the volatile nature of savings in Kenya. Whereas all the other graphs tend to show a more 
homogeneous distribution of autocorrelation coefficients for the different lag values, LSav shows 
lower levels of autocorrelation as well as more variability. All charts however show an approximately 
similar dynamic where autocorrelation coefficients tend to approach a zero or negative value at about 
10 lags. The Lgdp however tend to have stronger autocorrelation coefficients which approach zero at 
roughly 15 lags.  
Figure 12: Cross-correlograms among bivariate models 
 
 
A B 
C D 
F 
Note: each chart in the figure represents the cross-correlograms among different bivariate models. (Chart A: Lgdp and 
Depth, Chart B: Depth and LInv, Chart C: Depth and LSav, Chart D: LSav and Lgdp, Chart E: LInv and Lgdp, Chart F: LSav 
and LInv. 
E
 
 C 
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 The graphs in Figure 12  show the cross correlograms between pair of variables which can be 
useful as an initial description of the dataset and to make early assessments regarding the potential 
presence of Granger causality among pair of variables. As it will be discussed in depth later in this 
essay, Granger causality refers to the case where past values of a variable X are efficient at predicting 
future values of another variable Y. Granger causality therefore refers to the predictive capacity of 
time series processes rather than causality in the more common sense of the word. Cross-
correlograms can be handy at making this type of early predictions since they look at cross-
correlations between one variable at time t and another variable at time t+k and t-k.  For example the 
correlogram A on the top-left of Figure 12 looks at the cross-correlations between the variable Lgdp 
at time t and variable depth at time t-1 and t+1. The graph shows that the two variables are positively 
correlated throughout the period, with a peak value at t=0 and decreasing values as the number of 
lags increases. This suggests that the capacity of one variable to predict the future value of the other 
decreases as k increases. The other pairs of variables in Figure 12 follow very different irregular 
patterns and therefore are more difficult to assess in term of Granger causality. We see some 
similarities between charts B and F which study the cross-correlations between depth and LInv and 
between LSav and LInv respectively. They show a similar pattern where the cross correlation 
coefficient tends to be positive for t<0 and negative for t>0. A somewhat opposite dynamic is observed 
in charts D and E which analyze cross-correlation between LSav and LInv at time t and Lgdp at time 
t+k and t-k, which tend to go from negative to positive as t increases. However, the two cross-
correlograms are largely different in terms of the time t when the cross-correlation coefficient 
switches from negative to positive as well as the heterogeneity of the coefficients. Chart E is in fact 
shows a smooth distribution of cross-correlation coefficients compared to chart D which is 
substantially more volatile. The same can be said for chart C which alternates positive and negative 
coefficients at different lag values. 
 
5.4 AUGMENTED DICKEY FULLER TEST AND CHOICE OF THE OPTIMAL LAGS VALUES 
Numerous diagnostic tests are necessary before estimating a time series model. The 
conventional regression approach requires the time series to be covariance stationary, meaning that 
the variable’s mean and auto-covariance are ﬁnite and do not change over time. In case of non-
stationary processes, when the joint probability distribution of the variables is not constant over time, 
then a conventional regression approach can lead to spurious results (Granger and Newbold 1974) 
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where the outcome of a model makes no economic sense despite the high linear correlation 
coefficients and t-ratios would suggest otherwise63.  
Following conventional time-series approaches, the first step is to test the order of integration 
of the individual variables before proceeding with the cointegration analysis and Error-Correction 
Model (ECM). In this study, we rely on the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test to determine whether 
the variables have a unit root and therefore are non-stationary at level. Since the Dickey Fuller test is 
sensitive to the lag number chosen, a number of tests have been conducted to choose the optimal 
values for each variable. In Stata this is normally done using the varsoc function, which allows to test 
the optimal lag number for both individual variables and a combination of them64. The Stata output 
reports the results of the final prediction error (FPE), Akaike's information criterion (AIC), the 
Schwarz's Bayesian information criterion (SBIC), and the Hannan and Quinn information criterion 
(HQIC)65. The output of each individual test is included in Annex 2, whereas the summary of the lag 
number chosen is shown in Table 25. Note that since some tests do not reach a unanimous conclusion 
regarding the optimal lag value, the models are tested for different maximum lag values in order to 
assure for the consistency of the results66. 
 
Table 27: Choice of the optimal lag value for individual and multiple time-series variables. 
Variables Optimal lags (p) Models 
Lgdp 2, 4 ADF 
Depth 1 ADF 
LSav 1 ADF 
LInv 1 ADF 
Lgdp, Depth, LSav 1, 4 Johansen test, VECM 
Lgdp, Depth, LInv 2, 4 Johansen test, VECM 
 
                                                          
63 More specifically Granger and Newbold (1974) show that the confidence in the parameters is overestimated 
when the coefficient of determination r2 is greater than the Durbin-Watson d-value. 
64 The ADF test is based on the stationarity tests of individual time-series variables. Table 25 shows also the 
number of lags chosen for the trivariate models because they are used later in the essay for the VECM models 
estimation. 
65 For more details on these tests, see Lütkepohl and Krätzig (2004) and Nielsen (2001) 
66 Annex 2 shows that different tests provide different optimal lag values for the variable logg and the two 
trivariate models. The ADF tests Johansen tests for cointegration and therefore will include the outputs that 
use both lag values. Analysing the significance of results with multiple lag values is a conventional procedure in 
several time-series studies. 
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 Having chosen the lag values for all variables, the Augmented Dickey Fuller test (ADF) analyzes 
whether there are unit roots in the data, testing the following hypotheses: 
H0= There is a unit root in the data (non-stationary) 
Ha= There is not unit root in the data (stationary) 
 
The ADF testing is applied to the following model: 
 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝜃𝑦𝑡−1 +∑𝛿𝑗
∗
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
∆𝑦𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜇𝑡 
(12) 
Where  is a constant and β is a coefficient for the time trend; p is the lag order chosen for the 
model. The ADF test is based on the t-statistic of the coefficient  from an OLS estimation of equation 
13 (Dickey and Fuller 1979 in Lutkepohl and Kratzig, 2004). The next table shows the results of the ADF 
test for intercept only (Table 28) with the number of lags identified above. If the absolute value of the 
test statistic is larger than the absolute value of the 5% critical value, then the null hypothesis is 
rejected and there is not unit root in the data. The test statistic needs to be negative for the model to 
be valid. 
 
Table 28: ADF test, only intercept 
  Log-Level First difference 
Var  p Test-
statistic 
5% critical 
value 
Outcome null 
hypothesis 
Test-statistic 5% critical 
value 
Outcome null 
hypothesis 
LSav 1 -2.709 -2.969 Not Rejected -6.291 -2.972 Rejected 
LInv 1 -2.676 -2.930 Not Rejected -7.164 -2.933 Rejected 
Lgdp 
2 -1.242 -2.936 Not Rejected -4.455 -2.938 Rejected 
4 1.100 -2.941 Not rejected -3.571 -2.944 Rejected 
Depth 1 -2.044 -2.952 Not Rejected -4.559 -2.955 Rejected 
 
 The table above shows that the null hypothesis is not rejected for all variables and lag values, 
indicating that all variables are I(1), being non-stationary at level and stationary at first difference. This 
allows to test for co-integration presented in the next section.  
5.5 JOHANSEN CO-INTEGRATION MODEL 
Cointegration is a statistical feature of time-series variables that are non-stationary at levels but 
stationary at first difference (normally defined as I(1) variables) and have at least one linear 
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combination which is covariance stationary (I(0)) and share a common stochastic trend. The basic idea 
is that in the context of two processes Yt and Xt that are non-stationary at level but stationary at first 
difference, if the two processes have a relationship that is constant over time, then there will be a 
particular value  so that Yt- Xt is a stationary process. The key feature of co-integrated variables is 
that they are associated over the long-run and any deviations from the equilibrium is temporary and 
eventually returns to equilibrium. Since the ADF tests have shown that all the variables are I(1), 
cointegration analysis provides the appropriate framework for assessment and interpretation of the 
data.  
In order to check for co-integration among the variables, we conduct a Johansen test for 
cointegration which indicates “r” the number of co-integrating equations in the VECM based on the 
maximum likelihood estimation67. The Johansen test is based on two statistics: trace-statistics (λtrace) 
and maximum eigenvalue (λmax). The λtrace statistic tests the null hypothesis that r is equal to z against 
the alternative hypothesis is that r > z with z = (0, 1, 2,..k) showing cointegration among the time-
series, so that 
 
𝐽𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒 = −𝑇 ∑ ln (1 − λ𝑡)
𝑘
𝑖=𝑟+1
 
(13) 
where λ are the estimated eigenvalues and T are the number of observations. The maximum 
eigenvalue statistic λmax on the other hand tests the null hypothesis that the number of co-integrating 
vectors is equal to r against the alternative hypothesis of r+1 co-integrating vectors 
 𝐽𝑚𝑎𝑥 = −𝑇(1 − 𝜆𝑟+1) (14) 
Table 29 reports the results of the Johansen co-integration tests for the two trivariate models 
of interest with the lag values identified in Table 25 as well as the simple bivariate model that exclude 
the conditioning variables LSav and LInv. The general guideline to read the tables is that if the trace 
statistic is larger than the critical value, then the null hypothesis is rejected. Confirming the hypothesis 
outlined in the beginning of the paper, Table 29 shows that the trivariate models that include 
conditioning variables savings or investments have one co-integrating vector and therefore are 
characterized by long-run association68. For instance, our test statistic for Model 1 of 30.74 exceeds 
the 95% critical value of 29.68 which leads to the rejection of the hypothesis of no cointegrating 
relationship. The maximum eigenvalue statistic of 24.89 also exceeds its corresponding critical value 
of 20.97 which is consistent with the result using the trace statistic. If we move on to the second 
                                                          
67 For more details on the calculations of the cointegrating in the presence of a linear trend see Johansen 
(1992). 
68 The test however shows that the model 3 which uses logi as conditioning variable and 2 lag values shows no 
evidence of cointegrating vectors. 
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alternative hypothesis that r is higher or equal to 2, the test does not reject the null hypothesis for 
both the trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics. Similar results of one cointegrating vector are 
obtained in two other trivariate models (model 2 and model 4 in Table 29) while the Johansen test 
does not reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration for the bivariate models. The fact that long-
term co-integration is confirmed for the two trivariate models makes them eligible to be analyzed with 
the Vector Error Correction Model analyzed in the next section. 
 
Table 29: Johansen test result for two trivariate models 
λtrace test Λmax test 
H0 Ha Statistic 95% 
critical 
value 
H0 Ha Statistic 95% 
critical 
value 
Trivariate Models 
Model A:  Lgdp depth and LSav (p=1) 
r=0 r≥1 30.74** 29.68 r=0 r=1 24.89** 20.97 
r≤1 r≥2 5.84 15.41 r≤1 r=2 5.31 14.07 
r≤2 R=3 .52 3.76 r≤2 r=3 .52 3.76 
Model B: Lgdp depth and LSav (p=4) 
r=0 r≥1 26.48** 29.68 r=0 r=1 23.51** 20.97 
r≤1 r≥2 2.97 15.41 r≤1 r=2 2.71 14.07 
r≤2 R=3 .26 3.76 r≤2 r=3 .26 3.76 
Model C: Lgdp depth and LInv (p=2) 
r=0 r≥1 25.37 29.68 r=0 r=1 12.95 20.97 
r≤1 r≥2 12.4 15.41 r≤1 r=2 9.77 14.07 
r≤2 R=3 2.65 3.76 r≤2 r=3 2.65 3.76 
Model D: Lgdp depth and LInv (p=4) 
r=0 r≥1 30.90** 29.68 r=0 r=1 21.51** 20.97 
r≤1 r≥2 11.39 15.41 r≤1 r=2 8.79 14.07 
r≤2 R=3 2.60 3.76 r≤2 r=3 2.60 3.76 
Bivariate Model 
Model E:  Lgdp and depth (p=1) 
r=0 r≥1 14.22 15.41 r=0 r=1 12.77 14.07 
r≤1 R=2 1.45 3.76 r≤1 r=2 1.45 3.76 
Model F: Lgdp and depth (p=2) 
r=0 r≥1 14.55 15.41 r=0 r=1 11.64 14.07 
r≤1 R=2 2.90 9.24 r≤1 r=2 2.90 9.24 
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5.6 VECTOR ERROR CORRECTION MODEL WITH TWO TRIVARIATE MODELS  
The previous section has shown that the two trivariate models of interest have a cointegration 
relationship and therefore financial development, growth, and the conditioning variable (savings or 
investments) share a common stochastic trend and long-run equilibrium. This confirms one of the key 
hypothesis outlined in the paper and indicates that a relationship of causality in either way cannot be 
ruled out. Due to the cointegration relationship, the common procedure is to include an error 
correction model and proceed with the analysis in a VECM framework. In their seminal paper, Engle 
and Granger (1987) show that co-integrated variables must include an error correction term in the 
model in order to take into account the information lost while calculating the first difference. The 
error correction models are effective in the analysis of non-stationary time series variables because 
they allow long run components to follow the equilibrium constraints while short-run components to 
have a dynamic specification. In a model with two variables Yt and Xt the error correction term 
estimates the speed of adjustment in which a dependent variable Yt returns to equilibrium after a 
change in an independent variable Xt. In its basic form, the VECM takes the following form: 
 
 ∆𝑌𝑡 =  𝜇 + 𝛼0∆𝑋𝑡 − 𝛽1(𝑌𝑡−1 − 𝛽2𝑋𝑡−1) + 𝜀1 (15) 
 
where the part inside the parenthesis (Yt -1 - β2Xt-1) represents the error correction term and it is equal 
to zero when Xt and Yt are in their equilibrium state. α0 estimates the short term effects of a change 
of  Xt on Yt while β1 estimates the speed of adjustment after a deviation from equilibrium (Lütkepohl 
and Krätzig 2004). Since this paper attempts to analyze two trivariate models that were confirmed to 
have one co-integrating vector in the Johansen tests, the variables can be modeled as in the equations 
17, 18 and 19 when they include savings (LSav) as the main conditioning variable. They can be 
modelled as equations 21, 22 and 23 when they include investments (LInv) as the main conditioning 
variable. 
 
 
∆𝐿𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 = 𝜇1 + 𝛽11𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 +∑𝛼1𝑗∆𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡−𝑗 +  ∑ 𝛾1𝑗∆𝐿𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗 +∑∅1𝑗∆𝐿𝑆𝑎𝑣
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀1𝑡 
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
 
 
(16) 
 
∆𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡 = 𝜇1 + 𝛽21𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 +∑𝛼2𝑗∆𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡−𝑗 +  ∑ 𝛾2𝑗∆𝐿𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗 +∑∅2𝑗∆𝐿𝑆𝑎𝑣
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀2𝑡 
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
 
(17) 
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∆𝐿𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑡 = 𝜇1 + 𝛽31𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 +∑𝛼3𝑗∆𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡−𝑗 +  ∑ 𝛾3𝑗∆𝐿𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗 + ∑∅3𝑗∆𝐿𝑆𝑎𝑣
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀3𝑡  
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
 
(18) 
 
where Lgdp, LSav and depth are the main variables of interest described in the beginning of the 
section;  refers to the first difference of the variables and  is the error term. ECM is the error used 
to calculate the long term association between variables and is calculated through the following 
equation69: 
 
𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 = 𝐿𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−1 + (
𝛽21
𝛽11
)𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡−1 + (
𝛽31
𝛽11
) 𝐿𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑡−1 
(19) 
The second set of models that showed one co-integrating vector included the investments 
variable LInv as the main conditioning variable. Table 29 shows that the test for cointegration is valid 
only for model D which has lag-order p equal to 4, but there is no evidence of cointegration for model 
3 which a lag-order 2. Model 3 is nevertheless estimated in the VECM framework to confirm the 
robustness of the previous section’s results. The second set of models is formalized as follows: 
 
 
∆𝐿𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡 = 𝜇1 + 𝛽11𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 +∑𝛼1𝑗∆𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡−𝑗 +  ∑ 𝛾1𝑗∆𝐿𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗 +∑∅1𝑗∆𝐿𝐼𝑛𝑣
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀1𝑡  
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
 
 
(20) 
 
∆𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡 = 𝜇1 + 𝛽21𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 +∑𝛼2𝑗∆𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡−𝑗 +  ∑ 𝛾2𝑗∆𝐿𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗 +∑∅2𝑗∆𝐿𝐼𝑛𝑣
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀2𝑡  
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
 
 
(21) 
 
∆𝐿𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑡 = 𝜇1 + 𝛽31𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 +∑𝛼3𝑗∆𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑡−𝑗 +  ∑ 𝛾3𝑗∆𝐿𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑡−𝑗 + ∑∅3𝑗∆𝐿𝐼𝑛𝑣
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀3𝑡  
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
𝑝−1
𝑗=1
 
(22) 
 
                                                          
69 The equation refers to the error correction term in equation (17). The ECT for equations 18, 19, 21 and 22 
are derived in the same way by rearranging dependent and independent variables.  
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5.7 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The core focus of this paper is on the long-run relationships between the variables of interest 
and therefore particular attention will be paid to the parameters of the cointegrating equations 
identified in the VECM model as well as the error correction terms. Table 30 presents the results of 
the VECM estimations for all the six models formalized in the equations in the previous section with 
the cointegrating vectors normalized to the dependent variables. The β values in the last column of 
the table indicate the speed of adjustments of the model towards equilibrium; for the model to be 
stable, the β coefficients must have a value between 0 and |1| where the value 1 means that the 
model takes exactly one period t to return to equilibrium70. In order to check for serial correlations 
among the residuals, a Lagrange Multiplier Test is conducted for all models and the results are 
presented in the third column of the table. 
 
Table 30: VECM estimations for the trivariate models (long run causality) 
Model1 Lags (p) LM test 
statistic2 
Cointegrated equation βj1,  
Model 1: 
Lgdp, depth, LSav 
 
1 
 
14.68 
Lgdpt-1 = 0.44 deptht-1 – 2.32 LSavt-1 + 12.34 
                                 (7.59***)              (8.23***) 
0.10 
(2.38**) 
4 7.95 
Lgdpt-1 =  0.54 deptht-1 – 2.23 LSavt-1 + 6.33 
                            (3.53***)                   (-4.94) 
0.06 
(0.50) 
Model 2: 
depth, Lgdp, LSav 
 
1 14.68 
deptht-1 = 2.28 Lgdpt-1 + 5.30 LSavt-1 – 28.17  
                               (4.06***)                    (7.84***) 
-0.20 
(2.37**) 
4 7.95 
deptht-1 = 1.83 Lgdpt-1 + 4.08 LSavt-1 – 21.99  
                               (3.06**)                   (4.73***) 
-0.31 
(-1.16) 
Model 3: 
LSav, depth, Lgdp 
1 14.68 
LSavt-1 = 0.19 deptht-1 - 1.83 Lgdpt-1 + 5.31 
                                                     (4.77***)                (-4.66***) 
-0.83 
(-4.45***) 
4 7.95 
LSavt-1 = 0.25 deptht-1 - 0.44 Lgdpt-1 + 5.39 
                                                     (4.61***)                (-4.19***) 
-1.262 
(-2.64**) 
Model 4: 
Lgdp, depth, LInv 
 
2 
 
23.45** 
Lgdpt-1 = 0.39 deptht-1 – 2.79 LInvt-1 + 13.90 
                                 (3.24**)                (2.87**) 
-0.42 
(-1.19) 
4 10.46 
Lgdpt-1 =  0.41 deptht-1 – 1.31 LInvt-1 + 9.61 
                            (5.91***)                   (-2.73**) 
- 0.105 
(-1.43) 
Model 5: 
depth, Lgdp, LInv 
2 23.45** 
deptht-1 = 2.55 Lgdpt-1 + 7.12 LInvt-1 – 35.52  
                               (2.91**)                    (2.75**) 
-0.17 
(2.84**) 
                                                          
70 If the β value is above the absolute value of 1, then the model is considered unstable. For more details see 
Lütkepohl and Krätzig (2004) 
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4 10.46 
deptht-1 = 2.46 Lgdpt-1 + 3.22 LInvt-1 – 23.65  
                               (5.28**)                   (4.73***) 
-0.35 
(-3.32***) 
Model 6: 
LInv, depth, Lgdp 
2 23.45** 
LInvt-1 = 0.14deptht-1 - 0.35Lgdpt-1 + 4.99 
                                                     (2.38**)                (-2.22**) 
-0.13 
(-0.96) 
4 10.46 
LInvt-1 = 0.31deptht-1 - 0.76 Lgdpt-1 + 7.34 
                    (3.90***)                (-3.77***) 
-0.78 
(-0.69) 
1 *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance.  
2 The Lagrange-Multiplier Test (LM) is used to test for serial correlation among the residuals. The Null 
hypothesis tested H0 is that there is no serial correlation at the lag order specified in the model. 
 
The first step in analyzing the results of Table 30 is to look at the Lagrange Multiplier Tests to 
detect the models affected by serial correlation. The table shows that the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation is rejected in the models 4, 5 and 6 with lag-order 2 which use LInv as the main conditioning 
variable71. This model specification is therefore discarded in the rest of the analysis. All the other 
models however do not show evidence of serial correlation and therefore the analysis focuses on the 
interpretation of the signs and significance of cointegrating equations and the adjustment parameters.  
The next step is to look at the relation of causality between the variables in the model, with a 
particular focus on the relation between financial development and economic growth. The notion of 
Granger causality is based on the idea that if there are two time series processes Xt and Yt, X is said to 
Granger-cause Y if the past value of one variable are able to predict the future values of the other 
(Granger 1969). Important features of Granger causality is that it can be bi-directional (going both 
from Xt to Yt and vice versa) and, in the context of cointegrated variables, it can be both short-run and 
long-run. Long-run Granger causality is analyzed through the interpretation of the error correction 
terms, whereas short-term Granger causality is studied following the procedure suggested in Toda 
and Yamamoto (1995).  
Starting with long-run causality, the general interpretation of the results is that the model shows 
tri-directional VECM-based long-run causality when the savings variable LSav is used as the main 
conditioning variable, whereas it shows unidirectional long-run causality from growth (Lgdp) to 
financial development (depth) when the investments variable LInv is used as conditioning variable in 
the model. The long-run causality test is performed by setting a null hypothesis that βj1 is equal to 
zero, which is significantly rejected in most model specifications. The coefficients of the error 
correction terms βj1 are in fact stable and significant for model 1, 2 and 3 when they are specified at 
lag-order 1, whereas the significance of the adjustment parameters are less consistent for the same 
                                                          
71 This result is not unexpected as the Johansen cointegration tests in the previous sections already rejected 
the hypothesis of cointegration for this model (see Table 29). 
136 
 
models at lag-order 4. In the latter case, the β coefficient is not significant in model 1 and it has a value 
larger than |1| in model 3, indicating that the model specification is not stable in the long run. The 
overall assessment is therefore that lag-order 1 in models 1, 2 and 3 provides much stronger evidence 
regarding the tridirectional long-term causality of the VECM models. The models using LInv as 
conditioning variable, the adjustment parameter is significant only in model 5 when the financial 
development variable depth is specified as dependent variable, indicating therefore a unidirectional 
long-term causality from Lgdp and LSav to depth. The analysis of the signs of the coefficient shows 
that depth as an explanatory variable is positively associated with GDP growth, savings and 
investments; in the models 2 and 5 where depth is specified as dependent variable confirms the 
results, showing that LInv and LSav are positively associated with financial development and vice 
versa. This is arguably one of the most important findings of the paper: since the previous sections 
have shown that weak domestic savings is considered a key constraint for future growth of the 
country, this paper provides evidence that promoting financial deepening can be a key driver of 
growth of domestic savings. The negative trends in gross savings and gross investments as a % of GDP 
are reflected in the signs of cointegrating equations, which show that Lgdp has a negative sign when 
LSav and LInv are specified as a dependent variables and vice versa.    
 
Table 31: Short run Granger causality test based on Y-M procedure 
 
 
Short-run Granger causality is tested using the T-Y procedure outlined by Toda and Yamamoto 
(1995) and applied empirically in several studies such as Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2008), Shan, 
Morris, and Sun (2001) and Rousseau and Vuthipadadorn (2005) among others. The Y-M procedure 
uses a modified Wald test which ensures that the test statistic has an asymptotic chi-square 
Causality 
(individual 
coefficients) 
Model: 
1,2,3  
(p=1)1 
Causality 
(individual 
coefficients) 
Model 5 
 (p=2)1 
Joint Causality 
(combined 
coefficients) 
Model 1,2,3,5 
(p=1, 2) 
Deptht-1  Lgdp 0.09 Deptht-1  Lgdp 0.42 Depth, LSav  Lgdp 8.26** 
LSav t-1   Lgdp 7.59** LInv t-1   Lgdp 0.42 Lgdp, LSav  depth 3.23 
Lgdp t-1   depth 0.51 Lgdp t-1   depth 2.58 Lgdp, depth  LSav 4.51 
LSav t-1   depth 1.97 LInv t-1   depth 1.63 Depth, LInv  Lgdp 1.89 
Depth t-1   LSav 2.24 Depth t-1   LInv 0.58 Lgdp, LInv,  depth 3.92 
Lgdp t-1   LSav 0.45 Lgdp t-1   LInv 5.13** Lgdp, depth  LInv 5.13* 
1 H0: no Granger causality. The column shows the Wald test2 statistic 
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distribution when the lag-order selected is (p + d), where d is the order of integration among 
variables72. A Wald test is then performed for the zero restriction on the lag coefficients given by p73. 
This test is appropriate for a VECM framework because it can be applied independently of the order 
of cointegration of the model (Rousseau and Vuthipadadorn 2005).  
Table 31 shows the results of the short-run causality test for both model specifications (using 
LSav and LInv as conditioning variables) and it looks at both the Granger causality between individual 
variables as well as joint causality between pair of variables and the predicted variable over the short 
run. The overall assessment made from Table 31 is that there is weak evidence of short term causality 
between the time series analyzed in the model. In fact the only significant Wald test performed shows 
a causal link going from LSavt-1 to Lgdp in the equation that has savings as conditioning variable. There 
is evidence of short-term causality going from economic growth (Lgdp) to investments (LInv) when 
investments are used as conditioning variables. Table 31 also analyzes the joint short term causality 
between different combinations of variables, showing that financial development and savings jointly 
have a significant effect on economic growth. In the model including investments as conditioning 
variable, financial development and economic growth have short term causality with investments. 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The paper looked at the development of the financial sector in Kenya and the relation of 
causality with economic growth in the country. The first part of the paper reviewed the key literature 
on the role of finance in economic growth and explored the history of the financial sector in Kenya, 
from the rise of government-owned and indigenous banks after independence, to the bank failures in 
the ‘80s and ‘90s, financial liberalization and finally the rise of mobile banking and financial inclusion 
in recent years. It has shown that after the collapse of many politically-affiliated banks, Kenya has 
successfully reformed the financial sector and now has become at the fore-front of financial inclusion. 
In the last ten years the percentage of individuals with a formal bank account has increased extremely 
fast, from approximately 27 percent in 2006 to 67 percent in 2013. 
The second part of the paper analyzed time series data and explored the relationship between 
financial development and growth in the country. Rather than looking at the direct relation between 
the two variables, this paper looked at the intermediary role of gross savings and gross investments 
as a percentage of GDP. The hypothesis is that rather than having a direct relation to GDP growth, 
                                                          
72 All variables in this study are integrated of order 1, as shown in Table 28. 
73 Considering the estimations shown in Table 30, the maximum lag order considered is p=1 in the model with 
savings as conditioning variable. Instead p=2 in the model using investments as conditioning variable. 
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financial deepening promotes savings and investments which, in turn, contribute to economic growth. 
Another key innovation of this paper is that it created an index of financial development based on 
several variables such as liquid liabilities as a percentage of GDP, credit to the private sector as a 
percentage of GDP and the ratio between commercial bank assets and central bank plus commercial 
bank assets. These variables are widely used in the literature; however this study uses principal 
component analysis to create a single index variable that merges the different indicators and handles 
more effectively the issues of multicollinearity and over-parameterization of the models.   
The empirical analysis shows a number of relevant findings. First, it has shown that gross 
domestic savings and gross investments as a percentage of GDP have performed rather poorly in 
Kenya over the last few years compared to neighboring countries such as Uganda and Tanzania, and 
that encouraging higher savings rates from domestic households, firms and the government is of 
crucial importance for the future development of the country. On the other hand, the financial 
development index variable depth shows a clear upward trend in the period between 1968 and 2012, 
confirming the qualitative description of the evolution of the financial sector conducted in the first 
part of the paper. The following sections of the paper have gone more in-depth into analyzing the 
relation among the variables using common time series techniques such as cointegration analysis and 
the estimation of the vector error correction model. The analysis of cointegration has confirmed the 
initial hypothesis that there is no direct long-run association between financial deepening and 
economic growth when the two variables are studied in isolation (without the presence of 
conditioning variables); the findings are however very different when we construct trivariate models 
which, in addition to financial deepening and economic growth, include gross savings or gross 
investments as a percentage of GDP. The findings reported in Table 29 show that both trivariate 
models are characterized by co-integration in the long-run, meaning that they have a relationship of 
co-variance throughout the period and deviations tend to return back to the mean over the long run. 
The issue of causality is then tackled separately through a vector error correction model and short-
run Granger causality tests. The analysis conducted in section 5.6 shows that the trivariate model 
including financial development, economic growth and savings shows significant tri-directional 
causality between the variables. This means that each combination of variables in the trivariate model 
has a causal effect on the other: financial development and savings taken jointly have a causal effect 
of economic growth, growth and savings have a significant effect on financial development and growth 
and financial development have a causal effect on savings. The models also show that despite the 
poor performance of gross domestic savings over the last few years, financial development tends to 
positively affect the savings rate over the long term. These results are rather different from previous 
studies conducted in Kenya: as discussed in section 3, Greis et al (2009) find no evidence of causality 
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whereas Odhiambo (2008) finds evidence of causality going from economic growth to financial 
development and savings rather than the other way around. Why did this study find different results?  
 Arguably the main reasons is related to the econometric approach undertaken. This study 
differs from Greis et al (2008) in the selection of the conditioning variable: whereas their study uses 
trade openness as the main intermediate variable between finance and growth, this study looks at 
gross savings, which arguably have a stronger effect on both variables. Odhiambo (2008) on the other 
hand uses the saving rate in his model, however has a different way of measuring financial 
development: whereas this study combines several variables into a composite indicator, Odhiambo 
(2008) relies on a single proxy (M2 as a percentage of GDP), which is arguably a reductive way to 
measure financial development. Moreover, the dataset used in this paper looks at a longer period of 
time (1970 to 2010), whereas Odhiambo looks at the period between 1991 and 2005. As discussed in 
section 4.4, the Kenyan financial sector has gone through several fluctuations in the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s and a tremendous expansion after 2005, which appears clearly in Figure 10. This has certainly 
contributed to the significance of the results. 
As a final commentary to the findings of the paper, it is important to mention the policy 
recommendations emerging as a result of this study. A key constraint identified in the literature 
concerns the low levels of gross domestic savings and the reliance of foreign savings to finance 
investments and capital formation. One of the key findings in this study is that financial development 
is positively associated and Granger causes savings over the long-run. This is likely to accelerate over 
the next years if the substantial growth of financial development registered in recent years (and 
described in section 4.4) continues at the same speed. The Government and donors alike will benefit 
dramatically the development of the country if they contribute to build an inclusive and efficient 
financial system which allocates credit to the most productive parts of the economy and help 
households and firms to smooth consumption and finance investments. This can be done through a 
number of policy measures which promote stronger competition in the banking sector and expand 
access to finance to the parts of the economy and society that are still completely or partially excluded.   
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ANNEX 1: LIST OF BANKS IN KENYA   
Source: CBK, 2013 
  
Mark
et 
size 
index Assets 
% of 
marke
t  
Total 
deposit 
% of 
marke
t  
Total 
Capital 
% of 
marke
t 
Deposit 
accounts 
(Mil) 
% of 
market 
Loan 
account
s 
(Million
s) 
% of 
mar
ket 
 Large Peer Group>5%           
1 
Kenya 
Commercial 
Bank Ltd 
13.5
4% 
304,11
2 
13.10
% 
223,49
3 
13.10
% 52,926 
14.60
% 1.283 8.09% 0.221 
10.60
% 
2 
Equity Bank 
Ltd 
10.0
6% 
215,82
9 9.30% 
140,28
6 8.20% 42,672 
11.80
% 7.025 44.29% 0.782 
37.30
% 
3 
Cooperative 
Bank Ltd 
8.74
% 
199,66
3 8.60% 
162,26
7 9.50% 28,967 8.00% 2.326 14.67% 0.259 
12.40
% 
4 
Standard 
Chartered 
Bank (K) Ltd 
8.29
% 
195,49
3 8.40% 
140,52
5 8.20% 30,603 8.40% 0.171 1.08% 0.038 1.80% 
5 
Barclays Bank 
of Kenya Ltd 
8.08
% 
185,10
2 7.90% 
137,91
5 8.10% 29,583 8.20% 1.134 7.15% 0.273 
13.00
% 
6 
CFC Stanbic 
Bank Ltd 
5.01
% 
133,37
8 5.70% 75,633 4.40% 18,101 5.00% 0.088 0.55% 0.031 1.50% 
 Sub-Total 
53.7
2% 
1,233,5
77 
52.94
% 
880,11
9 
51.50
% 
202,85
3 
56.00
% 12.028 75.83% 1.604 
76.50
% 
 Medium Peer Group> 1% &           
 < 5%             
7 NIC Bank Ltd 
4.32
% 
101,77
2 4.40% 77,466 4.50% 15,065 4.20% 0.052 0.33% 0.026 1.20% 
8 
Diamond Trust 
Bank Ltd 
4.10
% 94,512 4.10% 72,505 4.20% 14,878 4.10% 0.092 0.58% 0.013 0.60% 
9 
Commercial 
Bank of Africa 
Ltd 
4.08
% 
100,45
6 4.30% 79,996 4.70% 11,641 3.20% 1.064 6.71% 0.089 4.20% 
10 I&M Bank Ltd 
4.08
% 91,520 3.90% 65,640 3.80% 16,591 4.60% 0.058 0.37% 0.007 0.30% 
11 Citibank N.A. 
3.42
% 69,580 3.00% 44,012 2.60% 17,346 4.80% 0.002 0.01% 0.001 0.00% 
12 
National Bank 
of Kenya Ltd 
3.00
% 67,155 2.90% 55,191 3.20% 10,450 2.90% 0.475 2.99% 0.063 3.00% 
13 
Baroda Bank 
Ltd 
1.92
% 46,138 2.00% 38,382 2.20% 5,758 1.60% 0.039 0.24% 0.002 0.10% 
14 
Chase Bank 
Ltd 
1.87
% 49,105 2.10% 36,506 2.10% 5,101 1.40% 0.055 0.35% 0.011 0.50% 
15 
Bank of Africa 
Ltd 
1.83
% 48,958 2.10% 35,100 2.10% 5,010 1.40% 0.037 0.23% 0.013 0.60% 
16 Prime Bank Ltd 
1.71
% 43,463 1.90% 36,715 2.10% 4,175 1.20% 0.023 0.15% 0.003 0.10% 
17 
Housing Fin. 
Co. of Kenya 
Ltd 
1.49
% 40,686 1.70% 22,968 1.30% 5,146 1.40% 0.054 0.34% 0.005 0.20% 
18 
Imperial Bank 
Ltd 
1.44
% 34,590 1.50% 27,581 1.60% 4,554 1.30% 0.041 0.26% 0.009 0.50% 
19 
Family Bank 
Ltd 
1.42
% 30,985 1.30% 24,630 1.40% 4,860 1.30% 1.15 7.25% 0.109 5.20% 
20 Bank of India 
1.08
% 24,877 1.10% 18,282 1.10% 4,063 1.10% 0.014 0.09% 0.001 0.00% 
21 
Ecobank Kenya 
Ltd 
1.06
% 31,771 1.40% 21,475 1.30% 1,999 0.60% 0.074 0.47% 0.036 1.70% 
 Sub-Total 
36.8
2% 
875,56
6 
37.60
% 
656,45
1 
38.40
% 
126,63
9 
35.00
% 3.229 20.36% 0.389 
18.60
% 
 Small Peer Group<1%           
22 
African 
Banking 
Corporation 
Ltd 
0.76
% 19,071 0.80% 15,255 0.90% 2,112 0.60% 0.018 0.12% 0.002 0.10% 
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23 Fina Bank Ltd 
0.74
% 17,150 0.70% 13,747 0.80% 2,504 0.70% 0.017 0.11% 0.002 0.10% 
24 
Consolidated 
Bank of Kenya 
Ltd 
0.66
% 18,001 0.80% 13,325 0.80% 1,574 0.40% 0.045 0.28% 0.013 0.60% 
25 
Gulf African 
Bank Ltd 
0.56
% 13,562 0.60% 11,684 0.70% 1,561 0.40% 0.041 0.26% 0.005 0.30% 
26 
Giro 
Commercial 
Bank Ltd 
0.54
% 12,280 0.50% 10,420 0.60% 1,775 0.50% 0.009 0.06% 0.002 0.10% 
27 
Equatorial 
Commercial 
Bank Ltd 
0.52
% 14,109 0.60% 12,963 0.80% 722 0.20% 0.01 0.06% 0.005 0.20% 
28 
Fidelity Bank 
Ltd 
0.48
% 11,772 0.50% 10,527 0.60% 1,185 0.30% 0.008 0.05% 0.001 0.10% 
29 
Guardian Bank 
Ltd 
0.48
% 11,745 0.50% 10,374 0.60% 1,219 0.30% 0.008 0.05% 0.001 0.00% 
30 
Victoria 
Commercial 
Bank Ltd 
0.48
% 10,323 0.40% 7,561 0.40% 2,036 0.60% 0.003 0.02% 0 0.00% 
31 
Development 
Bank of Kenya 
Ltd 
0.47
% 13,417 0.60% 6,953 0.40% 1,634 0.50% 0.002 0.01% 0.001 0.00% 
32 
Habib A.G. 
Zurich 
0.43
% 9,702 0.40% 7,748 0.50% 1,530 0.40% 0.007 0.04% 0 0.00% 
33 K-Rep Bank Ltd 
0.42
% 9,546 0.40% 6,650 0.40% 1,527 0.40% 0.211 1.33% 0.047 2.30% 
34 
Trans-National 
Bank Ltd 
0.42
% 8,801 0.40% 6,535 0.40% 1,834 0.50% 0.037 0.23% 0.004 0.20% 
35 
First 
Community 
Bank Ltd 
0.41
% 9,959 0.40% 8,833 0.50% 1,078 0.30% 0.047 0.30% 0.002 0.10% 
36 
Paramount 
Universal Bank 
Ltd 
0.32
% 7,255 0.30% 6,084 0.40% 1,136 0.30% 0.01 0.06% 0.001 0.10% 
37 Habib Bank Ltd 
0.32
% 7,014 0.30% 5,195 0.30% 1,348 0.40% 0.004 0.03% 0 0.00% 
38 
Oriental 
Commercial 
Bank Ltd 
0.31
% 6,220 0.30% 4,806 0.30% 1,385 0.40% 0.006 0.04% 0 0.00% 
39 
Credit Bank 
Ltd 
0.29
% 6,407 0.30% 4,781 0.30% 1,179 0.30% 0.009 0.05% 0.002 0.10% 
40 
Jamii Bora 
Bank Ltd 
0.27
% 3,480 0.10% 1,213 0.10% 2,093 0.60% 0.098 0.62% 0.013 0.60% 
41 
Middle East 
Bank (K) Ltd 
0.26
% 5,870 0.30% 3,907 0.20% 1,124 0.30% 0.002 0.01% 0 0.00% 
42 
UBA Bank 
Kenya Ltd 
0.18
% 2,924 0.10% 1,343 0.10% 1,219 0.30% 0.003 0.02% 0 0.00% 
43 Dubai Bank Ltd 
0.15
% 2,584 0.10% 1,361 0.10% 917 0.30% 0.006 0.04% 0 0.00% 
44 
Charterhouse 
Bank Ltd 
0.00
% 0 0.00% - 0.00% - 0.00% 0.005 0.03% 0 0.00% 
 Sub-Total  
9.46
% 
221,19
2 9.50% 
171,26
4 
10.00
% 32,691 9.00% 0.605 3.81% 0.102 4.90% 
 Grand-Total 100% 
2,330,3
35 100% 
1,707,8
34 100% 
362,18
2 100% 15.861 100% 2.096 100% 
 
Market share index is the composite 
of net assets, deposits, capita l , number of loan accounts and number of deposit accounts     
 Source: Banks Published Financial Statements 
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ANNEX 2: LAG SELECTION FOR ADF AND VECM MODELS 
 
LSav (1) 
lag LL LR df P FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 -2.248 0.070878 0.191059 0.206368 0.235952    
1 2.38895 9.2739* 1 0.002 .057233* -.022879* .00774* .066907* 
2 2.39091 0.00391 1 0.95 0.060714 0.035829 0.081758 0.170508 
3 2.49358 0.20534 1 0.65 0.064045 0.088613 0.149852 0.268185 
4 4.1982 3.4092 1 0.065 0.061509 0.047165 0.123714 0.27163 
 
Lgdp (2 and 4) 
lag LL LR df P FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 -36.5058 0.288841 1.59599 1.61081 1.63536    
1 37.8569 148.73 1 0 0.012732 -1.52582 -1.4962 -1.44709 
2 40.2775 4.8413 1 0.028 0.011986 -1.58628 -1.54184 -1.46818* 
3 40.5231 0.49107 1 0.483 0.01238 -1.55417 -1.49492 -1.39671 
4 42.9756 4.9052* 1 0.027 .011643* -1.61598* -1.54192* -1.41916 
 
LInv (1) 
lag LL LR df P FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 17.6249 0.029288 -0.6927 -0.67797 -0.65372    
1 28.4055 21.561* 1 0 .019486* -1.10023* -1.07077* -1.02226* 
2 28.9459 1.0808 1 0.299 0.019865 -1.08108 -1.03689 -0.96413 
3 29.5454 1.1988 1 0.274 0.020204 -1.06439 -1.00546 -0.90846 
4 29.8068 0.52293 1 0.47 0.020843 -1.03362 -0.95996 -0.8387 
 
Depth (1) 
lag LL LR df P FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 -62.2647 1.38454 3.16324 3.1785 3.20546    
1 -31.6315 61.266* 1 0 .314674* 1.68158* 1.71211* 1.76602* 
2 -31.5677 0.12763 1 0.721 0.32982 1.72839 1.77418 1.85505 
3 -31.5584 0.01869 1 0.891 0.346703 1.77792 1.83898 1.94681 
4 -31.1016 0.9136 1 0.339 0.356477 1.80508 1.88141 2.01619 
 
Lgdp depth and LSav (1 and 4) 
lag LL LR df P FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 -28.0097 0.001394 1.9381 1.98365 2.07552    
1 17.0808 90.181 9 0 .000147* -.317553* -.135359* .232098* 
2 25.2691 16.376 9 0.059 0.000157 -0.26682 0.052023 0.695073 
3 28.3272 6.1163 9 0.728 0.000238 0.10455 0.560034 1.47868 
4 40.6923 24.73* 9 0.003 0.00021 -0.10577 0.486362 1.6806 
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Lgdp depth and LInv (2 and 4) 
lag LL LR df P FPE AIC HQIC SBIC 
0 -50.6287 0.002932 2.68143 2.72723 2.8081    
1 25.8281 152.91 9 0 0.000101 -0.69141 -.508214* -.184743* 
2 32.4146 13.173 9 0.155 0.000115 -0.57073 -0.25014 0.315934 
3 44.3079 23.787 9 0.005 0.000101 -0.71539 -0.25741 0.551266 
4 57.1873 25.759* 9 0.002 .000087* -.909367* -0.31399 0.73729 
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Essay 4 
 
Bank Financing of SMEs in Kenya 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
The development of small and medium enterprise (SME) finance in low-income countries has 
become a core goal for both policymakers and donors over the two decades. Since SMEs are known 
to play a central role in employment creation and economic development, a growing number of 
donors and development financial institutions have provided credit guarantee schemes and credit 
lines to help local banks develop their SME finance portfolios and incentivize small business lending. 
For instance, in the last five years a large number of Kenyan banks have engaged with institutions such 
as the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Africa Development Bank (AfDB), the German 
development bank (KfW) and many others, to better manage their risk in the segment of small 
businesses and grow their service provision. A considerable volume of academic literature has 
developed as well. The key objective of many studies is to understand which types of banks are more 
likely to engage successfully with small firms, the lending technologies that maximize the efficiency of 
credit transactions and how different financial market structures can affect, both positively and 
negatively, the development of SME finance in low income countries (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Pería 
2011; Shen et al. 2009; Ayyagari, Beck, and Demirguc-Kunt 2007; de la Torre, Martínez Pería, and 
Schmukler 2010; Canales and Nanda 2012; Beck and Cull 2014).  
Two research paradigms have emerged in the SME finance literature. The “conventional” 
paradigm emphasizes the tendency of large financial institutions, especially the foreign ones, to 
engage with large corporate clients that are transparent and can be assessed with sophisticated 
quantitative credit risk technologies. On the other hand, small and domestic banks are believed to be 
better positioned to engage with small firms that are informationally opaque. In this paradigm, large 
banks are hypothesized to rely more heavily on ‘‘hard” quantitative information such as financial 
ratios and audited financial statements, collateral values from the registries, and credit scores (Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Pería 2011). On the other hand, loan officers at small institutions are believed to 
have more flexibility and to rely more heavily on ‘‘soft” qualitative information such as personal 
contacts with the clients and interactions with the community where the firms operate (Elyasiani and 
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Goldberg 2004). A recent wave of empirical studies however questioned the core arguments of the 
conventional paradigm. In particular, de la Torre, Martínez Pería, and Schmukler (2010), Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Pería (2011) and Canales and Nanda (2012) studied banks’ involvement with SMEs 
in several developed and emerging markets showing that many core pillars of the conventional 
paradigm are no longer valid. In particular, they show that large banks have a growing appetite for the 
SME market and that relationship lending is no longer the sole lending technology in this segment. 
Moreover, as it will be shown in the literature survey, some studies have shown that decentralized 
banks are not necessarily more inclined to engage with SMEs, in particular if they face little 
competition at the local level.  
This study wants to test these hypotheses in the context of SME finance in Kenya. The empirical 
analysis is based on data collected in two survey rounds by the author in a research project named 
FinAccess Business, which saw the collaboration of Financial Sector Deepening Kenya (FSD-K), the 
World Bank (WB) and the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK)74. The first survey round was conducted in 2012 
and collected data on SME financing as of December 2011 and December 2009. Moreover, a series of 
qualitative interviews was conducted with key players in the market. In 2014, a second survey round 
was conducted collecting data for 2013 and addressing various other questions such as the 
composition of SME finance portfolios, the lending technologies used by the banks and the 
characteristics of the loans such as interest rates, maturity and sectoral distribution of lending75. This 
research project is the first comprehensive effort to estimate the size of bank financing to SMEs in 
Kenya and analyze its characteristics. The different survey rounds had different response rates from 
the banks. The data captures a minimum of 80 percent to a maximum 94 percent of the credit market 
in the different survey rounds, therefore being highly representative of the Kenyan market. 
The findings of the research confirm hypotheses from both the “conventional” and “new” 
paradigms in SME finance. The empirical section shows that the market for SME finance is growing 
rapidly in Kenya and all banks seem interested to develop their engagement with SMEs regardless of 
their size (small, mid-size or large) or ownership (domestic or foreign). In terms of absolute lending to 
SMEs, the major players in the market are mid-sized banks, while small banks tend to have the highest 
level of exposure to SMEs. Between 2009 and 2013, SME lending by foreign banks has increased in 
absolute terms but has decreased relative to domestic banks, confirming a growing role played by 
local players in the SME market. While the overall SME finance portfolio has increased dramatically 
                                                          
74 The project team consisted of Gunhild Berg (World Bank), Michael Fuchs (World Bank), Haggar Olel (FSD-
Kenya), the late Ravindra Ramrattan (FSD-Kenya) and Smita Wagh (World Bank). 
75 The questionnaires used for the 2012 and 2014 surveys are attached in Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 
respectively. 
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during the period, there are concerns over the sophistication of this portfolio and in particular on the 
over-reliance of mid-sized banks on overdrafts as their main lending technology. While overdrafts can 
be useful when businesses need fast access to liquidity, this lending product can be inefficient as well 
as expensive and it can hinder the banks effort to innovate and develop new financial products tailored 
to the local needs. 
The next sections are organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature and explores the key 
arguments of the “conventional” and “new” paradigms in SME finance. Section 3 explains the data 
collection process and methodology used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 analyzes the data and 
shows the key developments and trends of SME finance in Kenya between 2009 and 2013. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2 LITERATURE SURVEY 
2.1 LENDING TECHNOLOGIES IN SME FINANCE 
In one of the most comprehensive conceptual frameworks on SME finance, Berger and Udell 
(2002) show that in order to prevent the market failures that lead to credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss 
1981) and over-lending (De Meza and Webb 1987) banks employ four main lending technologies: (i) 
financial statement lending, (ii) asset-based lending, (iii) credit scoring, and (iv) relationship lending. 
While the first three are considered transaction-based technologies based on hard information such 
as audited accounts or standardized credit scores; relationship lending relies on ‘‘soft” information 
collected over time through repeated personal interactions between credit officers and the 
borrowers. Since “hard information” normally comes in a numeric format while “soft information” is 
passed through verbal interaction and personal knowledge of the borrowers, transaction-based 
technologies are easier to transfer and less costly compared to relationship lending. The latter tends 
to be embedded in social ties and therefore more difficult to transfer between bank employees over 
time (Shen et al. 2009).  
Banks that engage in financial statement lending base their loan appraisals on the evaluation of 
hard information such as the firm’s audited accounts, the strength of the balance sheet and other 
certified income statements (Berger and Udell 2002). Two key requirements are that (i) firms must 
obtain audited financial accounts from reputable accounting firms and (ii) the financial ratios 
calculated from the statements must be strong. Both of these requirements tend to be problematic 
for small businesses, which often are unable to provide financial statements and transparent 
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accounting records. This technology is therefore more effective in the context of transparent large-
scale or mid-scale corporate clients or small firms that have a high degree of formality (Berger and 
Udell 2006). While financial statement lending relies on audited accounts, asset-based lending 
technologies are based on the availability of collateral, either fixed assets or movable assets such as 
inventories and accounts receivables (Haselmann, Pistor, and Vig 2010; Berger and Udell 2002). In 
recent years there have been attempts to develop trade-based financial products such as invoice 
discounting or factoring, which rely entirely on the accounts receivable of the firms (see Klapper 2006; 
Summers and Wilson 2000), however as it will be shown later in the paper, these technologies have 
had limited penetration in African markets like Kenya, especially because of the limited extent of the 
SME’s involvement in supply-chains and the weakness of the legal framework (Berg and Fuchs 2013). 
Asset-based lending can be both costly and risky for the banks especially in countries that have poor 
collateral registries and weak enforcement mechanisms.  
The third type of transaction-based lending is the credit scoring technology, which uses 
discriminant analysis and other statistical techniques that calculate a score for the expected quality of 
the future loan based on the borrower history and the characteristics of the firm and/or the 
entrepreneur (Feldman 1997; Frame, Srinivasan, and Woosley 2001). Credit scoring was initially used 
only in the context of consumer lending in the US, but in the late 1990s it was extended to small 
business finance as well. In a recent survey conducted by Berger, Cowan, and Frame (2011) in the US 
credit market, the authors show that credit scoring for small businesses is surprisingly used more by 
community banks than large banks 76, and that the scoring is based mostly on the consumer credit 
scores of the owners of the business, rather than the broader credit score of the business that include 
the evaluation of both the firms and their owners.  
Finally, relationship lending uses information on the firm and its owner(s) through repeated 
personal interactions with the borrower. Loan officers observe the savings trends or the previous 
lending transactions of the client and provide a qualitative assessment of the expected risk and quality 
of the loan. In case of community banks, loan officers may also gather additional information through 
relationships with the local community or firms in supply chain such as clients and suppliers. This 
technology has proved to be crucial for the development of credit markets in many low and middle 
income regions such as Sub Saharan Africa (Beck and Cull 2014) and Latin America (Clarke et al. 2005).  
Berger and Udell (2006) expanded their conceptual framework in a more recent paper and 
added new emerging technologies in the SME finance space. In addition to the four technologies 
described above, they added factoring, which is a technology where a lender (factor) purchases the 
accounts receivables from a firm at a discount. We mentioned this technology earlier under “asset-
                                                          
76 Community banks are defined as institutions with assets value below 1 billion USD. 
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based financing”, however Berger and Udell (2006) argue that this lending technology differs in two 
ways: first, factoring relies on the accounts receivable unlike asset-based lending that often uses 
inventory as collateral. Second, the underlying assets are de facto sold to the factor (or lender) not 
just used as collateral. Factoring represents a unique lending technology because it merges a variety 
of services that include a financing component, a credit component and a payment collection 
component. It can be very useful in the context of SME finance because the quality of the credit 
depends on the obligor (i.e. the firm billed for the services) rather than the firm expecting the 
payment. This is therefore suitable in the context of SMEs in the supply-chain of large enterprises 
(Klapper 2006). Other lending technologies added by Berger and Udell (2006) include leasing, a lending 
instrument where the lender (also known as “lessor”) purchases fixed assets and simultaneously 
enters into a rental agreement with the borrower (lessee). And trade credit which is the common 
credit agreement between players of a supply-chain. 
 
2.2 DETERMINANT OF THE BANKS INVOLVEMENT WITH SMES  
Because of the growing interest in SMEs as drivers of growth and employment creation, a 
growing body of empirical literature analyzed the nature of the banks’ involvement in the segment. 
The literature generally focuses on two levels of analysis: a micro-level interrogation of the lending 
technologies used by the banks and how they affect the involvement with small firms. These studies 
often analyze how bank size and ownership affect the capacity to finance SMEs. At a meso-level, 
numerous studies look at market structure and how concentration and competition can affect the 
development of the SME market. In this regard, there has been considerable interest in understanding 
the role of bank decentralization (e.g. decentralization of loan appraisals, risk management, decision-
making, etc.) and local financial development as determinants of SME finance growth. Two main 
paradigms have emerged in the literature: a “conventional” paradigm in the 1990s and early 2000s 
and a “new” paradigm emerged in the last ten years (Berger and Udell 2006; de la Torre, Martínez 
Pería, and Schmukler 2010; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Pería 2011). Next sections will illustrate the 
main arguments proposed by both strands of literature. 
2.2.1 The “Conventional” Paradigm 
If we simplify the overall picture emerged in the early literature in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
we can summarize the “conventional wisdom” in the depiction of two broad bank profiles: the large, 
foreign institution that uses sophisticated credit scoring technologies and favors large firms and high 
net worth individuals. At the opposite end there are small community banks that rely on relationships 
with the local business community and domestic SMEs. Clearly the latter was considered more 
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important in the SME finance space, whereas large, foreign institution were considered fundamentally 
uninterested in financing small businesses (see Berger and Udell 1995; Berger et al. 1995; Mian 2006).  
A first key argument in the conventional paradigm is the so-called “small bank advantage” 
(Elyasiani and Goldberg 2004; Jayaratne and Wolken 1999; Carter, McNulty, and Verbrugge 2004; 
Shen et al. 2009). Many empirical studies in the 1990s found that small-scale banks tend to have higher 
exposure to SMEs because of their stronger ties with the local community and reliance on relationship 
lending (Berger and Udell 1995). Studies such as Berger et al. (1998) show that the processes of 
mergers and acquisitions of banks in the US market led to a relative reduction of small business 
finance, confirming that the increase in size of a the bank has a negative effect of SME lending.  De 
Haas, Ferreira, and Taci (2010:390) argue that there could be an implicit segmentation based on the 
comparative advantage of financial institutions: “large banks may have a comparative advantage in 
lending to large customers as they can exploit scale economies in evaluating the hard information that 
is available on such customers. Small banks, however, may not be able to lend to large companies 
because of size limitations. They are, for instance, more constrained by regulatory lending limits. Small 
banks may also have a comparative advantage in processing soft information on SMEs”. A related 
strand of literature analyzed the role of bank ownership in SME finance and found that foreign banks 
are less likely to engage with SMEs than domestic banks. For example, Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta 
(2008) looked at the effect of foreign bank involvement on financial sector development in low-
income countries from both a theoretical and empirical point of view. They find evidence that low-
income countries with a stronger presence of foreign banks have weaker credit and slower growth of 
credit to GDP. They also find that loan loss provisions and loan loss reserves are higher in domestic 
banks than in foreign banks (Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta 2008). 
The second core argument in the conventional view is the so-called “soft information” 
hypothesis. Several studies have demonstrated the central role of relationship banking in both high 
income countries such as Europe (Degryse and Van Cayseele 2000; Elsas and Krahnen 1998) and the 
United States (Berger et al. 1995) as well as a variety of emerging markets (de la Torre, Martínez Pería, 
and Schmukler 2010) and Sub Saharan Africa (Beck and Cull 2014). The overall view is that small scale 
banks are more embedded in the local economies and therefore can exploit a market niche where 
strong ties between borrowers and lenders are the only solution to the problem of information 
asymmetry and ‘‘opaqueness” of small firms (Berger and Udell 2002). The notion of “informational 
opacity” is one of the key concepts in SME finance, referring to the difficulty of financial institutions 
to determine whether the loan applicants have viable investment plans and whether they are likely to 
re-pay the loan due to moral hazard. In much of the existing literature ‘‘relationship lending” is 
considered the only way to deal with informational opaqueness: if firms can’t provide transparent and 
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credible information on their activity, then banks have to rely on repeated, personal interactions with 
the firms to assess their ability to repay. Udell (2008) conducted a comprehensive analysis of 
relationship lending and find that its effectiveness depends on numerous factors. The author studies 
how relationship lending is affected by the banks’ overall risk-management strategies, the structure 
of the market and bank consolidation processes as well as macroeconomic aspects such as monetary 
policy. The overall conclusion is that the relative importance and success of relationship lending 
depends on the financial architecture of both the banks internal processes as well as the market. It 
cannot therefore be considered an absolute “best practice” in SME lending. 
Another common factor analyzed in the literature concerns the role of 
centralized/decentralized decision-making and the effect on the SME finance market: the common 
view is that centralized banks tend to be less inclined to lend to small firms. For example Berger et al. 
(2005) investigated whether proximity of firms to large or small banks in the US affects the likelihood 
of being credit constrained. They find evidence that SMEs operating in regions with a majority of large-
scale banks are more likely to be credit-constrained compared to firms located close to decentralized 
banks (Shen et al. 2009). Mian (2006) conducted another large scale study and reached similar results. 
Using a panel of over 80,000 loans over seven years, the author shows that banks with larger cultural 
and geographical distance between the bank’s headquarter and the branches are less likely to lend to 
firms in contexts of informational opacity. These banks also tend to avoid renegotiating loans and are 
less likely to succeed at recovering non-performing loans.  
 
2.2.2 Towards a new Paradigm 
A new strand of empirical studies has questioned the traditional wisdom in SME finance and 
analyzed how banks’ involvement with SMEs is evolving over time. This section will review a number 
of studies conducted in recent years that either contradict or provide more nuanced views on the 
arguments proposed in the early literature described above.  
One of the most important empirical investigations was conducted by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, 
and Pería (2011) who sampled 91 banks in 45 countries. Their study addresses three main issues: (i) 
they examine whether bank ownership types (foreign banks, domestic banks and government banks) 
use different lending technologies and organizational structures in lending to SMEs; (ii) they test the 
hypothesis that foreign banks are more likely than domestic private banks to use transaction based 
technologies and centralized organizational structures. (iii) Finally, they look at the quality of the 
regulatory and institutional environment and its relation to the development of SME finance in the 
banking sector. One of the basic model used in the empirical analysis is formalized as follows:  
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 𝑍𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (23) 
 
where i refers to the financial institution and the dependent variable Zi captures lending technologies 
and bank decentralization variables. The model uses different estimation techniques depending on 
the dependent variable used. It is estimated through a Probit model in four cases when the dependent 
variable takes a binary format: (i) reliance on relationship lending, (ii) reliance on credit scoring, (iii) 
decentralization of loan application approvals and (iv) decentralization of risk management. The 
model is estimated through conventional OLS regression when the variable Zi measures the ratio 
between collateralized loans and the banks’ overall SME portfolio. The explanatory variables in the 
model are very simple: they look at whether the bank’s ownership is local (DomesticPrivatei) or foreign 
(foreigni).The variable Devi is a dummy equal to 1 if the bank operates in a developing country and 0 
otherwise. 
While their empirical findings confirm the conventional view that large banks tend to use 
transaction-based lending technologies and to be more centralized compared to small banks, the 
authors show that arms’ length technologies are no longer restricted to the corporate segment. Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt, and Pería (2011) therefore argue in favor of an emerging paradigm in the field of bank 
financing of SMEs where relationship lending is no longer the driver of SME finance development. 
Their analysis also do not find a significant correlation between relationship lending and cheaper or 
expanded lending portfolios to SMEs and indicates that government-owned banks tend to place 
themselves in-between foreign and domestic banks: while they tend to decentralize key decision-
making processes (similarly to domestic banks) they rely a lot more on hard information and collateral 
in SME finance like foreign banks.  
Another study by de la Torre, Martínez Pería, and Schmukler (2010) study a sample of 48 banks 
and one leasing company in 12 emerging markets with data collected with a survey questionnaire and 
qualitative interviews with bank managers. The research questions in this paper are similar to the ones 
in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Pería (2011) and try to understand whether the main arguments of the 
conventional SME finance paradigm hold true: (i) whether banks in general lack interest in SME finance 
and (ii) whether small, domestic banks have to rely entirely on relationship lending to deal with SMEs.  
The results of their research shows that both hypotheses do not hold true. First, contrarily to 
the widespread view that banks are not interested in small enterprises, they find that the majority of 
banks have a growing appetite for SMEs because this segment is very profitable and because there is 
growing competition in other market segments, particularly in retail and corporate finance. The 
authors propose an interesting view on why emerging markets have a growing appetite for SMEs, 
which we’ll call the “middle market hypothesis”: “as the public sector and large corporations gain 
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access to local and international capital markets and as competition in the retail sector (among banks 
and retail chains) increases, banks have greater incentives to incur the switching costs needed to 
pursue new business in the ‘‘middle” market of SMEs. In this context, SMEs emerge as a strategic sector 
for most banks—including large and foreign banks, not just small and niche banks. As a result, the SME 
market in the sample countries has become competitive, yet is still far from saturated” (De la Torre, 
Martínez Pería, and Schmukler 2010:2281). The second finding of the paper confirms Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Pería (2011) showing that banks no longer rely only on relationship lending when dealing 
with SMEs. As shown by Berger and Udell (2006) in the previous chapter, banks are increasingly 
applying diverse lending technologies that include arms-length lending (e.g. credit scoring, 
standardized risk-rating tools, asset-based lending, factoring, etc). 
Other studies have questioned the relation between bank’s decentralization and SME lending. 
In particular, an important empirical research conducted in China by Shen et al. (2009) have studied 
how banks’ involvement with SMEs is affected by the decentralization of decision-making and risk-
management as well as the size of the bank and its incentive structures. The authors collected the 
data in a retrospective survey for the period between 2001 and 2004 in 12 provinces. These were 
chosen on the basis of geographical location and economic development. An interesting innovative 
feature of this research is that it collected branch-level data instead of bank level-data, as it is normally 
done in most studies. Shen et al. (2009) argue that this choice is necessary in a market like China 
because its financial system is characterized by very few large banks with Government ownership. 
However the authors observe relevant heterogeneity between branches within the same banks. This 
is because local governments and law enforcement mechanisms vary widely in different counties and 
each branch tends to maintain a strong degree of independence from other branches and the 
headquarters 
Shen et al. (2009) find evidence that the decentralization of decision-making processes and an 
incentive structure linking the loan managers’ wages to loan quality has a strong positive effect on the 
size of the SME portfolio. The authors confirm the central role of relationship lending as the key 
technology in SME finance, but with an important caveat concerning the role of decentralization: “If 
a local bank has higher self-loan approval rights, if the upper branch provides greater pressure in 
making profit through increasing the weight of profit in performance evaluation, and if wages are 
linked with loan quality and cost control measures are undertaken, then the local bank tends to work 
hard on collecting and using soft information to find high-quality customers”. 
Finally, a recent study by Canales and Nanda (2012) in Mexico provides a very nuanced view of 
how the bank’s organizational structure (e.g. centralization and decentralization) and market 
competition affect the banks’ involvement with SMEs. Using a loan-level dataset on SMEs, the authors 
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find that the conventional argument that decentralized banks are more inclined to lend to SMEs does 
not always hold true. Canales and Nanda (2012) build on the theoretical arguments proposed by Rajan 
(1992) and hypothesize that branch managers in decentralized banks are more responsive to the local 
competitive environment. This can be beneficial when there is high competition at the local level. 
However, if a bank has market power in a local context, decentralized banks are in the position of 
extracting more surplus from small firms than centralized banks and charging higher rates. The 
variable on the bank’s organizational structure is measured through extensive interviews with 
managers at branch and headquarter levels that aim to understand the degree of autonomy of local 
branches in the decision-making processes. 
The findings of the empirical research substantially confirm the theoretical hypotheses. Canales 
and Nanda (2012) find that small firms which rely on soft information tend to obtain larger loans from 
decentralized banks. However, in the context of concentrated markets with low degrees of bank 
competition, decentralized banks are more likely than centralized banks to “cherry pick” their 
customers and to provide smaller loans at higher interest rates77.  The authors argue that: “the relative 
benefit of decentralized bank structures for small business lending may depend on the institutional and 
competitive environment in which banks are located”. 
 
3 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This study uses a combination of data sources and methodologies that aim at understanding 
the development of SME finance sector in Kenya and the characteristics of bank financing to SMEs. 
The core source of data was collected between 2012 and 2014 in a project conducted by the author 
with the World Bank, Financial Sector Deepening Kenya (FSD-K) and the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) 
in a research project named FinAccess Business, which aims to shed light on the demand and supply 
of SME finance in Kenya78.   
Thanks to a close partnership with the CBK, a comprehensive survey questionnaire was 
distributed to all 44 licensed commercial banks in Kenya in 2012 and 2014. The first survey instrument 
was composed of 65 questions in four main areas of analysis: (i) the extent of the banks’ involvement 
with SMEs; (ii) the profile of SME clients; (iii) drivers and obstacles to SME and micro-enterprise 
financing, including the role of government policies and donor programs; (iv) the banks’ SME business 
models, including marketing strategies, the array of financial products offered to SMEs and the main 
                                                          
77 The authors show that this is particularly true for small firms in the service sector which are more unlikely to 
provide hard information to the banks. 
78 This paper focuses only on the supply-side data from FinAccess Business. 
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risk management models. The project team subsequently conducted in-depth interviews with bank 
staff directly responsible for the SME business. Overall 34 banks completed the questionnaire and 17 
banks were purposively sampled for an interview on the basis of market share and their involvement 
with SME lending. One of the two licensed Credit Reference Bureaus was interviewed as well. For 
insights into alternative sources of finance, interviews were held with Acumen Fund, Grassroots 
Business Fund, CIC Insurance and Faulu Kenya DTM Limited (a deposit-taking microfinance institution). 
For information on the involvement of government and donors in the SME finance space, 
representatives from the Ministry of Finance, International Finance Corporation (IFC), USAID and 
Proparco were interviewed with the rest of the information being collated through a desk review of 
publicly available information79. 
A second wave of research was conducted between June and August 2014. The objective of the 
second round was to update the credit data provided in 2012 and understand better the composition 
of SME finance portfolios with more detailed and recent figures. In order to increase the willingness 
to share information, it was stressed in the questionnaire and interview process that all data provided 
by the banks would remain anonymous and be presented only in an aggregated fashion. A total of 25 
institution completed the questionnaire in the second survey round, representing approximately 81 
percent of the credit market. The methodology used for the report is comparable to a study conducted 
in South Africa (Fuchs et al. 2011) and similar work has also been undertaken by the World Bank in 
analyzing SME finance in Nigeria, Rwanda and Tanzania. Part of the 2012 survey data was used for a 
cross-country comparison of SME finance in five Sub Saharan African countries (Berg and Fuchs 2013).  
Additional data analyzed in this paper comes from the Central Bank of Kenya and from the audited 
financial accounts published by the financial institutions at the end of the year and aggregated by 
Think Business80. 
From a methodological point of view, the data in this paper are analyzed through descriptive 
statistics and interpretation of time-series trends observed in the data. While previous studies such as 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Pería (2011) and de la Torre, Martínez Pería, and Schmukler (2010) used 
probit or OLS regression analysis to address similar questions, the main difference is that their studies 
focused on multiple countries and used larger cross-sectional sample sizes, whereas this paper has a 
smaller sample size but over a period of 4 years (2009-2013). The main analysis is therefore conducted 
through descriptive time-series analytics and comparisons of banks categorized by size and ownership.   
 
                                                          
79 The first survey round collected data on bank financing of SMEs as of December 2011 and December 2009. 
Note that this essay focuses on key issues identified in the literature survey, not on all issues addressed in the 
survey. 
80 See http://www.thinkbusinessafrica.com/ 
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4 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
4.1 OVERVIEW OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR IN KENYA 
While this study focuses prevalently on commercial banks, it is important to provide an 
overview of the overall financial sector in Kenya and see what other market players are active in the 
SME finance space. The formal financial sector consists of a large banking sector, a relatively well-
developed securities market, a large number of insurance and retirement benefits schemes, deposit 
taking microfinance banks (MFBs) and deposit taking savings and credit cooperatives (DTSs). As shown 
in Table 32, the main regulated credit providers are the 44 commercial banks (43 commercial banks 
and 1 mortgage finance company) which are by far the largest in terms of assets and credit to the 
private sector; there are also nine MFBs which target mostly the informal microenterprises and lower 
income consumers. Commercial banks and microfinance banks are prudentially regulated by the 
Central Bank of under a set of statutes such as the Banking Act, the Central Bank Act, Microfinance 
Act and the prudential guidelines and regulations. Deposit-taking savings and credit cooperatives on 
the other hand are regulated by the SACCO regulatory authority (SASRA). The mobile network 
operators have also become financial sector players through the provision of payments and more 
recently acting as a channel for loans and savings products.81 They are regulated by the National 
Payments System Division within the CBK and the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK). 
 
Table 32: Prudentially regulated financial institutions in Kenya 
Type of 
institution 
Regulatory 
Authority 
Number of 
institutions 
Total assets 
(KSh billion) 
Loans/ 
advances  
(KSh 
billion) 
Non-
Performing 
Loans (%) 
Lending to 
SMEs (KSh 
billion)  
Commercial 
banks 
CBK 44 2730 1531 5.2% 345 
MFBs CBK 9 42 27 9.2% NA 
DTSs SASRA 184 242 185 4.7% NA 
Sources: CBK (2014), SASRA (2014), own data. 
 
4.2 SEGMENTATION WITHIN THE BANKING SECTOR: A MATRIX BY SIZE AND OWNERSHIP 
This section shifts the attention from the overall financial market to the specific analysis of 
commercial banks. Following the analysis conducted in the literature survey, Table 33 creates a 3X3 
                                                          
81 Mshwari is a product launched by a commercial bank (Commercial Bank of Africa) and Safaricom (a major 
telecommunications company) in 2012. It provides credit and savings to consumers only through mobile 
phones. 
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matrix of the banking sector and categorizes financial institutions based on their size and shareholding 
structure. The table shows that in terms of number of institutions, the majority of banks in Kenya are 
small-sized: 16 institutions are indigenous (domestic) banks, 7 are foreign owned and 2 have 
Government participation. There are 13 middle-sized banks, 5 of which are domestic, 6 foreign, and 2 
have Government participation. Finally there are 6 large-scale banks, 2 of which 2 are local, 2 foreign 
and 2 have Government participation. The size of financial institutions are categorized according to 
the CBK ‘market-size index’82 which divides the 44 banks in three categories: 6 large banks (55 percent 
of the market), 15 medium-sized banks (36 percent) and 23 small banks (9 percent). 
 
Table 33: A 3x3 matrix of the Kenyan commercial banking sector in 2014 
 Local banks Foreign Banks Banks with government 
participation 
Small  African Banking Corporation Ltd. 
 Jamii Bora Bank Ltd. 
 Credit Bank Ltd. 
 Charterhouse Bank Ltd. 
 Dubai Bank Kenya Ltd 
 Equatorial Commercial Bank Ltd. 
 Fidelity Commercial Bank Ltd. 
 Fina Bank Ltd. 
 Giro Commercial Bank Ltd. 
 Guardian Bank Ltd. 
 Middle East Bank (K) Ltd. 
 Oriental Commercial Bank Ltd. 
 Paramount Universal Bank Ltd. 
 Prime Bank Ltd. 
 Trans-National Bank Ltd. 
 Victoria Commercial Bank Ltd. 
 Habib Bank A.G. Zurich 
 Habib Bank Ltd. 
 UBA Kenya Bank Limited 
 K-Rep Bank Ltd. 
 Gulf Africa Bank (K) Ltd 
 First Community Bank 
 
 
 Consolidated Bank of Kenya Ltd. 
 Development Bank of Kenya Ltd. 
 
Medium  Commercial Bank of Africa Ltd. 
 Chase Bank (K) Ltd. 
 Family Bank Ltd. 
 Imperial Bank Ltd. 
 I&M bank 
 NIC Bank Ltd. 
 
 Bank of India 
 Citibank N.A. Kenya 
 Bank of Baroda (K) Ltd. 
 Diamond Trust Bank Kenya Ltd. 
 Ecobank Ltd 
 Bank of Africa (K) Ltd. 
 Housing Finance Ltd. 
 National Bank of Kenya Ltd. 
 
Large  Equity Bank 
 Cooperative Bank of Kenya 
 Barclays Bank of Kenya 
 Standard Chartered Bank (K) Ltd. 
 
 Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd. 
 CFC Stanbic Bank Ltd. 
 
 
                                                          
82 The market-size index is based on net assets owned by the banks, their total deposits, total capital, number 
of deposit accounts and total number of loan accounts. For more details see CBK (2014). 
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It is important to note that out of the six banks with Government participation, only three of them 
have 100 percent Government ownership (Consolidated, National Bank, and Development Bank of 
Kenya), while the three other banks only have partial Government participation. The most important 
presence of the Government is in the Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB), the largest in Kenya by assets, 
where the Government moved from having full ownership in in 1970, to 35 percent in 2004. Two more 
rounds of shareholding sales in 2008 and 2010 reduced Governments shareholding to 17.7 percent. 
CFC Stanbic on the other hand has a minimal participation of the Government (approximately 1 
percent) and Housing Finance Ltd has a specific focus on mortgages and therefore it is not analyzed in 
the SME finance section of this paper. In the analysis of the survey data starting from and subsequently 
section 4.3, the Government owned banks will be categorized as domestic banks for two main reasons: 
first, because the largest banks with Government participation are mostly owned by private 
shareholders (e.g. CfC Stanbic and KCB). Second, because the group is very small and the degree of 
Government participation is very heterogeneous. It is therefore difficult to track how Government 
participation affects the overall involvement with SMEs. Moreover, since we assured the 
confidentiality of the data to all respondents, we decided not to make small groupings of banks where 
the trends of particular institutions would be easy to identify.  
Table 32 looks at key indicators and the overall market structure in a 3x2 matrix83, focusing on 
aspects such as the share of assets, share of total number and value deposits as well as the important 
figures on the credit market such as percentage of the credit market and average loan size. While 
these data do not focus specifically on small business finance, they are important because it reveal 
the overall infrastructure of the financial sector in Kenya and can provide a more in-depth picture on 
market concentration and segmentation. 
 
Table 34: Characteristics of Kenya financial sector by size and ownership of the banks 
  Small banks Mid-sized banks Large banks 
a. % of total assets 
Domestic 6.8% 21.6% 30.7% 
Foreign 3.8% 13.9% 23.2% 
b. % of total deposits (value) 
Domestic 7.6% 21.6% 31.0% 
Foreign 4.0% 13.9% 21.9% 
c. % of total deposit accounts 
Domestic 1.8% 8.6% 66.9% 
Foreign 2.5% 11.4% 8.8% 
Domestic 706,331 948,864 94,199 
                                                          
83 The 3x3 matrix has transformed into a 3x2 matrix because Government banks are analyzed as domestic 
banks not as an independent category. 
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d. Average value of deposits 
per account (KSh) 
Foreign 
834,880 828,256 708,550 
e. % of total loan accounts 
Domestic 1.5% 12.7% 62.6% 
Foreign 3.0% 3.3% 17.0% 
f. Average loan size (KSh) 
 
Domestic 4,768,925 4,076,940 557,858 
Foreign 2,512,433 9,299,921 2,061,834 
Source: Central Bank of Kenya (2014), Think Business (2014) 
 
In terms of assets, Table 32 shows that the 6 large banks own a total of almost 53 percent of 
the total assets in the financial system, whereas middle-sized banks own a total of almost 36 percent 
and small banks less than 11 percent. If we segment the market by bank ownership, we see that 
domestic banks have the largest share, having approximately 59 percent of total assets while foreign 
banks own about 41 percent. The table shows that the aggregate value of assets owned by domestic 
mid-sized banks (21.6 percent) is only slightly smaller than those owned by large foreign institutions 
(23.2 percent), confirming once again the dominant role of domestic banks in the Kenyan financial 
system.  
Table 32 also segments the financial sector based on the deposit market. There are three main 
components: share of total deposit value, share of total deposit accounts and average value in each 
deposit account. While the percentage of total deposit value (row b in Table 32) reflects quite closely 
the share of total assets (row a), we notice a striking heterogeneity when it comes to the number of 
deposit accounts and average value of deposits per account. While the difference in deposit value 
between domestic and foreign large banks is relatively small (31 and 22 percent respectively), 
domestic large banks have almost 67 percent of the total deposit accounts in Kenya while foreign large 
banks have only around 9 percent. This arguably confirms that domestic large banks have a much 
stronger focus on attracting deposits from the “bottom of the pyramid” compared to large foreign 
banks, targeting the low-income customers despite their little savings availability. In fact while large 
domestic banks have an average of over 94,000 KSh in each account (roughly 830 Euros), large foreign 
banks have an average of 708,000 KSh (almost 6,200 Euros)84. Small and mid-sized have less variability 
in their average deposit value per account, which oscillates between 700,000 KSh and 950,000 KSh. 
Another important level of analysis can be done by looking at the number of loan accounts and 
the average loan size across different types of institutions.  Hermes, Lensink, and Meesters (2011) for 
example use average loan size as a proxy for the outreach of microfinance institutions in an analysis 
                                                          
84 It is important to note that the average value of deposit is only indicative as it can be skewed by outliers as 
well as dormant accounts.  What is more important for this analysis is the comparison between different 
segments of the market rather than the value itself.  
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of several low-income markets, arguing that lower average loan sizes are likely to be related to a 
higher degree of penetration to the lower income segments of the population. While this approach 
could be affected by many factors, such as the composition of the loan portfolio and the focus on 
specific industry segments of the economy, it still provides an important overview on the 
characteristics of the banks and their lending to consumers and the private sector. The last two rows 
of Table 32 confirm what was observed on the analysis of deposit accounts: large domestic banks have 
the lion share of the credit market with over 60 percent of the total loan accounts provided in the 
country. The average loan size (row f) is around 560,000 KSh (about 5,000 euros) across the portfolio, 
far lower than large foreign banks as well as small and mid-sized banks. 
 
4.3 BANK FINANCING OF SMES 
Starting from this section the analysis will focus on the primary data collected in the two survey 
rounds, which will allow to test the hypotheses outlined in the literature survey. The section starts 
with the discussion of how banks define micro, small and medium enterprises and the size of the 
market over the three years. From section 4.4 onwards, the analysis focuses entirely on the 
characteristics of business lending, in particular interest rates, maturity and the composition of the 
SME portfolio. It also shows the risk management practices used by the banks and the drivers and 
obstacles for banks’ involvement with SMEs.  
 
4.3.1 Bank definitions of micro, small and medium enterprises 
One of the main challenges in the analysis of business finance is that the definition of what is 
considered a micro, small, medium or large enterprise differs considerably across banks. Although the 
Government of Kenya (GoK) proposed to adopt a unified definition of the micro and small enterprise 
segment in terms of turnover and number of employees, the banks’ definitions differ significantly both 
in terms of the information that is being collected and the categorization of enterprises. According to 
the GoK, firms are defined as “micro” when they have 1 to 10 employees and a turnover not exceeding 
KSh 500,000. They are considered “small” when they have 11 to 50 employees and a turnover not 
exceeding KSh5 million85. 
                                                          
85 The Micro and Small Enterprise Act (2013) defines micro and small activities but does not provide a 
definition of medium and large enterprises. 
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Table 35: Maximum thresholds of loan size (KSh), business turnover (KSh) and number of employees in the definition of 
business size 
Loan size Median 1st quartile 3rd quartile 
Micro 1,000,000 1,000,000 2,000,000 
Small 6,500,000 5,000,000 10,000,000 
Medium 50,000,000 20,000,000 100,000,000 
Turnover Median 1st quartile 3rd quartile 
Micro 10,000,000 3,250,000 11,500,000 
Small 50,000,000 16,250,000 250,000,000 
Medium 150,000,000 100,000,000 1,000,000,000 
Employees Median 1st quartile 3rd quartile 
Micro 10 8 10 
Small 22 11 44 
Medium 50 43 100 
 
The banks’ variables of SME classification in order of importance were loan size, turnover and 
then number of employees. In fact, very few banks were able to provide a classification based on the 
number of employees. The banks are aware that loan size is not the best proxy for the size of their 
business clients. However, it is used because of the ease of collection of that information and because 
it serves as a second order proxy for the overall size of the business. The challenge is that a large 
business if requesting a small working capital loan could be categorized as a small enterprise if no 
other information is available. Many banks however manage their clients in different departments 
(microenterprise department, SME department, corporate department, etc.), and therefore they are 
unlikely to mis-categorize the data.   
The quantitative differences in the definitional boundaries are considerable. Table 35 shows 
that the median turnover threshold for micro enterprises is twice as large compared to the definition 
used by the GoK, and the difference in the small enterprise segment is noteworthy as well. This 
illustrates that commercial banks tend to be reluctant to lend to the informal sector and firms with 
low turnover. Definitions differ widely also across banks depending on the market segment they are 
focusing on and their business-model: what is defined as a small enterprise in one bank might fall into 
the medium category in another. Looking at the difference between 1st and 3rd quartiles in Table 33, 
the heterogeneity of responses is apparent. The third quartile of the turnover threshold for example 
is far larger compared to the first quartile for all types of enterprises. The difference in the loan size 
definition is considerable as well. 
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In order to improve the classification of businesses among banks, a series of qualitative 
interviews was conducted with key commercial banks prior to the 2014 survey round. The objective 
was to understand how banks organize their data and whether we could standardize the definition of 
SMEs before the implementation of the survey. The outcome of these interviews was that using a 
standardized definition was not possible at the current stage. Although banks often collect data on 
their business clients (turnover, employees, asset size), they are often unable to link these data to the 
core data systems on lending facilities. If for example our questionnaire asked the total lending going 
to business with annual turnover between KSh 10 and KSh 20 million, most banks would not be able 
to provide such data, making it impossible to do any significant analysis of trends over time. This is 
clearly one of the key changes that authorities such as the CBK or industry associations such as the 
Kenya Bankers Association (KBA) should encourage in the near future.86  
 
4.3.2 Quantifying the SME finance market development in 2009, 2011 and 2013 
In the next sections we will analyze the development of the SME finance market over the period 
between December 2009, December 2011 and December 2013. Since the second survey round 
obtained data at a disaggregate level for micro, small, medium and large enterprises, it will provide an 
analysis of all business lending, not only SMEs, for a number of questions, such as maturity, interest 
rates and the composition of business lending.  
As shown in Figure 13, the involvement of Kenyan banks in the SME segment has grown 
remarkably in the period analyzed. With the exception of a few institutions specializing in specific 
markets (e.g. corporate, housing finance, etc.), the large majority of banks are involved with SMEs and 
about half of respondents have established dedicated SME departments. About a third of the banks 
also have microenterprises among their clients and six of them established a separate department for 
this segment. Where there is no separate department, SME clients are dealt with by either the 
‘corporate’ or ‘retail/consumer’ departments depending on the institutions’ organizational structure.   
The total SME lending portfolio in December 2013 was estimated at KSh332 billion, representing 
23.4% percent of the banks’ total loan portfolio (see Figure 13). The SME portfolio grew fast in absolute 
values but also as percentages of total lending: in 2009 and 2011 the total SME portfolio was estimated 
to be KSh133 and KSh225 billion respectively, and SME lending represented 19.5% and 20.9% of total 
lending. These figures show that in the context of general growth of the financial sector, SME financing 
                                                          
86 In the conclusions of this paper, we make a simple recommendation for the definition of SMEs on the way 
forward. 
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is growing at a relatively faster rate, representing a growing share of the commercial banks’ portfolios. 
Figure 13 also show the share of the SME portfolio is increasingly being driven by domestic banks while 
foreign banks have a decreasing share: while they provided 40 percent of SME loans in 2013, their 
share has shrunk to only 27 percent in 201387. 
 
Figure 13: Size of the total SME finance portfolio by bank size and ownership 
 
 
Another way to illustrate the diversity in the Kenyan financial system is to analyze the different 
levels of exposure and overall lending portfolios based on the size of banks. Figure 13 shows that in 
absolute values the largest share of the KSh 333 billion SME portfolios comes from medium-sized 
banks (46 percent), followed by large banks (38 percent) and small banks (18 percent). However, if we 
look at the ratio between SME lending to total lending instead of the absolute values (Figure 14), small 
and mid-sized banks tend to have higher exposure to SMEs compared to large banks. There are large 
differences within the same peer groups, however. For example, as a rather unique feature, large 
                                                          
87 As mentioned in the methodology section, the sample size differed for the three years surveyed, 
representing 81 percent of the credit market in 2009, 91 percent in 2011 and 85 percent in 2013. In order to 
make the portfolio size estimations comparable across the years, we followed the following procedure: first, 
we calculated the average growth rate in the specific bank segments (among small, medium or large banks, 
both foreign and domestic). Then, an estimation of portfolio size was made based on the available data and 
growth rate in the bank segment. For example, if a mid-sized domestic bank provided the 2011 figure but not 
the 2013 figure, then an estimation was made based on the average growth rate among banks of that specific 
segment. While this technique might have an error, this should be a minor concern considering that this 
imputation was done on a small percentage of the market. For those banks that did not participate to either 
survey round, it wasn’t possible to make any estimations of their SME portfolio side.   
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Kenyan banks have relatively large microfinance segments whereas large international banks have 
fewer but larger clients especially in the corporate and mid-corporate segments. These differences 
exist also among medium-sized banks.  
It is also important to note that between 2009 and 2013 the share of SME lending to total loan 
portfolios has increased for all types of bank sizes, but it has actually slightly decreased for foreign 
banks compared to domestic banks. One of the possible explanations for this finding is that foreign 
banks might have taken a more careful approach in response to the high interest rates imposed by 
the central bank at the end of 2011 and 2012, which will be discussed in section 4.4.6 of this paper. 
 
Figure 14: Exposure to SMEs by bank size and ownership 
 
 
4.4 CHARACTERISTICS OF BUSINESS LENDING IN 2013 
The 2014 survey provided a very detailed analysis of the composition of SME lending portfolio 
and the type of products that are mostly used by small firms. The idea is that while the growth of the 
overall portfolio certainly signals a growing relevance of small business financing in the banking sector, 
it tells us very little about the characteristics and sophistication of lending in the segment. This section 
will focus on key characteristics such as average loan size for different types of enterprises, loan 
maturity, interest rates, and the sectoral distribution of business lending. It will analyze also the role 
of different lending technologies in the composition of the SME finance portfolio. The objective is to 
analyze whether in addition to the size of the business portfolio, the financial sector is growing its level 
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of sophistication and is able to provide adequate and diverse services to address the heterogeneous 
needs of the SME sector.   
 
4.4.1 A supply-side estimation of access to credit and average loan sizes 
A first level of analysis can be conducted by looking at the simple ratio between the number of 
loan accounts and deposit accounts for business customers, which can shed light about the percentage 
of firms with access to a credit facility. This kind of question is normally addressed via demand-side 
surveys with the question “Have you received a loan from a bank in the last ‘x’ years?” directly posed 
to the firms interviewed. However looking at the same question from a supply-side point of view can 
shed light on the validity of results from a different perspective88: out of all businesses with a deposit 
account at a bank, how many are granted access to a loan? 
 
Table 36: Ratio of deposit accounts to loan accounts and average loan size by segment as of December 2013 
 Micro Small Medium Large 
Ratio of deposit accounts to loan 
accounts 
6.0% 20.2% 23.4% 38.7% 
Average loan size (KSh) 588,489 1,876,585 5,432,245 40,942,492 
 
  
Table 36 shows that the percentage is only 6 percent for microenterprises, 20.2 percent and 
23.4 percent for small and medium enterprises respectively and 38.7 percent for large-scale firms. It 
is crucial to note that this estimation is affected by many factors: first, many microenterprises may be 
borrowing from a personal account rather than a business account. Second, a business could have 
multiple deposit accounts at different institutions and receive a loan only from one or none of them. 
Third, businesses could have only one deposit account with a bank which is providing multiple loans 
at the same time (e.g. an overdraft and a term-loan simultaneously). The first and second scenarios 
are likely to be more common in Kenya, which is characterized by a fast mobility of demand and 
businesses often have more than one deposit account. The estimations from the supply-side survey 
are therefore likely to be slightly lower compared to demand side-surveys. However, this supply-side 
perspective arguably offers a valuable chance for triangulation of demand-side survey results and 
cross-check for the validity of the estimations. 
                                                          
88 The estimation of access to credit in demand-side surveys suffer from considerable error as well. In a paper 
titled “Lying about borrowing” Karlan and Zinman (2008) show that about 50 percent of recent borrowers do 
not report their high-interest consumer loans. 
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Another interesting estimation from the supply-side survey concerns the average loan size 
provided to different category of businesses. While the median value is more representative because 
it is less affected by outliers, the segmentation of the data by firm size should minimize this problem. 
Table 36 shows that in 2013 the average loan size was approximately KSh 590,000 for micro-
enterprises, KSh 1.9 million for small firms, KSh5.4 million for medium enterprises and about 41 million 
for large firms. The mean loan values confirm once more that commercial banks are not likely to 
engage with self-employed or informal operators, as loan sizes even at the micro-enterprise level 
seem relatively high and more adequate for formal microenterprises with relatively large turnovers.   
 
4.4.2 Average loan maturity  
 
Table 37: Average maturity (months) of loans for business clients by bank size and ownership 
 Bank size Bank ownership 
Total 
  
Small banks 
Mid-sized 
banks 
Large banks 
Domestic 
banks 
Foreign 
banks 
Micro 
enterprises 
19.8 22.9 11.0 19.7 15.0 18.8 
Small 
enterprises 
33.6 37.9 44.6 37.8 36.0 37.1 
Medium 
enterprises 
37.3 46.8 50.3 40.1 47.8 42.5 
Large 
enterprises 
41.2 57.7 60.0 47.9 50.4 48.7 
 
Table 37 shows the average maturity of loans provided to different types of business customers 
depending on bank size and ownership. The finding across the different types of banks is that 
microenterprise loans have maturity of about 19 months on average, for small and medium enterprise 
loans the average is about 37 and 43 months respectively and for large firms it’s almost 49 months. 
The results disaggregated by bank size and ownership shows that compared to small and mid-sized 
banks, large financial institutions provide loans with considerably shorter maturity to microenterprises 
(11 months on average) and longest maturity to small, medium and large enterprises. The difference 
between domestic and foreign banks is straightforward: while domestic banks provide longer 
repayment periods to micro and small enterprises, foreign banks tend to provide longer maturity to 
medium and large firms. However, it is important to note that the average maturity of loans should 
not be considered as an indicator of loan quality, as it could be affected by many factors, such as how 
banks define microenterprises or SMEs, and the composition of the business finance portfolio. 
Different lending products (e.g. short/long term loans, overdrafts, asset finance, etc.), in fact, are by 
definition characterized by different levels of maturity. This will be analyzed more in detail in this 
section 4.4.4. 
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4.4.3 Interest rates  
 
Table 38: Average interest rates for business clients by bank size and ownership 
 Bank size Bank ownership 
Total 
  
Small banks 
Mid-sized 
banks 
Large banks 
Domestic 
bank 
Foreign 
bank 
Micro 
enterprises 
23.5 18.5 20.5 20.2 22.1 20.6 
Small 
enterprises 
18.5 17.1 20.1 18.6 18.4 18.5 
Medium 
enterprises 
17.1 16.4 19.5 17.8 16.6 17.4 
Large 
enterprises 
14.8 16.2 15.6 16.1 13.4 15.3 
 
As expected, smaller businesses tend to be charged higher interest rates on loans compared to larger 
firms. Across all types of financial institutions, our survey finds that the average interest rate is 20.6% 
for microenterprises, 18.5% for small enterprises, 17.4% for medium enterprises and 15.3% for large 
enterprises. There are differences however depending on bank size and ownership. Mid-sized banks 
seem to be providing the lowest interest to micro, small and medium enterprises, whereas small banks 
seem to provide lower interest rates to large firms. The analysis of domestic/foreign ownership and 
interest rates shows what was hypothesized by part of the literature: foreign banks seem to provide 
lower interest rates to medium and large firms, while they charge higher rates to smaller firms, in 
particular microenterprises. The interest rate levels in this table may also be a function of outreach: 
as shown in Table 32, mid-sized banks tend to provide the largest loans sizes on average, especially 
the foreign mid-sized banks, showing that they are probably focusing on upper tier customers for each 
of the segments, including micro-enterprises.  
 
4.4.4 Composition of SME finance portfolios 
One of the key objectives of this study is to shed light on the type of financial products provided 
to SMEs in the Kenyan market, the difference between types of institutions and the overall level of 
sophistication of service provision to SMEs. Are banks providing diversified financial products to 
businesses? Are they using different lending technologies or relying on more conventional lending 
products? The 2014 survey round was the first attempt to address the loan portfolio composition on 
a large scale in the Kenyan market: while the time-series component is not available and therefore we 
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cannot identify trends in the market, we can nevertheless understand what types of market niches 
different banks are trying to target and set a baseline for future surveys. Lending products were 
grouped in five main types: term-loans with maturity below 24 months (short-term loans), term loans 
with maturity above 24 months (long-term loans), trade finance products (e.g. invoice discounting, 
letter of purchasing order financing, factoring, etc.), asset financing and overdrafts. Banks were also 
provided the option to specify a category “other” in case the list missed on some products that they 
are currently offering to SMEs. Banks were asked to provide data on both the number of outstanding 
loans for each lending product and the percentage that these products represent of the total SME 
finance portfolio: while the number of loans shows the level and frequency of demand for each type 
of credit product, the share of total portfolio shows the weight if these products have in the bank 
books.  
Table 39 presents the findings on the composition of SME portfolios by bank size. The table 
shows that in terms of value, long-term loans (maturity above 24 months) represent the largest share 
of total portfolios (42.1 percent) followed by overdrafts (27.8 percent) short-term loans (12.9 percent) 
asset financing (11.7 percent) and trade finance (4.2 percent). In terms of number of loan facilities 
overdrafts are by far the most common (43.4 percent) followed by short-term loans (24.7 percent) 
and asset-financing (19.3 percent). The differences between types of banks are noteworthy: mid-sized 
banks, which are the major players in the SME finance space, heavily rely on overdrafts as their main 
financial product representing 35 percent of total value and over 62 percent of total number of loans. 
Large banks on the other hand rely much less on overdrafts (about 15 percent of SME portfolio) while 
they are considerably more active in the provision of small scale long-term loans, which represents 
half of the value of their SME portfolio; long-term loans are relatively more important for large scale 
banks as well.  
 
Table 39: Composition of SME portfolio by lending product and bank size (value and volume) 
 
Value of portfolio by lending product (% of 
total) 
Number of loan facilities by lending 
product (% of total) 
 
Small 
banks 
Mid-
sized 
banks 
Large 
banks 
Total 
Small 
banks 
Mid-
sized 
banks 
Large 
banks 
Total 
Term loans (maturity 
below 24 months) 
15.5 11.2 9.6 12.9 13.4 6.6 13.7 10.2 
Term loans (maturity 
above 24 months) 
42.9 33.7 50.6 42.1 33.1 9.0 40.5 24.7 
Trade Finance 2.6 3.7 7.9 4.2 2.1 1.9 2.8 2.3 
Overdraft 30.0 34.9 15.3 27.8 42.9 62.4 23.1 43.4 
Asset financing 8.8 16.6 11.8 11.7 8.4 20.1 19.6 19.3 
Other 0.2 0.00 5.2 1.4 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 
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The analysis of the SME portfolio by bank ownership shows that in terms of frequency of 
product usage the reliance on overdrafts is mostly driven by domestic banks compared to foreign 
banks (45.9 percent against 35.6 respectively) but in terms of value foreign banks have a higher 
exposure to overdrafts (33.7 percent versus 25 percent) indicating that foreign banks are likely to have 
fewer but larger overdrafts by their clients. The opposite dynamic instead seems to occur for long-
term loans, which represent an approximately equal share of portfolios for both domestic and foreign 
banks (43.2 and 40 percent respectively), however they are more frequent in terms of number of 
facilities for foreign banks. Table 40 also shows that asset financing is a surprisingly common lending 
product for both foreign and domestic banks, representing almost 20 percent of total facilities. 
The most interesting finding for this section is arguably the central role played by overdrafts in 
SME lending in Kenya. While overdrafts can be useful in cases of quick liquidity needs in order to avoid 
firms to turn to informal lenders or shadow banking, the problem arises when firms use overdrafts as 
a substitute for specific working capital or investments finance products. Overdrafts tend to be very 
expensive and inefficient to address the specific needs of businesses. Banks on the other hand might 
not have a pressing incentive to reduce the firms’ reliance on overdrafts as they usually guarantee 
high profit margins. During the interviews, however, some bank managers confirmed that over-
reliance on overdrafts can be a major hindrance to SME finance development in Kenya: overdrafts are 
a financial “black-box” because they do not reveal why firms are borrowing nor how the loans are 
used. This makes it difficult for banks to understand the needs of their clients and respond to new 
developments in the market in a timely manner with appropriate financial services.    
 
Table 40: Composition of SME portfolio by lending product and bank ownership (value and volume) 
 
Value of portfolio by 
lending product (% of total) 
Number of loans per 
lending product (% of total) 
 
Domestic 
banks 
Foreign 
banks 
Domestic 
banks 
Foreign 
Banks 
Term loans (maturity below 24 
months) 15.4 7.6 11.5 6.1 
Term loans (maturity above 24 
months) 43.2 40 20.3 38.2 
Trade Finance 3.7 5.2 2.5 1.8 
Overdraft 25.0 33.7 45.9 35.6 
Asset financing 12.6 9.8 19.8 17.9 
Other 0.2 3.9 0.0 0.4 
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4.4.5 Sectoral distribution of business lending 
Table 41 shows the disaggregation of micro, small, medium and large lending portfolios by 
sector of operation of the borrowing firms. The analysis reveals relevant information about the type 
of businesses targeted by banks and the overall structure of the private sector89. For example, some 
sectors tend to have an approximately constant share of total lending regardless of the size of the 
firms. Lending to the construction sector for instance fluctuates only between 6.5 percent and 7.8 
percent across all segments, whereas real estate only represents 0.8 percent of lending to 
microenterprises while it represents almost 20 percent of the large-enterprise finance portfolio. 
Similarly, manufacturing goes from 6.8 percent for microenterprises to 15.2 percent of large 
enterprises. At the opposite end, we see that trade firms have by far the largest share of borrowing at 
micro-enterprise level (61.7 percent), while the share goes down to 21.9 percent at large enterprise 
level. At the level of small and medium enterprises, trade firms still play a predominant role, having 
39.5 and 36.3 percent of the total portfolio respectively. Transport and communication play an 
important role as well with 21.3 percent and 15.6 percent of the portfolio for small and medium 
enterprises respectively.  
Financing of agricultural firms seem to follow a “U” pattern, with a 4.8 percent at micro-
enterprise level, down to 2.7 percent at small enterprise level and then up again to 4.7 for medium 
enterprises and 7.4 percent for large enterprises. This confirms the idea that banks finance agricultural 
firms that are either micro-scale or large scale with a “missing middle” of SME financing to the 
agricultural sector. More generally however it seems that agricultural firms tend to be poorly served 
by the financial sector considering that agriculture is the backbone of the Kenyan economy 
representing over 20 percent of GDP.  It became clear during the interviews that a number of financial 
institutions lack the know-how of lending to agricultural enterprises and are therefore not inclined to 
increase their exposure to the typical risks of the segment, in particular the seasonality of revenues 
and the vulnerability to unpredictable weather conditions. The lower number of bank branches 
operating in rural areas also plays a significant role.  
 
 
 
                                                          
89 The analysis of the sectoral distribution of SME finance is restricted to the year 2013 because of data 
availability. If the data will be collected systematically over the years, the potential for analysis will increase 
substantially. For example, it will be possible to analyse whether there is a relationship between SME finance 
and value added in different industry segments or sectors of the economy. This analysis is however not 
possible at the present stage. 
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Table 41: Sectoral distribution of lending by size of the firms in 2013 
 
Micro-enterprise 
lending 
Small enterprise 
lending 
Medium enterprise 
lending 
Large enterprise 
lending 
Agriculture 4.8% 2.7% 4.7% 7.4% 
Manufacturing 6.8% 6.6% 12.3% 15.2% 
Real estate 0.8% 15.9% 15.9% 19.9% 
Construction 6.5% 7.8% 5.7% 6.6% 
Trade 61.7% 39.5% 36.3% 21.9% 
Transport and 
communication 12.8% 21.3% 15.6% 7.7% 
Restaurant, hotel 
and tourism 0.9% 2.3% 3.6% 4.1% 
Finance and 
business services 4.9% 2.2% 2.6% 6.3% 
Energy and water 0.5% 0.7% 1.5% 10.5% 
Mining and 
quarrying 0.3% 1.0% 1.8% 0.4% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
4.4.6 Quality of SME finance portfolio 
In order to understand the trends in the quality of loan portfolios and the portion of non-
performing loans in the SME segment it is important to look at the overall trends over the last few 
years. Figure 15 shows that the share of non-performing loans to total loans decreased dramatically 
in the last decade, from representing 33.6 percent in 2001 down to 4.3 percent in 2013.   
 
Figure 15: Non-performing loans as a share of total loans between 2001 and 2013 
 
Source: Think Business dataset (2014) 
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Following the period of liberalization discussed in Essay 3, and in particular after the economic 
crisis in the mid-1990s, there was a peak in non-performing loans in the banking sector to a high of 
33.6 percent in 2001, which was mostly due to the NPL crisis suffered by a few Government-owned 
and Government-influenced banks (Beck et al. 2010). After 2001 the share of NPLs to total loans has 
decreased very fast, however. This was not only due to an increase in total credit portfolios (the 
denominator in the ratio) but also to high levels of provisioning, which was imposed by strict guidelines 
introduced by the CBK in that period (Upadhyaya 2011). The level of NPLs started increasing again 
after 2011, mostly because of a spike in interest rates imposed by the CBK as a response to a period 
of macroeconomic instability. In 2011, the Kenyan currency lost nearly 25 percent of its value and the 
inflation rate spiked from 6 percent to nearly 20 percent in November 2011. In an attempt to halt the 
inflation spiral, the CBK raised its main lending rate from 6.25 percent to 18 percent in less than three 
months (see Figure 16). In the first quarter of 2013 inflation dropped below 5 percent and the Kenyan 
Shilling regained most of its value. Growth of total loan portfolio fell from 30.2 percent in 2011 to 14.3 
percent in 2012 and non-performing loans grew in both 2012 and 2013. Despite the macroeconomic 
volatility however, most banks made record profits in 2012 and 2013, partly because of the high 
interest rate spread in the second half of 2012 and 2013. 
 
Figure 16: Inflation rates (Fig. A) and Interest rates (Fig. B) between 2010/11 and 2014 
 
Figure 17 look more specifically at the level of NPLs in the SME segment divided by bank size 
and ownership. The overall assessment is that large banks, and foreign banks seem to have been 
affected more strongly by the volatility in interest rates between end of 2011 and 2012. NPLs in the 
 
 
* Note: CBR refers to the Central Bank Rate 
A B 
176 
 
SME segment were estimated at 9.3 percent for large institutions, 8.3 percent for small banks and 
only 3.4 percent for mid-sized banks. The trends over the period are also interesting: while mid-sized 
and large banks have followed the pattern of the overall NPL levels shown in Figure 15, small banks 
have decreased their bad loans throughout the period: while they were high in 2009 at over 15 
percent, they decreased to 11 percent in 2011 and 8.3 percent in 2013, which is below the NPL level 
of large scale banks. 
Figure 17: Non-performing loans in SME finance by bank size and ownership 
 
 
Another important measure to assess the quality of the business loan portfolio concerns the 
value of write-offs during the year. This question was added in the 2014 survey round because during 
the previous survey it was noticed that the NPL level data was affected by the value of loan write-offs 
during the year. Figure 18 shows that the value of write offs was relatively high in the micro-enterprise 
loan portfolio and in particular in the context of large, domestic banks. Write-offs for small enterprises 
was relatively higher for small banks and foreign banks. 
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Figure 18: Value of loan write-offs in 2013 as a % of total loan portfolio by bank size and ownership  
 
 
 
4.4.7 Risk Management and Lending technologies 
One of the key issues addressed in the literature survey concerns the role of lending 
technologies and how banks try to tackle the information opacity that often characterize the SME 
finance segment. Banks were provided the option to choose one or more technologies they use in 
their financing of SMEs, from relationship lending to arm’s length lending technologies. Banks were 
provided with five main options (see Figure 19): “relationship lending”, which was explained as the 
situation where the bank mainly approves loans through relationships with the client. This could 
involve soft information gathered by the loan officer through continuous, personalized direct contacts 
with the firms, their owners, managers and the local community in which they operate. The second 
option “arms’ length lending” refers to the context where banks mainly approve loans through 
transactional technologies such as credit scoring, standardized risk rating tools and processes, 
factoring, leasing, etc. The option “closer monitor” is an extension of relationship lending, which 
involve frequent visits at the firms’ premises, continuous interaction with clients, frequent reporting 
requirements, etc. Finally, automated monitoring refers to the context where banks rely on 
automatically generated preventive indicators based on the firms’ transactions with the bank.  
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Figure 19: Main lending technologies used by the banks with SMEs, categorized by bank size and ownership 
 
 
Figure 19 confirms the argument of the “conventional paradigm” and shows that relationship 
lending and close monitoring still play a central role in the SME finance space in Kenya. In particular, 
banks seem to go beyond the simple “relationship lending” and establish a close monitoring of the 
firms demanding credit with visits to the premises and careful observing of the activities of their 
clients. Transaction-based technologies however do play a role across all types of institutions. In 
particular many banks make use of credit scoring in the loan appraisal process (see Figure 20). While 
none of the banks completely rely on credit scoring in their SME finance portfolio, the large majority 
of banks use this technology as an input in the assessment of loan applications, or for some specific 
lending products. This is particularly the case for foreign banks. On the other hand, a relatively high 
number of banks –especially domestic, do not use credit scoring at all and seem to rely entirely on 
relationship-based technologies. Does this confirm the arguments of the conventional or new 
paradigms? The findings seem to partially confirm both views: large banks systematically use credit 
scoring as an input for assessing SME loans, especially because they have to deal with a high number 
of applications and loan officers across the country; however, scoring represents only an input in the 
decision-making, while close monitoring of the firms and relationship with the owners still play a 
central role. Some small banks use credit scoring as well, but not as systematically as large banks. In 
fact many small institutions rely entirely on relationship lending technologies.  
 
  
Note: the chart indicate the total number of responses. Respondents could choose more than one option 
179 
 
Figure 20: Reliance on credit scoring in SME finance by bank size and ownership 
 
 
 
4.4.8 Key drivers and obstacles to bank involvement with SMEs 
Financial institutions were asked to identify the major drivers for their decision to get involved 
in SME finance as well as the main obstacles that they face in their operations. Banks were given a list 
of potential drivers and obstacles and were asked to rank them as “not significant”, “significant” or 
“very significant”, and to explain the motivation for their answers. As illustrated in Figure 21, financial 
returns are the driving force for banks to target SMEs. The high profitability of the SME segment 
combined with growing competition in the corporate segment and the consequent reduction in profit 
margins encouraged banks to grow their SME portfolio. This partly confirms the “middle-market” 
hypothesis outlined in the literature survey: as numerous banks entered the market with a specific 
focus towards either the corporate segment or the micro-enterprise segment, the new frontier for 
expansion for many institutions is the SME market. Clearly the strategy of engagement with SMEs is 
different depending on the entry point: corporate-oriented banks tend to offer scale-down versions 
of their financial products and aim at capturing small businesses in the supply-chain of their existing 
large-scale clients. Banks with a focus on microenterprises tend to scale-up their services in order not 
to lose their clients as they grow from microenterprises to SMEs. This poses different types of 
challenges to the banks and it indicates an implicit segmentation of the SME market: while 
microenterprise-oriented banks have a much stronger focus on the “S” and a minor focus on the “M”, 
corporate-oriented banks have the opposite approach. The two types of banks however agree about 
the positive growth prospect in the segment.  As shown in Figure 21, future returns in the segment 
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are considered an important factor for engaging with SMEs: banks aim at positioning themselves 
ahead of competitors in a market that is perceived both as fast-growing and fast-evolving. When we 
asked banks to compare costs, risks and profitability of the SME segment relative to the corporate 
segment, the large majority of banks said that SMEs tend to be more costly and more risky than large 
corporates, but also more profitable. Cross-selling and supply-chain links were indicated as important 
drivers as well. 
 
Figure 21: Drivers for bank involvement with SMEs 
 
The analysis of the obstacles to SME financing depicts a clear picture of the specific challenges 
faced by financial institutions in the SME segment. The most significant obstacles are summarized in 
Figure 22. Macroeconomic factors such as inflation and foreign exchange risk were indicated as the 
most significant obstacles90. The second most important obstacle to SME finance as mentioned by the 
banks is related to SME specific factors. In this category, the large majority of banks highlighted three 
main issues: the poor quality of financial records, the inadequate (or complete lack) of collateral, and 
informality. Some banks also mentioned that SMEs tend to suffer from poor managerial practices and 
inability to manage risk. Overall, the SME segment is seen by most banks as particularly risky, both 
because dealing with SMEs implies high operating costs and because banks often lack proper risk 
appraisal and management processes for this client segment.    
                                                          
90 These ‘macroeconomic factors’ could well play into the banks’ decision-making by impacting the interest 
rate paid on governments securities, and thereby the attractiveness of expanding lending to the SME sector. 
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Figure 22: Obstacles to bank involvement with SMEs 
 
 
 
 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This research represents one of the first comprehensive attempts to analyze the size of bank 
financing of SMEs in Kenya and the characteristics of small business lending across the banking sector. 
Through the analysis of two survey rounds conducted in 2012 and 2014 in collaboration with Financial 
Sector Deepening Kenya (FSD-K), the World Bank (WB) and the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), this study 
portrays an in-depth picture about the lending technologies used in the segment, the composition of 
SME finance portfolios and the drivers and obstacles of banks’ involvement with SMEs. While the 
different survey rounds had different response rates from the banks, the data captures a minimum of 
81 percent to a maximum 94 percent of the total credit market in the different survey rounds, 
therefore being highly representative of the Kenyan market. 
The literature survey conducted in section 2 showed that two research paradigms have 
emerged in the literature in the last two decades. The “conventional” paradigm emphasizes the 
tendency of large financial institutions, especially international ones, to finance corporate firms that 
are transparent and analyzable through sophisticated ‘‘hard” quantitative information such as 
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financial ratios, audited financial statements, and credit scoring. On the other hand, smaller 
institutions with stronger ties with the local community have a competitive advantage with small, non-
transparent businesses that require a flexible approach based on ‘‘soft” qualitative information. A 
recent wave of empirical studies however questioned the core arguments of the conventional 
paradigm, showing that large banks have a growing appetite for the SME market and that relationship 
lending is no longer the sole lending technology in this segment.  
This study partially confirms arguments from both paradigms. In line with the “new” paradigm, 
the study confirms that the involvement of banks with SMEs has grown dramatically between 2009 
and 2013 for all banks regardless of size (small, medium and large) or ownership (domestic or foreign). 
With the exception of a few institutions specializing in specific markets (e.g. corporate, housing 
finance, etc.), all banks seem interested to develop their SME finance further over the next years. The 
overall lending to SMEs in fact increased from 133 KSh billion in 2009, to 225 KSh billion in 2009 and 
332 KSh billion in 2013. As a percentage of total lending, SME finance has increased as well, 19.5 
percent in 2009, to 20.9 percent in 2011 to 23.4 percent in 2013. In line with the conventional 
paradigm, however, the study shows that growth in the SME segment has been driven mostly by 
domestic institutions rather than foreign institutions, which seem to have decreased the expansion of 
their SME portfolios after macroeconomic instability in 2012 brought new risks to the segment.  
The “conventional paradigm” is partially confirmed also in the context of lending technologies. 
Figure 19 showed that relationship lending and close monitoring of clients still represent the core 
lending technology used in the SME finance space. However many banks, especially the large ones, 
have started complementing relationship lending with the use of credit scoring (Figure 20) as an input 
in the loan appraisal process. A relatively high number of small domestic banks have not yet started 
using this technology and entirely rely on the relationship between clients and loan officers to assess 
the quality of loan applications.   
The analysis of drivers for banks’ involvement with SMEs seems to confirm the “middle-market 
hypothesis” described in the literature survey. The high profitability of the SME segment combined 
with growing competition in both corporate and micro-enterprise segments encouraged banks to 
grow their “middle” (i.e. SME) portfolio. At the current stage, different banks seem to be targeting 
SMEs from different angles: banks that traditionally focused on the corporate segment tend to offer 
scale-down versions of their corporate financial products and capture small businesses in the supply-
chain of their existing clients. Banks that had a traditional focus on microenterprises tend to scale-up 
their services in order not to lose their clients as they grow. This means that the SME finance market 
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has an additional implicit segmentation: microenterprise-oriented banks have a much stronger focus 
on the “S” of SMEs while corporate-oriented banks are much more inclined towards the “M”. 
The main challenge in the analysis of the data concerned the definition of SMEs and the 
comparability of data across institutions. As shown in Table 35, banks differ widely in their definition 
of the segment, as a function of their target market and composition of lending portfolio. In 2014, we 
conducted a round of interviews to propose a new definition of SMEs. The main problem encountered 
is that banks have different ways of organizing their core-system data and it is often impossible for 
them to link loan-level data to firm-level data. For example, if we used a standardized definition and 
asked banks to provide data on lending to firms with annual turnover between, say, KSh 10 million 
and KSh 50 million, most banks would not be able to provide such data. On the way forward, it is 
recommended that regulatory institutions such as the CBK or the Kenya Bankers Association 
encourage banks to apply minor changes to the way they organize their data so they can provide more 
refined figures on their business lending. 
One possibility for a better identification of the characteristics of the business would be for 
banks to collect information on the Single Business Permit (SBP) obtained by loan applicants. The SBP 
is a license administered by the Municipal Councils and renewed on an annual basis which allocates a 
code to businesses depending on their sector, turnover and number of employees. A large proportion 
of businesses in Kenya have SBPs, including SMEs and microenterprises. Although the SBPs do not 
indicate the exact size of the businesses or internationally recognized standardized sector codes, they 
hold relevant information about the size range and specific subsectors where the firms operate.91 
Furthermore, banks could collect the information at negligible costs, since the validity of the data is 
checked by local authorities and updated on a yearly basis. If banks collected this information 
consistently, they would create comparable information about their customer base and policymakers 
would easily be able to identify segments of the economy that are served, or underserved, by the 
Kenyan financial sector.      
  
                                                          
91 The SBP divides businesses in 8 top level categories and 74 sub-categories depending on the size of the 
business and the specific activities it conducts. 
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Appendix 1 
Entrepreneurs’ Questionnaire – 2011/2012  
DATE: ………………………… Start Time: …………………………. End Time: ………………………..        Interviewer’s Name: ……………………………  Name of Respondent: …………………………………..  
Name of the Business (and stall number) ………………………………………………….         Location: 
 
Good Morning/afternoon. My name is …………… and I am working for a research project conducted 
by the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Nairobi and the University of Trento. Your enterprise has been selected for a survey and I am here today to ask you some 
questions about your business. Please note that the information given to us is completely confidential and it will be used only by the researchers coordinating the study. The questionnaire 
will take approximately 45 minutes. 
 
***Note for Interviewer: Questions numbers that are underlined (e.g. 1.11) can be answered by an employee or family member. All the other questions must be answered directly by the 
owner of the business*** 
Part 1 – Entrepreneurs Characteristics 
1.11 Gender: Male Female  
1.12 Age:……………………..  
1.14 Ethnic Group:…………………………………. 
1.15 Number of persons in households:  
1.18 Where do you live in Nairobi? ………………………………………………. 
 1.21  Education :   none        Some Primary          Primary Completed           Some Secondary      Secondary completed  Some University    University Completed          
Technical training (college) 
 1.22 Total years of Schooling: ………………………   1.3 Before becoming the owner of this enterprise, did you work somewhere else?  Yes No . 
If yes, please provide the details below (Start from latest) 
 A) Position (e.g. employee, apprentice, 
 owner,  etc) 
B) Type of Business  C) Started in year (begin from latest) D) Length of employment 
A  Formal Informal   
B  Formal Informal   
C  Formal Informal   
Respondent Code: (Back Office) Kariobangi Light Industries  
Kariobangi Market 
Korogocho 
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 Part 2 – Firms Characteristic 
 
2.01 When did you start this business? …..…..   
 
2.02 Are you the only owner? 
 Yes No   
 
2.03 If No, how many partners do you 
have?   
 
 
2.04 What percentage of the business do you 
own?  
 
 
 
2.05 What is the main business activity you engage in? 
Manufacturing Trading/Retail Services Other (Specify) 
Crafts/Carpentry/Upholstery/Joinery 
Metalwork 
Tailoring 
Baking / Food manufacture 
Charcoal / Brick making 
Other Manufacturing (specify) 
 
 
Trading in cereals /Agricultural 
produce 
Selling of cereals/vegetables/fruits 
Food Vending 
Second hand clothes 
Other petty trading 
Retail or wholesale shop 
Milk products 
Butchery/Fish 
Other animal products 
 
Phone shop/repair/phone transfer 
Transport/Usafiri (boda boda, 
matatu, etc) 
Mechanic 
Electronics repair/Kurekebisha 
Haircutting/Saloon 
Agricultural processing 
Restaurant/Bar/Lodging/Hotel 
Brewing 
Accomodation 
 
 
 
2.4 Entry to the Market 
 
2.48 What was your initial Capital for this business? KSh…………………………………………………… 
 
2.46 Where did you get your starting capital? (Multiple answers allowed) 
Own savings Lump-Sum from ROSCA   Loan from family/friends Loan from moneylender Loan from chama/ASCA Loan from a SACCO Loan from a MFI Loan from a bank  
Other (specify) 
 
2.47 If the answer was “own savings”, where did you gain the money used as initial investments? 
Previous jobs        Other businesses        inheritance     Retirement money       other (specify) 
 
2.07 Do you own or rent the building where you operate?  Own Rent 
 
 2.07b If you rent the premise, how much do you currently pay for rent? KSh …………………………  Monthly   Bimonthly    Quarterly    Annually   Other (specify)   
 
 2.07c How much did you pay to the landlord when you first entered this premise? (include deposits, fees, goodwill and other expenses) 
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2.2 Net Worth 
2.22 Please provide details about the firm’s assets (start from most valuable items): 
 Item A) Type of Machinery B) Year of 
Purchase 
C) Original 
Purchase price 
D) Price if sold today 
(after negotiations) 
E) % of 
ownership 
Source of money for the investment 
A Machinery/equipment 
Purchased New 
Purchased  Second hand 
 
     Loan from Bank 
Loan from MFI  
Loan from Sacco  
Loan ROSCA/ASCA  
Loan from shylock 
 
Loan from 
family/friend  
Own Savings  
Other (specify) 
 
 
 
B Machinery/equipment 
Purchased New 
Purchased  Second hand 
       
Loan from Bank 
Loan from MFI  
Loan from Sacco  
Loan ROSCA/ASCA  
Loan from shylock 
 
Loan from 
family/friend  
Own Savings  
Other (specify) 
 
 
 
C Machinery/equipment 
Purchased New 
Purchased  Second hand 
       
Loan from Bank 
Loan from MFI  
Loan from Sacco  
Loan ROSCA/ASCA  
Loan from shylock 
 
Loan from 
family/friend  
Own Savings  
Other (specify) 
 
 
 
D Machinery/equipment 
Purchased New 
Purchased  Second hand 
     Loan from Bank 
Loan from MFI  
Loan from Sacco  
Loan ROSCA/ASCA  
Loan from shylock 
 
Loan from 
family/friend  
Own Savings  
Other (specify) 
 
 
 
D2 Machinery/equipment 
Purchased New 
Purchased  Second hand 
     Loan from Bank 
Loan from MFI  
Loan from Sacco  
Loan ROSCA/ASCA  
Loan from shylock 
 
Loan from 
family/friend  
Own Savings  
Other (specify) 
 
 
 
D3 Machinery/equipment 
Purchased New 
Purchased  Second hand 
     Loan from Bank 
Loan from MFI  
Loan from Sacco  
Loan ROSCA/ASCA  
Loan from shylock 
 
Loan from 
family/friend  
Own Savings  
Other (specify) 
 
 
 
D4 Machinery/equipment 
Purchased New 
Purchased  Second hand 
     Loan from Bank 
Loan from MFI  
Loan from Sacco  
Loan ROSCA/ASCA  
Loan from shylock 
 
Loan from 
family/friend  
Own Savings  
Other (specify) 
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E Furniture and furnishings      Loan from Bank 
Loan from MFI  
Loan from Sacco  
Loan ROSCA/ASCA  
Loan from shylock 
 
Loan from 
family/friend  
Own Savings  
Other (specify) 
 
 
 
F Furniture and furnishings      Loan from Bank 
Loan from MFI  
Loan from Sacco  
Loan ROSCA/ASCA  
Loan from shylock 
 
Loan from 
family/friend  
Own Savings  
Other (specify) 
 
 
 
G Vehicles 
Purchased New 
Purchased  Second hand 
     Loan from Bank 
Loan from MFI  
Loan from Sacco  
Loan ROSCA/ASCA  
Loan from shylock 
 
Loan from 
family/friend  
Own Savings  
Other (specify) 
 
 
 
H Buildings (only if owned)      Loan from Bank 
Loan from MFI  
Loan from Sacco  
Loan ROSCA/ASCA  
Loan from shylock 
 
Loan from 
family/friend  
Own Savings  
Other (specify) 
 
 
 
I Buildings      Loan from Bank 
Loan from MFI  
Loan from Sacco  
Loan ROSCA/ASCA  
Loan from shylock 
 
Loan from 
family/friend  
Own Savings  
Other (specify) 
 
 
 
L Other       
 
 
2.23 
A What is the total value of your raw materials/supplies if you sold them 
today (now)?  
 
B What is the total value of all your finished products if you sold them 
today? 
 
C In total, how much do your customers owe you as of today? (Put zero if 
nothing is owed.) 
 
D How much do other traders owe you as of today? (Put zero if nothing is 
owed.) 
 
E Do other family members/friends owe you money that they borrowed 
from the business? If yes, how much do they still owe you as of today? 
(Put zero if nothing is owed.)  
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F If you have received credit for this business sources, how much do you still 
owe today? 
 
 
2.29  
  
  
 
2.3 Labour 
2.31 What was the total number of regular (not occasional) employees:   
 
A) When the business started (indicate 
year from question 2.01)………………………… 
B) in 2007 C) in 2009 D) in 2012 (current) 
    
 
2.32 Please provide the following details about your current employees:     
Type of employment A) Number of 
employees 
B) Average pay (per 
day per person) 
A- Full time (paid)   
B- Part Time (paid)   
C- Occasional   
D- Unpaid full time   
E- Unpaid part-time   
F- Apprentices   
2.33 Do any of your employees have a contract? If yes, how many of your employees have a contract? …………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
 
2.30  If you use trade credit, please provide the following details 
 A- % of supplies you buy on trade 
credit 
C- Interest rate required by 
the supplier 
D- Repayment Period  -days 
(maximum) 
A  
 
  
2.29 Do you pay your suppliers upfront (when you receive the products) or 
do you pay them once you have sold the products? (Trade Credit)   
I pay upfront      I receive the goods on credit and pay them back once 
I sell them    Both 
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2.34: SUPPLY CHAIN  
A HOW MANY KEY SUPPLIERS DOES YOUR BUSINESS HAVE  
 
B WHERE ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT SUPPLIERS LOCATED (RANK FROM MOST IMPORTANT TO 
LEAST IMPORTANT) 
1 =                                                                                                3 = 
 
  
2 =                                                                                                 4=  
  
C WHAT IS THE SIZE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT SUPPLIERS?  
1 = Informal business                     3 = Large formal business 
2= Small formal business               4= Public Institutions 
 
D DOES THE BUSINESS HAVE SUPPLIERS LOCATED IN OTHER COUNTRIES  
0 = No        1 = Yes    
E DO YOU RELY ON MIDDLEMEN TO PURCHASE YOUR SUPPLIES? 
1 = Always      2=Often     3=Rarely        4=Never    
 
2.35: CUSTOMERS 
A WHERE ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT CUSTOMERS OF THE BUSINESS LOCATED? 
1 =                                                                                                3 = 
 
  
2 =                                                                                                 4=  
 
B DOES THE BUSINESS HAVE CUSTOMERS LOCATED IN OTHER COUNTRIES? 
0 = No        1 = Yes    
C WHAT IS THE TYPE OF CUSTOMERS DOES THE BUSINESS HAVE?  
1 = individuals mostly                                        3 = Big Enterprises mostly  
2 = Small Enterprises mostly                             4= Public Institutions 
D DO YOU RELY ON MIDDLEMEN FOR YOUR SALES? 
 
1 = Always  2=Often  3=Rarely  4=Never    
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*****Continuation of Section 2 on Firms Characteristics********** 
2.1 Firms Profits 
 
2.14 Over the last month (30 days), what profits did you make from this business? (KSh) …………………………………………………. 
 
2.14b What are your average monthly profits  from this 
business? KSh  
2.15 In a good month, what are your profits? KSh…………… 
 
2.16 And in a bad month? KSh.......................................... 
 
 
2.19 Compared to one year ago, your average profits have:   Increased  Remained equal Decreased Don’t know 
 2.20 (Proxy 2) A- Value (Put a zero if 
nothing has been 
consumed or used by the 
household.) 
B- Time period: (1)daily 
(2)weekly (3)monthly 
(4)quarterly (5)semi-
annually (6)yearly 
A- ***only for Korogocho*** Does your household consume or use any of this business’ products or services? If yes, what is the 
value of the products normally consumed or used by your household? 
  
B-  How much money from the business do you normally use for yourself or your household?   
C- After making purchases for the business and after using some money for yourself or your household, is there usually any money 
left? If yes, how much money do you usually have left after purchases for the business and using some of the money for yourself or 
your household? 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.11 Is this business your main source 
of income?   
 
 
Yes  No 
2.12 Do you or someone in your household have 
other sources of income? (other jobs, businesses, 
pensions, remittances etc.)          
 Yes  No 
2.13  If yes, how much does your household 
make from other sources of income (not this 
one)? ***interviewer: indicate the time 
period (month, week, quarter, year, etc)*** 
 
2.13b Please tick the other sources of income 
(if any) in your household. 
Other jobs (employment) 
Other business 
Remittances from family or friends 
Pensions or other government funds 
None
Other (specify) 
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Part 4 – Focus on Chamas/Self-help Groups 
4.01 Many people belong to informal societies or group saving schemes such as, merry go round, savings and lending groups, chamas, investment clubs, clan/welfare groups to which they 
contribute on a regular basis. How many do you personally belong to? / Watu wengi wamejijumuisha na jamii kwa kundi la kuhifadhi pesa kama mashirika ya mzunguko, makundi ya kuweka 
akiba na kukopa pesa ,makundi ya kuwekeza, kundi za jamii ambazo wanachangia mara kwa mara. Ni vingapi umejiunga navyo? 
 
                          4.01 RECORD NUMBER 0 FOR NONE IF NONE (0) GO TO 4.6 (Page 16) 
 
4.02 
 
A- Name of SHG B- Frequency of 
Contribution 
(1=daily, 2=weekly, 
3=monthly, 
4=annually, 
5=irregular 6=other) 
C- How much do 
you contribute? (if 
the amount is not 
fixed write the 
range) 
E- How many are in the 
group? 
F- What kind of people 
does the group mainly 
consist of? (1=relatives, 
2=friends, 3=neighbors, 
4=workmates/colleagues, 
5=religious groups) 
H- How long have you 
been in this group 
1       
2       
3       
4       
 
4.04 Which of the following does ... (READ GROUP) do for its members? / Ni nini kati ya hizi kikundi chenu hufanyia wanachama wake?  MULTIPLE mentions possible per group.  
 
4.05 If the group has multiple activities, what is the most important activity of the group? (Interviewer, circle the relevant answer) 
  A- Group 1 B- Group 2 C- Group 3 D- Group 4 
A Welfare - we help each other out for things like funerals / Welfare-husaidia kila moja wakati wa msiba..     
B We collect money and give to each member a lump sum (pot) in turn / Kukusanya pesa na kupeana kwa kila mwana 
chama kwa zamu 
    
C We lend money to each other in the group and repay loans with interest / Kukopesha pesa kwa wanachama za kulipa 
na faida. 
 
    
D We lend money to non-members to be repaid with interests / Kukopesha pesa kwa watu wasio wanachama za kulipa 
na faida 
    
E We periodically distribute all monies held by the group to its members / mara moja moja tuwagawia wanachama 
pesa zote zilizo na chama 
    
F We buy in-kind household goods (e.g. food, soap, utensils etc).     
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G We make other kinds of investments e.g. property, business / Tunawekeza katika njia zingine mbali mbali kama 
biashara na mali. 
    
H We invest in the stock market / Tunawekeza katika soko la hisa     
 
 
 
4.2 In relation to the groups that provide loans to members, please provide the following details: 
 A- Number of loans 
received this year 
B- Total value of 
loans 
C- Interest rate D- Repayment 
period 
E- Purpose F- Did you use any 
of these loans for 
this business? 
E- If yes, what did you 
buy? 
A- Group 1  
 
    Yes No 
B- Group 2  
 
    Yes No 
C- Group 3  
 
    Yes No 
D- Group 4  
 
    Yes No 
 
4.3 In relation to the groups that provide lump-sums to members, please provide the following details: 
 A- Number of lump-sums 
received this year 
B- Total value of lump-sums C- Purpose D- Did you use any of these 
lump-sums for this 
business? 
 E- If yes, what did you 
buy? 
A- Group 1  
 
  Y  No 
B- Group 2  
 
  Yes No 
C- Group 3  
 
  Yes No 
D- Group 4  
 
  Yes No 
 
4.4 In relation to the groups that operate for emergencies (hospitalization, funerals, weddings, fire, theft, other sudden emergencies), provide the following details 
 A- Number of contributions 
received this year for 
emergencies 
B- Value (Ksh) of the contributions 
received from the group 
C- Type of emergency D- Was the contribution 
a lump-sum or a loan? 
E- If it was a loan, 
what was the interest 
rate? 
F- What was the 
Repayment period? 
A- Group 1       
B- Group 2       
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C- Group 3  
 
     
D- Group 4  
 
     
4.6 ASK ALL CURRENTLY NOT IN A GROUP. OTHERWISE SKIP THIS QUESTION 
 Why do you not belong to any groups? / Ni kwa nini hujajiunga na kundi lolote? SPONTANEOUS. Do not prompt. MULTIPLE mentions possible. 
You have an account in a bank or other formal institution / Una akiba na benki au 
shirika lingine 
 You don't have any money / Huna pesa zozote 
People steal your money / Watu huiba pesa zako 
 You don't know about them / Hujui kuzihusu 
 You don't need any service from them / Uhitaji huduma yoyote kutoka kwao 
 You don't trust them / Huwaamini 
 Groups require too much time in meetings / Vikundi hutaka muda mwingi sana kwa 
mikutano 
 Others (SPECIFY)  
 
Part 3 - Formal and Informal Financial Instruments (Savings and Credits in MFIs, banks, Saccos, Money lenders, etc) 
Which services and products are you CURRENTLY using? MULTIPLE responses possible Which services and products have you used in the past (since you started your business) but no longer 
have? MULTIPLE responses possible. Which products have you NEVER used? MULTIPLE responses possible 
 Savings and Loans in Commercial Banks Currently 
Have 
Used to 
have 
Never 
Had 
3.01 Bank A - Savings account at a commercial bank     
B - Business loan from a bank / Mkopo wa kibinafsi au kibiashara kutoka kwa benki.    
 
3.02 Please provide the following details about the bank accounts that you currently have or used to have: 
 A - Name of the 
Bank 
C- How long have 
you had this 
account? 
D- Number of 
Loans received 
since you started 
the business 
E- Total Amounts 
(KSh) 
F- Year/Month 
when you 
received the 
loans 
G- Interest 
Rate 
H- Repayment 
Period 
I- Amount still 
to be repaid 
(KSh) 
Purpose of the 
loan (how did you 
use the loan?) 
 
A 
         
      
      
 
B 
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3.04- Please provide the following details about the  MFI accounts that you currently have or used to have: 
 A - Name of the 
MFI 
B- Purpose C- How long 
have you had 
this account? 
D- Number of 
Loans received 
since you started 
the business 
E- Total Amounts 
(KSh) 
F- Year/Month 
when you 
received the 
loans 
G- Interest 
Rate 
H- Repayment 
Period 
I- Amount still 
to be repaid 
(KSh) 
Purpose of the 
loan (how did you 
use the loan?) 
 
A 
 Business only 
Personal only  
Both business 
and personal 
        
      
      
 
B 
 Business only 
Personal only  
Both business 
and personal 
        
      
      
 
 
 
Savings and Loans in SACCOs Currently 
Have 
Used to 
have 
Never 
Had 
3.05 Sacco Savings account at SACCO (organisation which requires you to be a member e.g. agricultural co-op or 
workplace co-op) / Akaunti ya akiba katika SACCO  
   
Business loan from a SACCO / Mkopo kutoka kwa SACCO     
 
 
 3.06  Please provide the following details about Sacco accounts that you currently have or used to have: 
 A - Name of the 
Sacco 
B- Purpose C- How long 
have you had 
this account? 
D- Number of 
Loans received 
since you started 
the business 
E- Total Amounts 
(KSh) 
F- Year/Month 
when you 
received the 
loans 
G- Interest 
Rate 
H- Repayment 
Period 
I- Amount still 
to be repaid 
(KSh) 
Purpose of the 
loan (how did you 
use the loan?) 
 
A 
 Business only 
Personal only  
Both business 
and personal 
 
        
      
      
 
B 
 Business only 
Personal only  
Both business 
and personal 

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 Loans  from Family/Friends Currently 
Have 
Used to 
have 
Never 
Had 
3.11 Loans 
Family/Friend 
 
Business loan from family/friends / Mkopo kutoka kwa marafiki / jamii.    
 
3.12 A- Number of Loans 
Received since you 
started the business 
B- Years/Month 
when you received 
the loans 
C- Amounts (Ksh) D- Interest Rate (% or 
total amount repaid 
after interest) 
E- Repayment 
Period 
F- Amount still 
to be repaid as 
of now 
G- Relation 
with the 
creditor 
H- Purpose (How 
did you use this 
loan?) 
A- Loan from a 
friend/Family 
  
 
      
 
 
      
 
 
      
 Loans from Moneylenders Currently Have Used to have Never Had 
3.13 Loans 
Money Lender 
Business loan from an informal money lender/Shylock / Mkopo kutoka kwa wakopeshaji wasio rasmi.     
  
3.14 Please provide details about the loans from moneylenders you had since you started the business 
3.12 A- Number of Loans 
Received since you 
started the business 
B- Year/month 
when you received 
the loans 
C- Amounts (Ksh) D- Interest Rate (% or 
total amount repaid 
after interest) 
E- Repayment 
Period 
F- Amount still 
to be repaid as 
of now 
G- Relation 
with the 
creditor 
H- Purpose of the 
loan (How did you 
use this loan?) 
A- Loan from a 
money-lender 
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3.3 Money transfer services 
3.34 How often do you use mobile money services? (i.e. M-Pesa, Orange Money, etc)) 
Everyday  A few times every week  Once a week  A few times every months  Once every few months 
3.35 Which of the following money transfers mechanisms  
do you normally use to  pay and receive payments in your 
business? (If more than one, please indicate estimated 
percentages) 
A- Cash transfers  
(percent) 
B- Mobile money 
transfers (percent) 
C- Transfer of airtime 
(percent) 
D- Bank Transfers 
(percent) 
E- Other (specify) 
A- To pay your employees      
B- To pay your suppliers      
C- To pay bills for this business (electricity, water)      
D- To pay rent for this business      
E- To receive payments from costumers      
 
3.35 How much money have you put on your mobile account over the last 30 days? ………………………………. Savings   Only for transactions Both 
 
3.38 Insurance Currently 
Have 
Used to 
have 
Never Had 
A Government medical insurance e.g NHIF / Bima ya matibabu ya serikali kama NHIF    
B Private medical insurance e.g AAR, Mediplus / Bima ya matibabu ya kibinafsi kama AAR,Mediplus     
C Life insurance policy / Bima ya maisha.    
D Retirement / pension / Malipo yanayopeanwa baada ya kustaafu.    
E Government social security e.g. NSSF / Malipo ya uzeeni k.m NSSF.    
F Business Insurance : (specify name):    
G Microinsurance (medical insurance provided by a microfinance institutions)    
 
2.5 Regulatory Compliance (Degree of formality) 
2.51 Do you have an operational License? a-Which type of License? 
 
How much do you pay for the license?  
Yes   
No  
I had it in the past, but not anymore 
 Period of Compliance  From :                  To 
Daily Licence 
Single Business Permit (annual) 
Other (specify) 
 
 
2.52 Taxes: Are you registered at the KRA? Which taxes are you currently paying? When did you register at KRA?  
Yes   
No  
I had it in the past, but not anymore 
Period of Compliance  From :                    To 
a-Type 
income tax 
 corporate tax  
VAT 
Other (specify ) 
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    
 
 
2.53 Is your business registered at the 
Attorney General? 
What type of registration did you make? When did you register? How much did you pay for the 
registration? 
Yes   
No  
I had it in the past, but not anymore 
Period of Compliance  From :                    To 
a- Type  
sole proprietorship  
 Incorporated company  
Partnership 
Other (specify 
 
  
    
2.54 Are you registered at the Kenya Bureau 
of Standards? 
What did you register for? When did you register? How much did you pay for the 
registration?
Yes   
No  
I had it in the past, but not anymore 
 
Period of Compliance  From :                    To 
   
 
Part 5 - Contract enforcement and Property Rights  
 
5.01 Have you ever had problems or disputes over your business? For example, Partners who did not respect the contract, clients who did not pay, employee who stole goods, problem 
with other traders or business neighbors, etc? 
Yes 
No 
5.02 If yes, Can you remember the most important disputes you had over your business since you started it? Please provide the following details 
 A- Type of problem B- Year C- Who did you have a 
dispute with?  
D- How did you try to solve it? E- Was it solved 
successfully? 
A Theft During Storage 
Theft during Transport 
Late delivery by suppliers 
Deficient quality of delivery by 
suppliers 
Late payments by clients 
Non-payment by clients 
Others 
 
 Employee 
Clients 
Suppliers 
Business Neighbor 
Unknown person 
Other (specify) 
I solved it on my own    
 I did not do anything  
 I went to the police 
I went to the gatekeeper 
I went to the area chief 
I went to the market chief     
I went to the community leader  
Jua Kali association  
Local vigilante group  
Others: 
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B Theft During Storage 
Theft during Transport 
Late delivery by suppliers 
Deficient quality of delivery by 
suppliers 
Late payments by clients 
Non-payment by clients 
Others 
 
 Employee 
Clients 
Suppliers 
Business Neighbor 
Unknown person 
Other (specify) 
  
I solved it on my own    
 I did not do anything  
 I went to the police 
I went to the gatekeeper 
I went to the area chief 
I went to the market chief     
I went to the community leader  
Jua Kali association  
Local vigilante group  
Others: 
 
 
C Theft During Storage 
Theft during Transport 
Late delivery by suppliers 
Deficient quality of delivery by 
suppliers 
Late payments by clients 
Non-payment by clients 
Others 
 
 Employee 
Clients 
Suppliers 
Business Neighbor 
Unknown person 
Other (specify) 
I solved it on my own    
 I did not do anything  
 I went to the police 
I went to the gatekeeper 
I went to the area chief 
I went to the market chief     
I went to the community leader  
Jua Kali association  
Local vigilante group  
Others: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.03 If you did not use any formal institution (police, courts, area chief), why have you not relied on these institutions?  (Spontaneous, multiple answers allowed) 
 My disputes were not that serious 
Other enforcement methods work better 
Too expensive 
I do not know the procedures 
It is too time-consuming 
It makes things worse 
I am not entitled to go to courts 
Fear of retaliation 
Others (specify)
 
6.0 My supervisor may need to contact you to confirm you have completed this interview. Would you mind giving me your phone number?  
 
+254………………………………………………………………..                                                            The questionnaire is finished, thank you for your time. 
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Appendix 2: Supply-side questionnaire (2012) 
 
FinAccess Business 
Supply-side Questionnaire 
Name of the bank:       
Bank’s activity:  Commercial,   Investment,  Corporate,  Retail,  Other. [Put an X (by 
double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response and specify if “Other”]. 
Bank’s ownership structure:  Private sector domestic,   Private sector foreign,  
Government/State, International Financial Institutions,  Other.  [Put an X (by double-clicking on 
the box) next to the appropriate response(s) and specify if “Other”]. 
Staff name (Overall coordinator) :       
Staff Title/Designation:       
Phone number:       
E-mail:       
 
INTRODUCTION 
The World Bank and Financial Sector Deepening Kenya in partnership with the Central Bank of Kenya 
are embarking on FinAccess Business - a study to analyze demand for and access to financial services 
for businesses in Kenya from both the demand and supply perspectives. The core idea of the supply 
side survey is to assess the development of the financing market for businesses in Kenya and identify 
constraints posed by the credit environment, regulations, and other obstacles. The results from the 
supply side survey will then be analyzed in relation to the demand side information derived from the 
World Bank’s Enterprise Survey and FinAccess Business demand side Survey to be conducted in 2012. 
More specifically, the study will: (i) assess the extent of banks’ involvement in the financing of 
businesses in Kenya, and (ii) offer concrete policy recommendations on how to reduce constraints to 
the supply of financial services to businesses. Similar studies by the World Bank and its partners have 
recently been concluded in South Africa and Nigeria, and are ongoing in Rwanda and Tanzania, using a 
similar methodology, in order to derive insights that may be relevant for the Sub-Saharan Africa region 
as a whole. Additional outputs of the study in Sub-Saharan Africa may include a regional issues paper. 
 FOCUS 
While this quantitative questionnaire is focused predominantly on credit to small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs), the FinAccess Business supply side study has been designed to provide information on the a 
wide range of financial products (credit, equity, factoring, leasing etc.) for the entire spectrum of 
businesses: Micro, Small, Medium and Large Businesses. This questionnaire is designed to address 
five broad areas:  
(i) the extent of the financial institutions’ involvement with SMEs and micro-enterprises, 
(ii) determinants of SME and micro-enterprise financing, 
(iii) SME financing business models - including products and credit risk management,  
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(iv) characteristics of SMEs and micro-enterprises currently being targeted by financial 
institutions, and  
(v) the impact of various obstacles (credit environment, regulations, and other issues) on SME 
and micro-enterprise financing. 
 
Different parts of the questionnaire could be better answered by different managers of your bank. 
Section I (Involvement with SMEs and micro-enterprises) could be better answered by the bank’s 
general manager, or the SME and micro-enterprise business managers (if applicable). Section II (Bank’s 
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) Business Model and Procedures) could be better answered 
by the SME/micro-enterprise business manager and the credit risk manager. The questionnaire is 
focused on credit to SMEs but, where appropriate, please distinguish your responses by micro-
enterprises (MIs), small enterprises (SEs) and medium enterprises (MEs).   
 
The questionnaire includes questions in blue and black. Questions in blue include numerical data 
requests. If the precise numerical data are not available, please provide an approximation/estimate and 
indicate so. Questions in black are perception related questions. Any additional information or comments 
related to the questions in the survey should be included below the relevant question next to “Notes”. 
Since the questionnaire has been prepared for banks, some questions may not be applicable for non-
bank financial institutions.  
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I. Involvement with SME and Micro-enterprise Financing 
 
This section tries to understand the extent of the bank’s involvement with micro, small and 
medium enterprises/businesses and the reasons behind it. The questions in this section should be 
addressed to the bank’s general manager or the SME and micro-enterprise managers. 
 
a) Assessing the bank’s involvement with SMEs and micro-
enterprises 
 
1. Does the bank currently have SMEs and/or micro-enterprises among its clients? [Put an 
X (by double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response.] 
 Only SMEs  
 Only micro-enterprises 
 Both SMEs and micro-enterprises 
 None of the above 
Notes:       
 
Note If your institution deals only with SMEs or only with micro-enterprises, 
please skip the sections in the next questions that are not applicable to your 
institution.  
 
 
2. Provide your bank’s definition criteria for a micro enterprise (MI), small enterprise (SE), 
medium enterprise (ME), and large enterprise (LE). [Put an X (by double-clicking on the 
box) next to the appropriate criteria and complete it.] 
 MI SE ME LE 
Enterprise with total 
annual 
revenue/turnover: 
 From       
to       KSh 
 From       to 
      KSh 
 From       
to       KSh 
 From       
to       KSh 
Loan size:  From       
to       KSh 
 From       to 
      KSh 
 From       
to       KSh 
 From       
to       KSh 
Enterprise with total 
employees: 
 From       
to       
 From       to 
      
 From       
to       
 From       
to       
Other. 
Please specify:       
 From       
to       
 From       to 
      
 From       
to       
 From       
to       
Notes:       
 
 
3. Does the bank have a separate unit or department managing the banking relation with 
SMEs and/or micro-enterprises? [Put an X (by double-clicking on the box) next to the 
appropriate response.]  
 We have a SME department (but not a micro-enterprise department) 
 206 
 
 We have a micro-enterprise department (but not a SME department) 
 We have both a SME and a micro-enterprise department 
 We have none of the above 
a) If you have none of the above, please specify which unit oversees the banking relation 
with micro-enterprises and SMEs. 
 MI clients:       
 SME clients:       
b) If yes, please indicate the following:  
 Location of the SME and micro-enterprise units within the bank’s structure (i.e. indicate 
the division they belong to):  
SME Unit:          Micro-enterprise Unit:       
 Employees working in the SME and micro-enterprise units (as a percentage of the total 
number of employees in the bank:  
SME Unit        %   Micro-enterprise Unit:      % 
 Average years of experience of employees in the SME and micro-enterprise market 
segments) 
SME unit:         Micro-enterprise Unit:       
Notes:       
 
4. Please provide the data specified below.  If the data are not available for the specified 
periods, please provide the closest available and specify the relevant period.  If possible, 
provide data separately for MIs, SEs, MEs and LEs. If not available, provide data for the 
aggregate (SMEs).  
a) Contribution to bank’s net income (as 
a % of total net income). 
As of December 
2009   
As of December 
2011  
Target in 3 
years (if 
known) 
MIs contribution to bank’s net income         %       %       % 
SEs contribution to bank’s net income         %       %       % 
MEs contribution to bank’s net income       %       %       % 
LEs contribution to bank’s net income        %       %       % 
If the disaggregation between small and medium enterprises is not available, please provide 
details about the aggregate level (SME): 
SMEs contribution to bank’s net income       %       %       % 
b) Amount of loans outstanding.  Please 
express loans in KSH and specify units 
(thousands, millions, etc). 
As of December 
2009   
As of December 
2011  
Target in 3 
years (if 
known) 
Loans to MIs        KSH        KSH        KSH 
Loans to SEs         KSH        KSH        KSH 
Loans to MEs        KSH        KSH        KSH 
Loans to LEs        KSH        KSH        KSH 
If the disaggregation between small and medium enterprises is not available, please provide 
details about the aggregate level (SME): 
 207 
 
Loans to SMEs        KSH        KSH        KSH 
Total amount of loans outstanding at the 
bank 
       KSH        KSH        KSH 
c) Number of loans outstanding  As of December 
2009   
As of December 
2011  
Target in 3 
years (if 
known) 
Loans to MIs                        
Loans to SEs                          
Loans to MEs                        
Loans to LEs                         
If the disaggregation between small and medium enterprises is not available, please provide 
details about the aggregate level (SME): 
Loans to SMEs                         
Total amount of loans outstanding at the 
bank 
                        
d) Number of loan applications received  As of year 2009 As of year 2011  
Total number to MIs                  
Total number for SEs                  
Total number for MEs                  
Total number for LEs                  
If the disaggregation between small and medium enterprises is not available, please provide 
details about the aggregate level (SME): 
Total number for SMEs                  
Total number of applications received by the 
bank 
                 
e) Number of loan applications approved As of year 2009 As of year 2011  
Total number to MIs                  
Total number for SEs                  
Total number for MEs                  
Total number for LEs                  
If the disaggregation between small and medium enterprises is not available, please provide 
details about the aggregate level (SME): 
Total number for SMEs                  
Total number of applications received by the 
bank 
                 
f) Annual interest rate charged to the 
best (lower risk) customer for:  
As of December 
2009   
As of December 
2011  
 
Loans to MIs       %       %  
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Loans to SEs        %       %  
Loans to MEs       %       %  
Loans to LEs       %       %  
If the disaggregation between small and medium enterprises is not available, please provide 
details about the aggregate level (SME): 
Loans to SMEs       %       %  
g) Annual interest rate charged to the 
highest risk customer for:  
As of December 
2009   
As of December 
2011  
 
Loans to MIs       %       %  
Loans to SEs        %       %  
Loans to MEs       %       %  
Loans to LEs       %       %  
If the disaggregation between small and medium enterprises is not available, please provide 
details about the aggregate level (SME): 
Loans to SMEs       %       %  
h) Average maturity of loans As of December 
2009   
As of December 
2011  
 
Loans to MIs              
Loans to SEs                   
Loans to MEs              
Loans to LEs                  
If the disaggregation between small and medium enterprises is not available, please provide 
details about the aggregate level (SME): 
Loans to SMEs                  
i) Currency of SME loans As of December 
2009 
As of December 
2011  
 
% of total SME loans in local currency      %       %  
% of total SME loans in foreign currency      %       %  
j) Currency of MI (micro-enterprise) 
loans 
As of December 
2009 
As of December 
2011  
 
% of total micro-enterprise loans in local 
currency 
     %       %  
% of total micro-enterprise loans in foreign 
currency 
     %       %  
k) Purpose of SME loans As of December 
2009 
As of December 
2011  
 
Investment (% of total SME loans)             %  
Working Capital (% of total SME loans)             %  
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Other (e.g. trade) (% of total SME loans)             %  
l) Purpose of (MI) micro-enterprise 
loans ( answer only if your institution has a 
specialized micro-enterprise department) 
As of December 
2009 
As of December 
2011  
 
Investment (% of total MI loans)             %  
Working Capital (% of total MI loans)             %  
Other (e.g. trade) (% of total MI loans)             %  
m) Amount of non-performing loans 
(NPLs).  Please express amount in KSH and 
state the units (thousands, millions, etc.) 
As of December 
2009 
As of December 
2011 
 
NPLs to MIs        KSH        KSH  
NPLs to SEs        KSH        KSH  
NPLs to MEs        KSH        KSH  
NPLs to LEs        KSH        KSH  
If the disaggregation between small and medium enterprises is not available, please provide 
details about the aggregate level (SME): 
NPLs to SMEs        KSH        KSH  
Total amount of NPLs at the bank        KSH        KSH  
n) Value of deposits.  Please express 
deposits in KSH and specify units (thousands, 
millions, etc). 
As of December 
2009   
As of December 
2011  
Target in 3 
years (if 
known) 
Deposits of MIs         KSH        KSH        KSH 
Deposits of SEs         KSH        KSH        KSH 
Deposits of MEs        KSH        KSH        KSH 
Deposits of LEs        KSH        KSH        KSH 
If the disaggregation between small and medium enterprises is not available, please provide 
details about the aggregate level (SME): 
Deposits of SMEs        KSH        KSH        KSH 
Total amount of deposits held in the bank        KSH        KSH        KSH 
o) Number of branches  As of December 
2009 
As of December 
2011 
Target in 3 
years (if 
known) 
Branches serving MIs                          
Branches serving SEs                          
Branches serving MEs                         
If the disaggregation between small and medium enterprises is not available, please provide 
details about the aggregate level (SME): 
Branches serving SMEs                         
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Total number of bank branches                         
p) Number of loan officers As of December 
2009 
As of December 
2011 
Target in 3 
years (if 
known) 
Loan officers serving MIs                         
Loan officers serving SEs                         
Loan officers serving MEs                         
If the disaggregation between small and medium enterprises is not available, please provide 
details about the aggregate level (SME): 
Loan officers serving SMEs    
Total number of loan officers working at the 
bank 
                        
q) Number of female loan officers As of December 
2009 
As of December 
2011 
Target in 3 
years (if 
known) 
Female loan officers serving MIs                         
Female loan officers serving SEs                         
Female loan officers serving MEs                         
If the disaggregation between small and medium enterprises is not available, please provide 
details about the aggregate level (SME): 
Loan officers serving SMEs                         
Total number of loan officers working at the 
bank 
                        
Total number of female loan officers working 
at the bank 
                        
Notes:       
 
 
5. Do you offer the following lending products to SMEs and micro-enterprises? [Put an X 
(by double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response and specify their 
number and amount for the period between December 2010 and December 2011] 
  SMEs Micro-enterprises (if 
applicable) 
 Loans for working 
capital.   
Number:      .  Amount:        
KSH 
Number:      .  Amount:        
KSH 
 Loans for investment.  Number:      .  Amount:        
KSH 
Number:      .  Amount:        
KSH 
 Asset based loans and 
property loans.   
Number:      .  Amount:        
KSH 
Number:      .  Amount:        
KSH 
 Credit lines.   Number:      .  Amount:        
KSH 
Number:      .  Amount:        
KSH 
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 Unsecured overdrafts.   Number:      .  Amount:        
KSH 
Number:      .  Amount:        
KSH 
 Business credit cards.   Number:      .  Amount:        
KSH 
Number:      .  Amount:        
KSH 
 Trade financing.   Number:      .  Amount:        
KSH 
Number:      .  Amount:        
KSH 
 Leasing.   Number:      .  Amount:        
KSH 
Number:      .  Amount:        
KSH 
 Factoring.   Number:      .  Amount:        
KSH 
Number:      .  Amount:        
KSH 
 Other, please specify: 
     .   
Number:      .  Amount:        
KSH 
Number:      .  Amount:        
KSH 
Notes:       
 
 
6. Of the revenues that SMEs and micro-enterprises currently generate, please indicate the 
breakdown (in percent).  If the exact breakdown is not available, please include an 
estimate and indicate this next to “Notes”. 
  SMEs Micro-enterprises (if 
applicable) 
 Credit:                                                        %       % 
 Deposit/account management:                      %       % 
 Other transactions & fee based 
services:  
      %       % 
 Total revenue:                                    100% 100 % 
 If different for SEs and MEs, 
provide figures separately.  
      % --- 
Notes:       
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b) Profile of businesses receiving loans 
 
 
 7. Sectoral distribution of MSME lending.  If possible, please provide data on the volumes 
of lending in each sector separately for MIs, SEs and MEs for the period between 
December 2010 and December 2011. If the distinction between small and medium 
enterprises is not available, provide data for the aggregate level (SMEs). 
  MIs SEs MEs  
 
If the 
disaggregation 
between small 
and medium 
enterprises is 
not available, 
please provide 
details about 
the aggregate 
level (SME): 
SMEs 
 Agriculture       KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Manufacturing        KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Real Estate        KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Building and 
Construction  
      KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Trade       KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Transport & 
Communication 
      KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Restaurant, 
hotel and 
tourism  
      KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Finance and 
business 
Services 
      KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Energy and 
Water 
      KSh       KSh       KSh       Ksh 
 Mining and 
Quarrying 
      KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Total:       KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
Notes:       
 
 
 
 8. Legal Status of businesses with a loan account at your institutions.  If possible, please 
provide the percentages for MIs, SEs and MEs. If the distinction between small and 
medium enterprises is not available, provide data for the aggregate level (SMEs). 
  MIs SEs MEs  
 
If the 
disaggregation 
between small 
and medium 
SMEs 
 Private limited 
companies  
      %       %       %       % 
 Public limited 
companies 
      %       %       %       % 
 Branch offices of 
companies 
      %       %       %       % 
 213 
 
registered 
outside Kenya 
enterprises is 
not available, 
please provide 
details about 
the aggregate 
level (SME): 
 Partnerships       %       %       %       % 
 Sole 
proprietorships 
      %       %       %       % 
 Co-operatives       %       %       %       % 
Notes:       
 
 
 
 9. Please indicate the volumes of MSME lending in each Kenyan province (in KSh). If 
possible, please provide data separately for MIs, SEs and MEs. If the distinction 
between small and medium enterprises is not available, provide data for the aggregate 
level (SMEs). 
  MIs SEs MEs  
 
If the 
disaggregation 
between small 
and medium 
enterprises is 
not available, 
please provide 
details about 
the aggregate 
level (SME): 
SMEs 
 Central       KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Coast       KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Eastern       KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Nairobi       KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 North Eastern       KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Nyanza       KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Rift Valley       KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Western       KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Total       KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 
 
10. Of the businesses that have a loan account at your institution, what is the average 
number of years that have elapsed since they acquired a certificate of registration? If 
possible, please provide data separately for MIs, SEs and MEs. If the distinction between 
small and medium enterprises is not available, provide data for the aggregate level 
(SMEs). 
  MIs SEs MEs If the disaggregation 
between small and 
medium enterprises is not 
available, please provide 
details about the 
aggregate level (SME): 
SMEs 
 Average age of 
businesses with 
loan accounts 
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11. Which documents do you require from businesses in the loan application process? Please 
tick the correct answers for micro, small and medium enterprises. If the documents are 
not listed in the table, please add them in the left column and tick where appropriate.   
  MIs SEs MEs 
 Certificate of registration                                                     
  Single business permit    
 Registration of the 
business at the KRA:  
   
  Other documents. 
Please specify       
   
 Other documents (2). 
Please specify       
   
 Other documents (3). 
Please specify       
   
Notes:       
 
 
12. If your bank has both a micro-enterprise and a SME department, please provide 
data on the percentage of businesses that have “graduated” from micro-enterprise to 
SME finance if that information is available.     
            
                 % 
Notes:       
 
13. If your bank has a micro-enterprise department, please provide data on the 
percentage of businesses that have “graduated” from group lending to individual lending 
if that information is available.     
            
               % 
Notes:       
 
 
b) Determinants of the bank’s involvement with SMEs and micro-
enterprises 
 
14. To what degree is SME and micro-enterprise lending driven by the following in your 
bank? [Put an X under the appropriate column.]   
 For SMEs For Micro-enterprises 
(if applicable) 
Returns (profitability in the SME/micro-
enterprise segments) 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
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Intense competition for large enterprises / SMEs  Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
Intense competition for retail customers  Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
Excessive exposure to large enterprises/SMEs  Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
Excessive exposure to retail customers sector  Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
Supply chain links (possibility to seek out 
SMEs/micro-enterprises through existing 
relations with large clients) 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
Cross selling (selling a variety of products to the 
SME/micro-enterprise customers) 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
Structural changes in the market as a result of 
socio-economic development that have 
generated new opportunities 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
Growth prospects in the segment over the next 
years 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
Contributing to the economic development of 
the country 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
Availability of donor (e.g. World Bank or IFC) 
credit lines for SME lending 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
Others (specify) 
      
      
      
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very significant 
Notes:       
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15. Indicate to what degree the following factors are important obstacles to your exposure to 
SMEs and micro-enterprises. Rate [by putting an X in the appropriate column under 
each heading] and specify up to the 3 most important aspects within these categories. 
Please provide further explanations if this could be helpful for understanding the issue 
under the ‘Notes’ field.  
 For SMEs For micro-
enterprises (if 
applicable) 
Macroeconomic (economy-wide) factors 
E.g. macroeconomic instability, high interest rates, 
exchange rate risk, etc. 
 
Please, specify whether macro-economic factors are 
significant obstacles to SMEs and micro-enterprise 
finance and list up to 3 most important factors (from 
examples above or any other factors that might be 
relevant).  
Notes:       
 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very 
significant 
 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very 
significant 
Please, list up to 
3 macro-
economic factors 
affecting SMEs. 
      
      
      
Please, list up to 
3 macro-
economic factors 
affecting micro-
enterprises. 
      
      
      
Legal and regulatory framework affecting 
financial institutions 
E.g. collateral law, capital requirements, loan 
classification regulations, regulations regarding 
documents required from borrowers to qualify for 
loans, anti-money laundering (AML) regulations, etc.   
Please, specify whether the legal and regulatory 
framework is a significant obstacle to SME and micro-
enterprise finance and list up to 3 most important 
factors (from examples above or any other factors that 
might be relevant). 
Notes:       
 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very 
significant 
 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very 
significant 
Please, list up to 
3 factors affecting 
SMEs. 
      
      
      
Please, list up to 
3 factors affecting 
micro-
enterprises. 
      
      
      
Contractual environment 
E.g. contract enforcement, judicial efficiency, etc. 
 
 
Please, specify whether the contractual environment is 
a significant obstacle to SME and micro-enterprise 
finance and list up to 3 most important factors (from 
examples above or any other factors that might be 
relevant). 
Notes:       
 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very 
significant 
 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very 
significant 
Please, list up to 
3 factors affecting 
SMEs. 
      
      
      
Please, list up to 
3 factors affecting 
micro-
enterprises. 
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Bank specific factors 
E.g. lack of interest at the bank, limited geographic 
coverage, lack of appropriate information technology 
tools (scoring and rating models), lack of knowledge on 
how to evaluate MSMEs, difficulty in designing 
appropriate products, high collateral requirements, etc. 
Please, specify whether the bank specific factors are a 
significant obstacle to SME and micro-enterprise 
finance and list up to 3 most important factors (from 
examples above or any other factors that might be 
relevant). 
Notes:       
 
 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very 
significant 
 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very 
significant 
Please, list up to 
3 factors affecting 
SMEs. 
      
      
      
Please, list up to 
3 factors affecting 
micro-
enterprises. 
      
      
      
SME/Micro-enterprise specific factors 
E.g. poor quality of financial statements, inability of 
MSMEs to manage risk, informality, lack of adequate 
collateral, etc. 
 
Please, specify whether the SME/micro-enterprise 
specific factors are a significant obstacle to enterprise 
finance and list up to 3 most important factors (from 
examples above or any other factors that might be 
relevant). 
Notes:       
 
 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very 
significant 
 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very 
significant 
Please, list up to 
3 factors affecting 
SMEs. 
      
      
      
Please, list up to 
3 factors affecting 
micro-
enterprises. 
      
      
      
Characteristics of SME/micro-enterprise lending  
E.g. high fixed costs per transaction (relative to loan 
size), difficulty in standardizing products and 
procedures, difficulty in attaining scale economies, etc.  
 
Please, specify whether the characteristics of 
SME/micro-enterprise lending are a significant obstacle 
to enterprise finance and list up to 3 most important 
factors (from examples above or any other factors that 
might be relevant). 
Notes:       
 
 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very 
significant 
 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very 
significant 
Please, list up to 
3 factors affecting 
SMEs. 
      
      
      
Please, list up to 
3 factors affecting 
micro-
enterprises. 
      
      
      
Competition in the SME/micro-enterprise 
segment 
E.g. presence of public banks, presence of niche 
players, overall narrow margins, etc. 
 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very 
significant 
 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very 
significant 
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Please, specify whether competition in the SME/micro-
enterprise segment is a significant obstacle to SME and 
micro-enterprise finance and list up to 3 most 
important factors (from examples above or any other 
factors that might be relevant). 
Notes:       
 
Please, list up to 
3 factors affecting 
SMEs. 
      
      
      
Please, list up to 
3 factors affecting 
micro-
enterprises. 
      
      
      
Lack of adequate demand 
E.g. lack of sufficient demand, there is demand but 
from customers that are not credit worthy, etc. 
Please, specify whether lack of adequate demand a 
significant obstacle to SME and micro-enterprise 
finance and list up to 3 most important factors (from 
examples above or any other factors that might be 
relevant). 
Notes:       
 
 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very 
significant 
 
 Not significant 
  Significant 
  Very 
significant 
Please, list up to 
3 factors affecting 
SMEs. 
      
      
      
Please, list up to 
3 factors affecting 
micro-
enterprises. 
      
      
      
Notes:       
 
16. Provide your assessment of the risk, profitability and cost of SME loans relative to the LE 
loans.  
 SME loans are less … 
than LE loans 
SME loans are equally … 
as compared to LE loans 
SME loans are more … 
than LE loans 
Profitable    
Risky    
Costly    
Notes:       
 
17. Provide your assessment of the risk, profitability and cost of micro-enterprise loans 
relative to the SME loans (answer only if applicable).  
 Micro-enterprise 
loans are less … than 
SME loans 
Micro-enterprise loans 
are equally … as 
compared to SME loans 
Micro-enterprise loans 
are more … than SME 
loans 
Profitable    
Risky    
Costly    
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18. If the following categories of government programs are offered in Kenya, please comment 
on the effect that these have on your decision to lend to SMEs and micro-enterprises. 
[Put an X next to the appropriate response].  
 SMEs Micro-enterprises (if applicable) 
Interest 
subsidies: 
 Positive 
 Negative 
 Inconsequential 
 Positive 
 Negative 
 Inconsequential 
Guarantees:  Positive 
 Negative 
 Inconsequential 
 Positive 
 Negative 
 Inconsequential 
Directed credit 
programs: 
 Positive 
 Negative 
 Inconsequential 
 Positive 
 Negative 
 Inconsequential 
Regulatory 
subsidies (like 
lower provisions): 
 Positive 
 Negative 
 Inconsequential 
 Positive 
 Negative 
 Inconsequential 
Other Please 
specify:       
 Positive 
 Negative 
 Inconsequential 
 Positive 
 Negative 
 Inconsequential 
Notes:       
 
 
19. To what extent do you lend to SMEs and micro-enterprise based on government 
programs? (e.g. on behalf of the government through the SME fund/Women’s fund/Youth 
Fund or other government programs targeting micro, small and medium enterprises) 
[Put an X (by double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response.] 
 Relevance for SMEs  Relevance for Micro-enterprises (if applicable) 
 Extremely significant  Extremely significant 
 Very significant  Very significant 
 Significant  Significant 
 Marginally significant  Marginally significant 
 Not significant  Not significant 
 If at all significant, please indicate 
the percentage of SME loans that 
are based on government 
programs:       
 If at all significant, please indicate the percentage 
of SME loans that are based on government 
programs:       
Notes:       
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20. How do prudential regulations (capital requirements, regulations concerning loan 
classification, etc.) affect your involvement with SMEs and micro-enterprises? [Put an X 
(by double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response.] 
 SMEs  Micro-enterprises (if applicable) 
 Positively  Positively 
 Negatively  Negatively 
 Inconsequential  Inconsequential 
 Please explain:        Please explain:       
Notes:       
 
 
21. Give your impression of the burden posed by regulatory documentation requirements (if 
any) for lending to MSMEs. [Put an X (by double-clicking on the box) next to the 
appropriate response.] 
 SMEs  Micro-enterprises (if applicable) 
 Excessive for almost all products  Excessive for almost all products 
 Excessive only for some products 
If so, explain which ones:       
 Excessive only for some products 
If so, explain which ones:       
 Appropriate and beneficial  Appropriate and beneficial 
 Inconsequential   Inconsequential  
 Other, please specify:        Other, please specify:       
Notes:       
 
 
22. Are there issues in registering collateral that inhibit secured lending to MSMEs? [Put an X 
(by double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response.]  
 Yes.  Please explain:       
 No 
Notes:       
 
23. Are there issues in enforcing (seizing) collateral for MSME lending? [Put an X (by double-
clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response.] 
 Yes.  Please explain:       
 No 
Notes:       
 
24. Do any tax related issues affect your appetite for MSME lending? [Put an X (by double-
clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response.] 
 Yes, positively  
 Yes, negatively  
 No 
 Please explain:       
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Notes:       
 
25. Do you use a credit registry or credit bureau as part of the MSME loan analysis process? 
[Put an X (by double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response.] 
 Yes 
 No 
 Only for SMEs (not for micro-enterprises) 
a) Are credit bureaus effective at facilitating MSME lending in your bank? [Put an X (by 
double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response.] 
 Yes 
 No 
 If the service provided by the credit bureaus needs to be improved, explain how:       
Notes:       
 
26. Do you think the government could increase the appeal of SME and micro-enterprises 
lending through actions in the following areas? [Put an X (by double-clicking on the box) 
next to the appropriate response and explain how.]  
 Legal 
 
 Regulatory 
 
 Institutional 
 
 Guarantees 
 
 Subsidies 
 
 Credit bureaus 
 
 Judicial 
 
 Other, please specify:       
 
Notes:       
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27. How would you qualify the impact, if any, of development finance institutions on your 
appetite for micro-enterprises and SME lending? [Put an X (by double-clicking on the 
box) next to the appropriate response.] 
 SMEs  Micro-enterprises 
 Positive  Positive 
 Negative  Negative 
 Inconsequential  Inconsequential 
 Please explain:        Please explain:       
Notes:       
 
c) MSME market 
 
28. What is your view on the size and prospects for the SME and micro-enterprise markets 
in general, not just for your bank? [Put an X (by double-clicking on the box) next to the 
appropriate response.] 
  SME market Micro-enterprise 
market 
 The market is small and prospects are bleak    
 The market is small but prospects are good   
 The market is big but prospects are bleak   
 The market is big and prospects are good   
 Other, please specify:         
Notes:       
 
29. In your opinion, which segment of the private sector has the most promising growth 
prospects over the next five years? [Put an X (by double-clicking on the box) next to the 
appropriate response.] 
 The micro-enterprise segment  
 The small-enterprise segment 
 The medium-enterprise segment 
 The corporate segment (large enterprises) 
Notes:       
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30. What is the market structure of the SME and micro-enterprise loan market in Kenya? 
[Put an X (by double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response.] 
  SME loan 
market 
Micro-
enterprise loan 
market 
 A small number of financial institutions (e.g. 2 or 3) 
dominate the market 
  
 The market is very segmented (e.g. there is a small 
number of banks with national reach and a large number of 
regional (i.e. East African/Sub Saharan African) or sector 
specific players) 
  
 The market is atomized (many players are active and 
target similar MSMEs) 
  
 Other, please specify:         
Notes:       
 
31. Have there been significant changes in the market for bank lending to MSMEs in terms of 
competition, consolidation, and entry during the last five years? [Put an X (by double-
clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response.] 
 Yes 
 No 
 If yes, please explain:       
Notes:       
 
32. Who are the main players in SME and micro-enterprise financing? [Put an X (by 
double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response(s).] 
 In the SME market  In the micro-enterprise market 
 Small banks   Small banks  
 Large banks   Large banks  
 Niche banks (microfinance banks, 
region specific, sector specific) 
 Niche banks (microfinance banks, region 
specific, sector specific) 
 Public financial institutions  Public financial institutions 
 Deposit taking microfinance institutions 
(DTMs) 
 Deposit taking microfinance institutions 
(DTMs) 
 Credit-only microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) 
 Credit-only microfinance institutions (MFIs) 
 Saving and credit cooperatives 
(SACCOs) 
 Saving and credit cooperatives (SACCOs) 
 Other non-bank financial institutions, 
please specify:       
 Other non-bank financial institutions, please 
specify:       
 Other, please specify:        Other, please specify:       
Notes:       
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II. Bank’s SME/micro-enterprise Business Models and Procedures  
 
 
This section tries to understand the bank’s business model for the SME and micro-enterprise 
segments and how the bank organizes itself to provide financing to businesses, reduce the costs of 
financing MSMEs, and mitigate the associated risks. 
 
a) Marketing  
The questions in this section need to be addressed to the MI and SME manager(s). 
33. Does the bank have a sector-specific focus in dealing with MI and/or SMEs? [Put an X (by 
double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response.] 
 Yes, we have a sector-specific focus for both microenterprises and SMEs 
 Yes, we have a sector-specific focus for SMEs (but not for micro-enterprises) 
 Yes, we have a sector-specific focus for micro-enterprises (but not for SMEs) 
 No, we do not have a sector-specific focus 
a) If you have a sector-specific focus, what are the top sectors pursued?  
 For SMEs            For Micro-enterprises        
b) Are any of the top sectors pursued by your bank supported/promoted by the Government 
(either through government subsidized programs, direct credit or other government programs)?   
  
Notes:       
 
34. Does the bank have a specific geographic focus in dealing with MI/SMEs? [Put an X (by 
double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response.] 
 Yes 
 No 
 If yes, please explain        
Notes:       
 
35. Which particular criteria does the bank use to determine the MIs, SEs and MEs it will 
target? [Rank the top 3 among the following (1= most important, 2= second most 
important, 3= third most important)] 
 MIs SEs MEs 
Company size     
Geographic area where 
enterprise operates  
   
Industry sector to which 
enterprise belongs 
   
Product needs    
Expected profitability    
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Exposure size    
Credit quality    
Previous/longstanding 
banking relation 
   
Other, please specify:          
Notes:       
 
 
36. How much reaching out to SMEs and micro-enterprises does the bank have to do? [Put 
an X (by double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response.] 
 The bank reaches out only to SMEs because their demand for our lending products is weak 
 The bank reaches out only to micro-enterprises because their demand for our lending 
products is weak 
 The demand for the bank’s lending products is strong, but we still do a fair amount of reaching 
out to both SMEs and micro-enterprises  
 Demand for the bank’s lending products is strong, so we don’t actively seek clients by 
reaching out to them  
 Other, please specify:       
Notes:       
 
37. What types of distribution channels does your bank have which are important for 
relations with SME and micro-enterprise clients? [Put an X (by double-clicking on the 
box) next to the appropriate response(s)] 
  SMEs Micro-enterprises (if 
applicable) 
 Own branches    
 Mobile branches    
 ATMs   
 Points of sale   
 Agents (post office, retail 
outlets, other non-bank 
entities)  
  
 Internet banking   
 Self service (automated 
banking) 
  
 Phone banking   
 Other. Please specify:   
Notes:       
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b) Products  
The questions in this section need to be addressed to the MI and  SME manager(s). 
38. Please provide information on the breakdown of your top three loan products (e.g. 
overdrafts, lines of credit, leasing, etc.) by enterprise type (enter the % that each loan 
product represents out of the total portfolio by type of enterprise). 
Loan products MIs SMEs LEs  
1.         % of total MI 
lending 
      % of total SE 
lending 
      % of total LE 
lending 
2.         % of total MI 
lending 
      % of total SE 
lending 
      % of total LE 
lending 
3.         % of total MI 
lending 
      % of total SE 
lending 
      % of total LE 
lending 
Notes:       
 
 
39. What type and amount of fees did your bank charge on loans of the following type as of 
December 2011? If data are not available for December 2011, please provide the closest 
possible and specify the date. (Please indicate with a Yes or No in each cell; and if the 
response is yes, enter amount charged on a representative loan expressed in KSH or as a 
percentage of loan amount).   
 Loans to MIs  Loans to SMEs  Loans to LEs 
Flat fee   No  
 Yes. 
 Fee amount:       
KSH 
 No  
 Yes.  
Fee amount:       KSH 
 No  
 Yes.  
Fee amount:       KSH 
Fee expressed 
as a % of loan 
amount 
 No  
 Yes.   
Fee amount:       
% of loan  
Representative loan 
amount:       KSH 
 No  
 Yes.   
Fee amount:       % 
of loan  
Representative loan 
amount:       KSH 
 No  
 Yes.  
Fee amount:       % of 
loan 
Representative loan 
amount:       KSH 
Other fees 
(specify) 
      
      
Fee amount:        
Type of fee. Please 
describe:        
Representative loan 
amount:       KSH 
Fee amount:         
Type of fee. Please 
describe:        
Representative loan 
amount:       KSH 
Fee amount:        
Type of fee. Please 
describe:        
 Representative loan 
amount:       KSH 
 Notes:       
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40. What type and amount of fees did your bank charge on loans of the following type as of 
December 2009? If data are not available for December 2009, please provide the closest 
possible and specify the date. (Please indicate with a Yes or No in each cell; and if the 
response is yes, enter amount charged on a representative loan expressed in KSH or as a 
percentage of loan amount).   
 Loans to MIs  Loans to SMEs  Loans to LEs 
Flat fee   No  
 Yes. 
 Fee amount:       
KSH 
 No  
 Yes.  
Fee amount:       KSH 
 No  
 Yes.  
Fee amount:       KSH 
Fee expressed 
as a % of loan 
amount 
 No  
 Yes.   
Fee amount:       
% of loan  
Representative loan 
amount:       KSH 
 No  
 Yes.   
Fee amount:       % 
of loan  
Representative loan 
amount:       KSH 
 No  
 Yes.  
Fee amount:       % of 
loan 
Representative loan 
amount:       KSH 
Other fees 
(specify) 
      
      
Fee amount:        
Type of fee. Please 
describe:        
Representative loan 
amount:       KSH 
Fee amount:         
Type of fee. Please 
describe:        
Representative loan 
amount:       KSH 
Fee amount:        
Type of fee. Please 
describe:        
 Representative loan 
amount:       KSH 
Notes:       
 
 
41. How do you mitigate costs of MSME loans?  
      
 
Notes:       
 
42. Do you offer the following saving products to SMEs and micro-enterprises? [Put an X (by 
double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response(s).] 
 SMEs  Micro-enterprises 
 Cheque accounts  Cheque accounts 
 Savings accounts   Savings accounts  
 Time deposit accounts  Time deposit accounts 
 Other, please specify:        Other, please specify:       
Notes:       
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43. Do you offer the following transaction and fee based services to SMEs and micro-
enterprises? [Put an X (by double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response(s).] 
. 
Loan products SMEs Micro-
enterprises 
Cash management   
Payroll and pensions/retirement payments   
Other payment services   
Foreign Exchange   
Business training, technical training, coaching    
Outsourced back office facilities (e.g. accounting or 
book-keeping)  
  
Other, please specify:         
Notes:       
 
 
44. Do you offer any services to your SME and micro-enterprise clients for free? [Put an X 
(by double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response.] 
 Yes 
 No 
If yes, please specify which services you offer for free 
 To SMEs   To Micro-enterprises (if applicable) 
 Payment services  Payment services 
 Business training, technical training, 
coaching  
 Business training, technical training, 
coaching  
 Outsourced back office facilities (e.g. 
accounting or book-keeping)  
 Outsourced back office facilities (e.g. 
accounting or book-keeping)  
 Other, please specify:        Other, please specify:       
Notes:       
 
45. List the main non-lending products you offer to Micro-enterprises and SMEs ranked from 
the most profitable to the least profitable.  
 SMEs Micro-enterprises 
1.    
2.   
3.   
4.   
5.   
Notes:       
 229 
 
 
46. Has there been a change between 2009 and 2011 in the products you offer to MSMEs? [Put 
an X (by double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response.] 
 Yes 
 No 
a) If yes, please specify how [put an X (by double-clicking on the box) next to the 
appropriate response(s)] and list affected products. 
 Elimination of products. List products: 
 Offering of new products. List products: 
 Relative importance of some products has declined.  List products: 
 Relative importance of some products has increased.  List products: 
Notes:       
 
47. Indicate the most relevant statement regarding the standardization of your MSME products. 
[Put an X (by double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response.] 
 MIs are mostly offered standardized products 
 MIs are mostly offered tailored products 
 MIs are offered a similar proportion of standardized and tailored products 
 SEs are mostly offered standardized products 
 SEs are mostly offered tailored products 
 SEs are offered a similar proportion of standardized and tailored products 
 MEs are mostly offered standardized products 
 MEs are mostly offered tailored products 
 MEs are offered a similar proportion of standardized and tailored products 
 Other, please specify:       
Notes:       
 
 
c) Credit risk management process 
The questions in this section need to be addressed to the bank’s credit risk manager. 
 
48. How is the credit risk management function for loan origination organized in your bank? 
[Put an X (by double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response(s).] 
  For SMEs For Micro-
enterprises (if 
applicable) 
 Risk management is separated from sales 
(different persons) 
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 Risk management and sales are performed by 
the same person/group 
  
 Risk management is largely automated (e.g. 
through scoring) 
  
 Risk management is mostly done by a credit risk 
analyst 
  
 Risk management is done primarily from 
headquarters 
  
 Risk management is done primarily at the branch 
level 
  
 Other, please specify:         
Notes:       
 
49. Does your bank have any of the following credit limits for the approval of SME and micro-
enterprise loans? [Put an X (by double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate 
response(s).] 
  For SMEs For Micro-
enterprises (if 
applicable) 
 Yes, limits exist for the overall bank portfolio    
 Yes, limits exist per sector of activity    
 Yes, limits exist per lending product   
 Yes, limits exists per individual loan    
 No set limits exist   
 If no limits exist, please explain how the bank 
manages its credit risk:       
  
Notes:       
 
50. How would you qualify your bank’s involvement with SMEs and micro-enterprises in 
terms of loan origination and monitoring? [Put an X (by double-clicking on the box) next 
to the appropriate response(s). 
  For SMEs For Micro-
enterprises 
(if 
applicable) 
 The bank mainly approves loans through relationship lending 
(i.e. mostly based on soft information gathered by the loan 
officer through continuous, personalized direct contacts with the 
MSMEs, their owners, managers and the local community in 
which they operate).     
  
 The bank mainly approves loans through transactional 
technologies that facilitate arms-length lending (such as credit 
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scoring, standardized risk rating tools and processes, factoring, 
leasing, etc).  
 The bank keeps a close relationship with clients to monitor loans 
(e.g. through post approval site visits, continuous interaction 
with client, frequent reporting requirements, etc).    
  
 The bank relies more on automatically generated preventive 
indicators/triggers for monitoring purposes than on a continuous 
personalized direct contacts with the client.  
  
 Other.  Please explain:         
Notes:       
 
51. Does your bank use scoring models to approve loans to SMEs and micro-enterprises? 
[Put an X (by double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response(s).] 
  For SMEs  For Micro-
enterprises 
 Yes, approval is completely done by scoring.  Please specify the 
loan range or size over which scoring is used to approve loans:  
 
from       to       KSH.     
 Yes, but scoring is only an input in loan decision.     
 Yes, but scoring is only used for certain products.  Please 
specify:       
  
 No, scoring plays no role in loan decision.   
Notes:       
 
52. If your bank uses scoring models, put an X (by double-clicking on the box) next to the 
appropriate response(s). 
  For SMEs  For Micro-
enterprises 
 The model is country specific   
 The model is sector specific    
 The variables used are mostly collected from credit bureaus    
 The variables used are mostly collected from other public 
sources  
  
 The variables used are mostly collected from internal sources    
 The variables used are submitted by the client   
 We score just the enterprise   
 We score just the owner    
 We score both the owner and their enterprise    
 Other, please specify:         
Notes:       
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53. Does the credit analysis rely on qualitative assessments? [Put an X (by double-clicking on 
the box) next to the appropriate response.] 
 Yes 
 No 
 Yes, but only for micro-enterprises 
 Yes, but only for SMEs 
a) If yes, does the bank use the following variables? [Put an X (by double-clicking on the 
box) next to the appropriate response(s).] 
 Rating the quality of (M)SME management 
 Strength, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis of the (M)SME  
 Viability of the business idea 
 Realistic assessment of market size and potential 
 Entrepreneurial character of the owner 
 Other, please specify:       
Notes:       
 
54. Does the credit analysis rely on quantitative assessments? [Put an X (by double-clicking on 
the box) next to the appropriate response.] 
 Yes 
 No 
 Yes, but only for micro-enterprises 
 Yes, but only for SMEs 
a) If yes, does the bank use one of the following? [Put an X (by double-clicking on the box) 
next to the appropriate response(s).] 
 Financial analysis of the (M)SME   
 Projected sector trends/indicators 
 Financial projections of the (M)SME 
 Financial analysis of the (M)SME owner(s) 
 Other, please specify:       
Notes:       
 
 
55. Please indicate how important for your bank the following factors are in making decisions 
regarding loans to the following types of enterprises.  Rank importance from 1 to 6 (1 
being the most important) for each type of enterprise.   If the disaggregation between SEs 
and MEs is not available, please specify the aggregate level (SME) 
 For MIs For SEs  For MEs For LEs   
If the 
disaggregati
For 
SMEs 
1. Collateral      
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2. Financial assessment 
of the business 
    on between 
small (SEs) 
and 
medium 
(MEs) 
enterprises 
is not 
available, 
please 
provide 
details about 
the 
aggregate 
level (SME): 
 
3. Enterprise’s credit 
history with your bank  
     
4. Enterprise’s credit 
history from a credit 
bureau 
     
5. Enterprise’s owner 
characteristics 
     
6. Other. Please specify:       
Notes:       
 
 
56. List and provide the following information for the main lending products offered to SMEs 
and micro-enterprises, ranked from the most profitable to the least profitable. (If 
different for SEs and MEs, specify.) 
 
 
 
 
 
For SMEs 
# of days to 
process a loan 
application  
Type of documentation 
needed to process a 
disbursement 
Collateral required as 
% of financing  
1.    
2.    
3.    
4.    
5.    
 
For micro-enterprises 
(if applicable) 
   
1.    
2.    
3.    
4.    
5.    
Notes:       
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57. Describe collateral requirements across segments. Fill each cell, separating MIs, SEs, MEs 
and LEs if possible. 
 
 
 
 
Segments 
Do you 
require 
collateral?   
Percentage of 
loans requiring 
collateral (i.e. 
percentage of 
the portfolio 
that is 
collateralized) 
For a 
representative 
loan, what is 
the ratio 
between 
collateral and 
loan value 
(i.e. the 
collateral 
required as % 
of financing)?  
Is movable 
collateral 
(excluding 
guarantees) 
acceptable?  
If the loan 
is secured 
by 
collateral, is 
the interest 
rate 
charged 
lower? 
MI loans      
SE loans      
ME loans      
LE loans      
If the disaggregation between small and medium enterprises is not available, please provide 
details about the aggregate level (SME): 
SME loans      
Notes:       
 
58. If collateral requirements are higher for MSMEs than for LEs, indicate which of the 
reasons below apply or list up to 3 other factors. [Put an X (by double-clicking on the 
box) next to the appropriate response(s).] 
  SMEs Micro-enterprises (if 
applicable) 
 They lack adequate financial information    
 They are more informal   
 They have worse management    
 They are harder to evaluate   
 They are harder to prosecute  (e.g. for civil 
suits for recovery on defaults) 
  
 Their collateral more difficult to seize in case 
of default 
  
 Other, please specify:         
 Other, please specify:         
 Other, please specify:         
Notes:       
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59. What types of assets are commonly used as collateral for lending to the following type of 
enterprises? Rank importance from 1 to 7 (with 1 being the most important) for each 
type of enterprise. 
 
 
For MIs For SEs For MEs  For LEs   
If the 
disaggregation 
between 
small (SEs) 
and medium 
(MEs) 
enterprises is 
not available, 
please provide 
details about 
the aggregate 
level (SME): 
For SMEs 
1.  Land      
2.  Equipment      
3.  Real estate      
4.  Livestock      
5.  Bank/personal 
guarantees 
     
6.  Cash and other 
liquid assets 
     
7. Household and 
business items 
(Chattels) 
      
8.  Other. Please 
specify: 
      
Notes:       
 
60. How do you mitigate risks of SME loans?  
      
 
Notes:       
 
61. Does the bank manage the credit exposure to MSMEs using a portfolio approach? [Put an 
X (by double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response.] 
 Yes 
 No 
a) If yes, does your bank seek portfolio diversification effect through any of the following? 
[Put an X (by double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response(s).] 
  For SMEs For Micro-enterprises (if 
applicable) 
 Sectoral location   
 Geographical location   
 Scale   
 Other, please specify:         
Notes:       
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c) Bad Loans Recovery 
 
62. After how many days is a non-serviced loan considered overdue for micro-enterprises and 
SMEs? If there are differences across products please specify.  
SMEs Micro-enterprises (if applicable) 
      days       days 
Notes:       
 
63. After how many days is a non-serviced loan moved to non-accrual for micro-enterprises 
and SMEs? If there are differences across products please specify. 
SMEs Micro-enterprises (if applicable) 
      days       days 
Notes:       
 
64. Do you have a dedicated SME and micro-enterprise loan recovery unit? [Put an X (by 
double-clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response.] 
For SMEs For Micro-enterprises (if applicable) 
 Yes  Yes 
 No  No 
Notes:       
 
65. Please provide the following data if available. If you do not keep track of these variables 
please indicate so. 
 MIs SEs MEs If the 
disaggregation 
between small 
and medium 
enterprises is 
not available, 
please provide 
details about 
the aggregate 
level (SME):: 
SMEs 
How long does it 
usually take to recover 
a non-performing 
loan? 
      
days 
       days        days        
days 
What is the typical 
share of recovery?  
      % 
of loan 
value 
      % of 
loan value 
      % of 
loan value 
     % of 
loan value 
What is the usual cost 
to recover? 
      % 
of loan 
value 
      % of 
loan value 
      % of 
loan value 
      % of 
loan value 
Notes:       
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Appendix 3: Supply-side questionnaire (2014) 
 
FAB14 Questionnaire 
 
Introduction 
The World Bank and Financial Sector Deepening Kenya (FSD Kenya) in partnership with the Central 
Bank of Kenya are embarking on a second round of FinAccess Business - a study to analyze the supply 
of financial services to Kenyan businesses. The core idea of the supply side survey is to assess the 
development of the financial services market for businesses in Kenya and identify constraints posed 
by the credit environment, regulations, and other obstacles. While the previous wave of the survey 
collected data on business lending as of December 2009 and December 2011, the current 
questionnaire focuses on data as of December 201392.  
A core result of this survey is to identify a standardized definition of microenterprises, SMEs and 
large businesses in order to facilitate the comparison of data across institutions and track changes 
in the market over time. Since banks are currently using different methods to classify their data, this 
survey requests banks to provide their own definition of microenterprises, SMEs and large 
enterprises. The last section of the questionnaire seeks your suggestions on the preferred approaches 
to define micro, small, medium and large enterprises from which a standardized new definition will 
be proposed for next year’s survey 2015. The new definition will be jointly agreed upon by CBK, FSD-
K and the financial institutions.   
This questionnaire will take approximately 30 to 40 minutes to be completed. Please note that your 
institution might be re-contacted in case of missing values or unclear\inconsistent answers. Kindly 
answer all questions with the maximum degree of accuracy.  
  
                                                          
92 The results from last year’s survey were published in a World Bank working paper comparing five African 
markets. The report is available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-6563  
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Name of the bank:       
Staff name:       
Staff Title:       
Phone number:       
E-mail:       
 
Definition of micro, small, medium and large enterprises 
1. DEFINITION STRATEGIES 
Provide your bank’s definition criteria for a micro enterprise (MI), small enterprise (SE), medium 
enterprise (ME), and large enterprise (LE). [Put an X (by clicking on the box) next to the 
appropriate criteria and complete it.] 
 MI SE ME LE 
Enterprise with 
total annual 
revenue/turnover: 
 From       to 
      KSh 
 From       to 
      KSh 
 From       
to       KSh 
 From       
to       KSh 
Loan size:  From       to 
      KSh 
 From       to 
      KSh 
 From       
to       KSh 
 From       
to       KSh 
Enterprise with 
total employees: 
 From       to 
      
 From       to 
      
 From       
to       
 From       
to       
Other. 
Please specify:  
 From       to 
      
 From       to 
      
 From       
to       
 From       
to       
 
2. NUMBER OF LOANS AND SIZE OF BUSINESS PORTFOLIOS IN 2013 
2.1. USING THE DEFINITION OF MICRO, SMALL, MEDIUM AND LARGE ENTERPRISE INDICATED IN QUESTION 
1, PLEASE INDICATE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF LOANS PROVIDED TO BUSINESSES AND TOTAL AMOUNT 
OUTSTANDING AS OF DECEMBER 2013 
Number of outstanding business loans (as of Dec 
2013) 
Total amount outstanding (as of Dec 2013) 
Number of loans to micro-enterprises 
(MI): 
Number 
      
Amount outstanding to micro-
enterprise: 
KES       
Number of loans to small- enterprises 
(SE): 
Number 
      
Amount outstanding to small-
enterprises: 
KES       
Number of loans to medium- enterprises 
(ME) 
Number 
      
Amount outstanding to medium-
enterprises: 
KES       
Number of loans to large- enterprises (LE)  
Number 
      
Amount outstanding to large-
enterprises: 
KES       
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DATA ACCURACY CHECK: ACCORDING TO THE DATA PROVIDED ABOVE, THE AVERAGE LOAN SIZE 
FOR EACH CATEGORY IS AS FOLLOWS: 
Micro [insert figure] 
Small [insert figure] 
Medium [insert figure] 
Large [insert figure] 
 
Comments (optional): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. CONTRIBUTION OF MICRO, SMALL, MEDIUM AND LARGE ENTERPRISE 
LENDING TO THE BANK’S INCOME.  
Contribution of business lending to 
bank’s income as of December 2013 
Value of 
interest 
income on 
loans and 
advances 
Value of fees 
and 
commissions 
on loans and 
advances 
Value of 
other fees 
and 
commissions’ 
income 
Micro-enterprises  KES       KES       KES       
Small-enterprises  KES       KES       KES       
Medium-enterprises  KES       KES       KES       
Large-enterprises contribution  KES       KES       KES       
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4. AVERAGE LOAN TERM (REPAYMENT PERIOD) OF BUSINESS LOANS (AS 
OF DECEMBER 2013) 
As of December 2013 
Average loan term of micro-enterprise loans Months       
Average loan term of small- enterprise  loans Months       
Average loan term of medium- enterprise  
loans 
Months       
Average loan term of large- enterprise loans Months       
 
5. ANNUAL AVERAGE INTEREST RATE CHARGED TO BEST (LOWEST RISK) 
BUSINESS CUSTOMERS (EXCLUDING BANK STAFF) 
As of December 2013 
Average interest rates on micro-enterprise loans  %       
Average interest rates on small- enterprise  loans  %       
Average interest rates on medium-enterprise loans %       
Average interest rates on large- enterprise loans  %       
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. LENDING PRODUCTS OFFERED AT YOUR INSTITUTIONS TO SMES AS OF 
DECEMBER 2013 
 
The total size of your SME portfolio is estimated at [insert value from question 2.1]. 
In this section, please provide the breakdown of your SME portfolio by primary product types. [Note 
that this question focuses on small and medium enterprises only (SMEs), not micro or large 
enterprises] 
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As of December 2013   % of total SME portfolio Number of loans 
Term loans (maturity below 24 
months) 
%       Number        
Term loans (maturity of 24 months 
and above) 
%       Number        
Trade finance loans (invoice 
discounting, LPO financing, supplier 
finance, guarantees, etc.) 
%       Number        
Overdrafts %       Number        
Asset financing (including leasing) %       Number        
Other 1 (specify)       
 
%       Number        
Other 2 (specify)       
 
%       Number        
 
Note: total should sum 
up to 100% 
 
 
7. DEPOSITS FROM BUSINESS CLIENTS 
Number and Value of deposits.  Please express 
deposits in KSH  
Number of Deposits 
accounts - As of 
December 2013   
Value of 
deposits- As of 
December 2013   
Deposits of micro-enterprises Number               KSH 
Deposits of small- enterprises  Number               KSH 
Deposits of medium-enterprises Number               KSH 
Deposits of large- enterprises Number               KSH 
 
8. PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE 
 
8.1 Please indicate the total value of NPLs in each loan size category (Note: NPLs are 
defined as per CBK definitions) 
Non-performing loans (NPLs).  Please 
express amount in KSH 
Number of NPLs 
As of December 
2013 
Value - As of 
December 2013 
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NPLs to micro-enterprise Number               KSH 
NPLs to small- enterprise s Number               KSH 
NPLs to medium-enterprise s Number               KSH 
NPLs to large- enterprise s Number               KSH 
 
8.2 Annual write-off due to non-performing business loans in 2013 
Annual write-offs due to non-performing 
loans.  Please express amount in KSH 
Number of write-
offs (in 2013) 
Value of write-
offs (in 2013) 
Write-offs on micro-enterprise loans Number               KSH 
Write-offs on small- enterprise  loans Number               KSH 
Write-offs on medium-enterprise loans Number               KSH 
Write-offs on large- enterprise loans Number               KSH 
 
 
 
8.3 Time and costs for recovering non-performing loans 
Loan Size 
Recovering NPLs 
Average number of 
days necessary to 
recover non-
performing loans 
Typical share of 
recovery 
Typical cost of recovery 
(% of loan value) 
Micro-enterprise loans  Days       %       %       
Small- enterprise  loans  Days       %       %       
Medium- enterprise  
loans 
Days       %       %       
Large- enterprise loans  
 
Days       %       %       
 
 
9 COLLATERAL REQUIRED AS PERCENTAGE OF LOAN GRANTED 
(AVERAGE) 
Please indicate the average value of collateral 
required per loan granted  
% of collateral 
required- As of 
December 2013   
Average % of collateral required for micro-
enterprise loans 
%       
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Average % of collateral required for small-
enterprise loans 
  %       
Average % of collateral required for medium-
enterprise loans 
  %       
Average % of collateral required for large-
enterprise loans 
  %       
 
 
10 SECTORAL DISTRIBUTION OF BUSINESS LENDING (AS PER CBK 
COMPLETION NOTES) 
  MIs SEs MEs LEs 
 Agriculture       KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Manufacturing        KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Real Estate        KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Building and 
Construction  
      KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Trade       KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Transport & 
Communication 
      KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Restaurant, hotel and 
tourism  
      KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Finance and business 
Services 
      KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Energy and Water       KSh       KSh       KSh       Ksh 
 Mining and Quarrying       KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
 Total:       KSh       KSh       KSh       KSh 
11  INNOVATIONS IN THE BUSINESS FINANCE SEGMENT 
 
Has there been a change between 2011 and 2013 in the products you offer to businesses at 
your institution? [Put an X (by clicking on the box) next to the appropriate response.] 
☐ Yes 
☐ No 
a) If yes, please specify how [put an X (by double-clicking on the box) next to the 
appropriate response(s)] and list affected products. 
☐ Elimination of products. List products: 
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☐ Offering of new products. List products: 
☐ Relative importance of some products has declined.  List products: 
☐ Relative importance of some products has increased.  List products: 
12 DEFINING ENTERPRISES – WAY FORWARD 
One of the key objectives of this study is to propose a standardized way to define micro, small, medium 
and large enterprises across financial institutions. The new definition will be based on the results of 
this study and the following discussions between banks, the CBK and FSD-Kenya.  In your view, which 
of the following options are the most appropriate\feasible and easy ways to define micro, small, 
medium and large enterprises in your institution? Please click on the answers that you find most 
relevant and comment in the box below. 
    
Micro 
enterprises 
Small 
enterprises 
Medium 
enterprises 
Large 
enterprises 
☐ Number of employees  
 From      
To       
 From        
To       
 From        
To       
 From        
To       
☐ Annual business turnover 
 From      
To       
 From        
To       
 From        
To       
 From        
To       
☐ Annual account turnover 
 From      
To       
 From        
To       
 From        
To       
 From        
To       
☐ Asset size 
 From      
To       
 From        
To       
 From        
To       
 From        
To       
☐ Loan size 
 From      
To       
 From        
To       
 From        
To       
 From        
To       
☐ 
Government definitions such as 
the Single Business Permit (SBP) 
code         
☐ Other 1: Specify 
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